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viiiForeword
S
ince early 1996, IFPRI’s Trade and Macroeconomics Division has been working with
country-based and international collaborators on a multiyear research project entitled
Macroeconomic Reforms and Regional Integration in Southern Africa (MERRISA),
with funding from Danida and German Agency for Technical Cooperation.  The project com-
prised two interlinked components: a set of six in-depth country studies on Malawi, Mozam-
bique, South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe, and a study of regional integration
possibilities and the impact of global trade reform on the study’s subject countries. 
MERRISA’s central hypothesis was that agricultural growth and transformation are cru-
cial in generating sustainable and equitable growth in southern African economies.  But the
key question was why various reform programs had failed to generate stronger responses by
African agricultural sectors—especially smallholder sectors. MERRISA was specifically de-
signed to examine a variety of macroeconomic and trade policy reform packages for their
ability to enhance agricultural performance and contribute to economic growth and poverty
reduction.
This volume comprehensively reports the results of the country study on Mozambique. It
represents ongoing collaboration between IFPRI’s Trade and Macroeconomics Division and
a research group based at the Development Economics Research Group (DERG) within the
University of Copenhagen’s Institute of Economics.  Close links were also established with
Mozambican researchers at the Research Office of the Ministry of Planning and Finance in
Maputo, and, in the later stages of the project, with Purdue University. 
In line with the methodology and organization of country studies under MERRISA, this
report incorporates both historical analysis and formal modeling.  Historical records provide
invaluable information on past policies and actual country performance. Historical analysis
cannot, however, establish the strength of causal relationships between policy instruments and
outcomes. The modeling approaches used in this study, including computable general equi-
librium (CGE) modeling, enable the specification of important multisectoral linkages that op-
erate simultaneously and interactively within the national economy.  The models also incor-
porate special structural features that reflect southern African characteristics, such as home
consumption and high transportation and transaction costs on staples like cassava and maize. 
Underpinning the modeling is an economywide database, a social accounting matrix
(SAM), that emphasizes the agricultural sector and different household groups.  The SAM in-
tegrates national income, input-output, flow-of-funds, and foreign trade statistics into a com-
prehensive and consistent data set, thereby illustrating that, even in “data-poor” contexts,
much can be done in terms of quantitative economic analysis. To facilitate the estimation of
a consistent SAM, IFPRI developed a new estimation approach during the 1990s that allows
the incorporation of errors in variables, inequality constraints, and prior knowledge about any
ixpart of the SAM. This entropy methodology—further developed in this study—deserves at-
tention because it provides an efficient approach of incorporating data from scattered sources
into a consistent framework.
The more wide-ranging benefit of MERRISA’s Mozambique country study is its broad
perspective on the economywide effects of agricultural growth and its contribution to the un-
derstanding of potential macroeconomic policies in achieving more rapid, equitable, and sus-
tainable growth in Mozambique and the surrounding region.  The report confirms the impor-
tance of the agricultural sector in any satisfactory development process in Mozambique. Agri-
cultural development is key to achieving the twin goals of growth and improved income dis-
tribution. The report also demonstrates that the successful implementation of such a strategy
relies heavily on both appropriate government action and active donor support.  
The authors outline what can be gained by making better use of available knowledge,
tools, and data systems in one of the poorest countries in the world.  Importantly, while the
analyses in this volume are specific to Mozambique, the analytical approach is applicable to
a series of countries both within and outside Africa. As such, this report’s research results and
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Summary
F
ollowing Mozambique’s economic collapse in 1986, the country began a wide-rang-
ing process of reform, with the support of the international community. The diagnosis
was of an economy that failed to maintain monetary control, consumed beyond its
means, focused production excessively on nontraded goods, and relied on inefficient and in-
flexible microeconomic structures. Nevertheless, Mozambique was also at war. The pace of
stabilization and structural adjustment quickened after 1992, when, concurrent with the de-
mise of apartheid, civil strife finally came to an end. After more than 10 years of adjustment,
the reform program has now been essentially implemented. Yet, this does not imply, as shown
in this study, that sufficient conditions for sustained economic development are in place.
Mozambique remains very poor, and even under highly optimistic assumptions about the fu-
ture, the development process is set to last for decades.
This report attempts to respond to some of the basic development challenges facing
Mozambique and to provide both qualitative and quantitative insights for policymaking in the
years to come. Throughout, the issues addressed are approached from an economywide per-
spective.
This study forms a part of the multicountry research initiative, Macroeconomic Reforms
and Regional Integration in Southern Africa. This initiative covers six countries in the region
and pays particular attention to the evaluation of the merits of alternative development strate-
gies. The choice and design of an appropriate development strategy is by no means immedi-
ately evident for any developing country. However, for a country with abundant arable land
and scarce human and physical capital, such as Mozambique, the role of agriculture in de-
velopment is particularly interesting. In keeping with the focus on agriculture, a social ac-
counting matrix (SAM) for 1995, with significant agricultural sector detail, was constructed
as part of this study. The SAM contains 40 activities, including 13 agricultural and 2 food-
processing activities, 3 factors of production, and 2 households (urban and rural). It captures
two innovative but fundamental features of the Mozambican economy: high marketing costs
for domestic, imported, and exported goods; and the significant prevalence of home con-
sumption, particularly for rural households.
The report begins by putting the economic and social characteristics of Mozambique in
regional perspective, tracing the historical path to economic collapse and providing a detailed
analysis and assessment of the stabilization and structural adjustment program. The study
shows that the program successfully stabilized inflation and markedly augmented reliance on
market forces. Relative macroeconomic stability combined with the high and stable (reported)
investment level give rise to optimism for the future. Indeed, economic growth has been rel-
atively rapid since 1992. Still, recovery from a low point resulting from the war, drought, and
prior economic mismanagement has been a major aspect of the turnaround. Underlying realxiv SUMMARY
development constraints remain much the same and the more difficult development chal-
lenges lie ahead.
The 1995 SAM provides a picture of the structure of the economy. It is used to highlight
the importance of agricultural development through a series of traditional SAM-based multi-
plier analyses. These analyses show that agriculture has large sectoral multiplier effects rela-
tive to nonagriculture and that applying scarce capital to agriculture is generally more effec-
tive than applying it to industry and services. The SAM also forms the basis for a static com-
putable general-equilibrium (CGE) model with an unusually solid empirical foundation in
terms of its model parameter values and structure, including a maximum entropy approach to
parameter estimation for CGE models. This approach applies information theory to estimat-
ing parameters in a system of nonlinear simultaneous equations. The trade parameter esti-
mates obtained point strongly to the need for development efforts to aid in the transformation
of domestic output into export products. Moreover, the CGE model is capable of capturing
many key aspects of the performance of the Mozambican economy in the postwar period.
The CGE model is used in a series of concrete analyses in which attention focuses on the
impact and design of economic policy. The challenges addressed are: aid dependency, the
price incentives facing the agriculture sector, agricultural technology and marketing margins,
risk-reducing behavior and gender roles in agricultural production, and food aid distribution.
Avariety of insights emerge, including, for example, that priority should be given to simulta-
neous improvement in agricultural productivity, especially in small-scale farming, and in mar-
keting infrastructure to reduce marketing costs. Another key example is that technological
change in cassava appears to be a particularly strong lever for increasing female and overall
household welfare. In general, the results in this report suggest a strong potential for 
agricultural-led development with attractive distributional implications, provided adequate
policy measures are taken. The results also suggest that the negative effects of unavoidable
natural calamities can be minimized if appropriate schemes for distributing food aid are put
in place.
While the static CGE model developed in this study is capable of providing many policy-
relevant insights, it cannot be relied on as a guide in budgetary planning within a medium-
term framework. This task is important in Mozambique, which is saddled with considerable
international debt. For this reason, a set of coherent macroeconomic medium-term scenarios
for Mozambique was developed on the basis of standard World Bank and International Mon-
etary Fund simulation tools. While widely used within these institutions, the projection mod-
els are less well-known elsewhere, and in Mozambique there is an evident gap in applying
them so that both sides of the policy negotiation table are equally in command of analytical
results and insights. For this reason, a merged version of these tools is laid out in some detail,
and three different scenarios are elaborated on. The importance of debt relief and access to in-
ternational capital markets in underpinning economic development in Mozambique stand out.
Nevertheless, the merged-model framework does not provide critically important information
on distributional issues and relative prices. For this reason, Chapter 13 presents a simple, but
innovative, SAM methodology for integrating macroeconomic and CGE models. This frame-
work is subsequently applied to integrate the merged and the static CGE model into a dynamic
CGE model with an aggregated financial sector. This model amounts to a modern simulation
tool that accounts for relative prices and income distribution. Given the growing availability
of SAMs for a wide range of developing countries, it is argued that data requirements can in
many cases be fulfilled in practice without major difficulty. Implementation of the proposed
CGE model is therefore not only desirable but a feasible operational proposal for how to movebeyond the simple framework widely used by the World Bank and the International Monetary
Fund.
Finally, this study aims to demonstrate that sophisticated analytical tools can be of signif-
icant value, even in “data-poor” situations. The need for a clear perspective and in-depth un-
derstanding of the socioeconomic complexities of the country in question stands out. How-
ever, while the analyses in this report are Mozambique specific, the basic analytical approach
is replicable and could be brought to bear on other countries both within and outside Africa.
SUMMARY  xvCHAPTER 1
Introduction
F
ew nations have endured the tumultuous changes that have characterized Mozambique
in the past three decades. The combined legacies of colonialism, idealism, socialism,
war fuelled by racism, economic collapse, and structural adjustment (inspired by stout
liberalism) have made a lasting impact on the structure of the economy. In the early 1990s,
Mozambique was frequently referred to as “the poorest country in the world.” Reasonable
economic growth performance since 1992 combined with economic disasters elsewhere has
put an end to this unwanted distinction. Nevertheless, the country remains poor by almost any
measure.
In economywide studies, such as this report, social accounting matrices (SAMs) and com-
putable general-equilibrium (CGE) models have become important analytical workhorses.
These basic frameworks have by now been applied fairly frequently in the African context.
For example, Sahn, Dorosh, and Younger (1996) applied a SAM/CGE approach to investigate
the impact of structural adjustment on poverty in a number of African countries. They con-
cluded that, in most countries, adjustment policies have not hurt and may have helped the poor.
These conclusions are widely contested. De Maio, Stewart, and van der Hoeven (1999) argue
that the core result is a reflection of the assumptions made in developing the CGE models
rather than of reality. Our study attempts to advance the state of the art in CGE modeling of
African economies and, as such, implicitly addresses some (but certainly not all) of the criti-
cisms advanced by de Maio, Stewart, and van der Hoeven.
The analyses conducted in this study run the gamut from the standard (such as descriptive
analysis, SAM construction, and multiplier analysis); to the recent (such as estimation of SAM
coefficients based on information theory, merged real and financial sector simulation model-
ing, and incorporation of risk in a CGE model; to the novel (such as explicit incorporation of
home consumption in a SAM/CGE framework, examination of gender issues in a CGE model,
development of a new method for estimation of critical model parameters, and the treatment
of macroeconomics in dynamic CGE models). The research aims to demonstrate that sophis-
ticated tools can be of significant value, even in data-poor situations.
Afurther word on data and methodologies is merited. Economic collapse and war were not
kind to data-gathering systems in Mozambique. One might construe that this study should
have been delayed until improved data systems had been established. We reject this conjec-
ture. We do not believe that scattered and potentially inconsistent data sources necessarily
imply simplistic analysis. Often, fundamental decisions must be made fairly early in a newly
relaunched development process, such as the one ongoing in Mozambique, and those 
This chapter was written by Channing Arndt and Finn Tarp.
1decisions should be made using the best
possible analysis. Also, advanced tools now
exist to extract information from scattered
or inconsistent data sources, and these tools
were employed to develop a fairly detailed
and consistent image of the economy. As
new data emerge, they can be relatively eas-
ily incorporated into the analytical frame-
works put forward here for updated eco-
nomic analyses.
We take as a point of departure the need
for moving on from stabilization and ad-
justment to focusing on transformation and
development. As such, we try to respond to
the signpost outlined in the work by Cornia
and Helleiner (1994). They argue that it is
time to call a formal end to the decade of
“structural adjustment,” agree that there are
no economic “quick fixes” for Africa, and
reactivate the development debate. This de-
bate is, in their view and ours, nowhere near
“the end of its history.” Another signpost,
the so-called Berg Report (World Bank
1982), is widely regarded as the seminal
document in launching the era of structural
adjustment. Despite its general focus, the
Berg Report recognized up front that the
policy changes recommended were basi-
cally short-run. Perhaps obscured by the
considerable difficulties encountered in the
implementation of structural adjustment
programs throughout Africa, the same re-
port also highlighted the critical importance
of long-run investments and programs that
must form part of a coherent development
strategy. The report placed particular em-
phasis on agricultural research, infrastruc-
ture, and human resources—a view echoed
in this study.
After more than 10 years of structural
adjustment in Mozambique the program
has, essentially, been implemented. How-
ever, more-or-less complete implementa-
tion of the structural adjustment program
does not imply that sufficient conditions for
sustained economic development are in
place, and long-run strategy debate should
now take center stage. For a country with
abundant arable land and scarce human and
physical capital such as Mozambique, the
role of agriculture is of particular interest.
This report pursues this approach with the
working hypothesis that the agricultural
sector is crucially important in any work-
able development strategy.
2 CHAPTER 1CHAPTER 2
Economic and Social Structure in 
Perspective
T
his chapter argues that, although Mozambique is currently among the world’s least de-
veloped countries as judged by most economic and social indicators, the country has
good prospects for sustained and broad-based growth.
Mozambique’s excellent natural harbors along the Indian Ocean are among the best in
Africa, and they make the country an important provider of transport and services in southern
Africa. Moreover, population density (20 people per square kilometer) is quite low (Table
2.1).
1 The population census carried out in 1997 found a population of 15.3 million, compared
with the 18.3 million projected from the previous census, which was taken in the 1970s. Se-
vere food insecurity, disease, and migration caused by war and natural disasters (see Chapter
3) account for the difference.
Mozambique’s role as a regional transport provider emerged during its colonial days (see
Chapter 3 for more detail), and regional transport dominates physical infrastructure and the
modern part of the economy. While Mozambique is relatively well connected to its neighbors,
domestic transport of people and goods is costly and cumbersome. Road and rail networks
have expanded east to west, linking the harbors of Maputo, Beira, and Nacala with the min-
ing and industrial centers of South Africa, Zimbabwe, and Malawi. However, infrastructure
for north–south domestic transport and trade is poor: rail links are completely lacking, and per-
manent roads minimal.
Estimates vary as to how much land in Mozambique is cultivable. The World Bank (1996)
records that 46 percent of Mozambique’s land area is cultivable, providing on average around
12 to 13 hectares to the country’s 3 million farm families. Much of this land is not yet used.
Mozambique has ample water resources from rainfall and river systems, especially in the cen-
tral and northern areas of the country. Major river systems include the Zambezi, Save, and
Limpopo rivers. These and other rivers hold the promise of developing intensive irrigated agri-
culture sometime in the future.
The agricultural sector consists of a large number of dispersed smallholders cultivating 95
percent of all farmland, with the remaining being cultivated by a limited number of large plan-
tations. Food production is dominated by cassava, maize, groundnuts, cowpeas, sorghum, and
millet, which account for some 80 percent of food energy intake at the national level. The main
This chapter was written by Rasmus Heltberg.
1Southern Africa is defined in this report as including Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique,
Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.
3export crops are cotton and cashews, grown
by smallholders. In addition, seafood is a
major export product.
Soils in Mozambique are of mixed qual-
ity. Prime agricultural land is in the northern
and central parts as well as in river valleys
throughout the country, where soils are fer-
tile and water-retentive. The principal
source of regional variation in cropping
practices is rainfall, which declines in quan-
tity and predictability from north to south.
The northern and central provinces have
relatively ample and reliable rainfall. The
southern provinces tend to have sandy, in-
fertile soils, except for river valleys and cer-
tain coastal plains; and rainfall is scarcer
and more irregular. Much of the southern
portion of Mozambique offers good pasture
land free from tse-tse fly, but water scarcity
can be a problem. Therefore, regular rain-
fall and fertile soils make for more intensive
agriculture in the central and northern por-
tions of the country, while extensive agri-
cultural practices prevail in most of the dry
south, which is subject to regular droughts
and floods. Variation in rainfall determines
the probability of crop failure and is there-
fore a major cause of food insecurity. In the
north, households report one to two months
of annual food insecurity whereas, in the
south, five months of food insecurity every
year is normal.
Mozambique has three main farming
systems. The relatively extensive agro-
pastoral practices in the southern areas 
resemble farming systems in Zimbabwe’s
dry lands. They are a response to frequent
droughts. Cattle stocks were decimated by
the war. On the dry lands, farmers operate a
substantial number of different machambas
(plots). In areas along rivers and close to the
coast, where soils are good and moisture is
plentiful, land is scarce and fallow periods
short. The more intensive and diversified
northern areas, where agroforestry is com-
mon, resembles southern Tanzania. Here,
farmers practice strategies of long-fallow
shifting cultivation of maize, sorghum, mil-
let, cassava, and other crops. Cashews and
cotton are the major cash crops and have
4 CHAPTER 2
Table 2.1  Comparative overview
Sub- High 
Southern Saharan South Latin income
Socioeconomic indicator Mozambique Africa Africa Asia America countries Year
Population density (people per square kilometer) 20 33 24 256 23 29 1994
Population in cities with more than 1 million 
people (percentage of total population) 14 7 8 10 28 33 1995
GNP per capita, atlas method (U.S. dollars) 80 1,293 490 350 3,320 24,930 1995
Life expectancy at birth, total (years) 46.5 56.0 52.2 61.3 69.1 77.3 1995
Mortality rate, infant (per 1,000 live births) 126 82 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 1995
Mortality rate, under five years 
(per 1,000 live births) 190 126 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 1995
Safe water (percentage of population with access) 28 56 47 63 80 94 1995
Sanitation (percentage of population with access) 23 46 n.a. 29 68 92 Latest
1990–95
Population growth 2.37 2.41 2.81 1.97 1.77 0.69 mean
Health expenditure, public (percentage of GDP) 4.6 3.0 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. Latest
School enrollment, primary (percentage of gross) 60 108 72 98 110 103 Latest
Illiteracy rate, adult (percentage of people 
over 15 years) 60 32 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. Latest
Fertilizer use (100 grams per hectare of arable land) 22 311 135 803 647 1,169 1994
Source: Fan, Zhang, and Robinson 2001. They constructed GDPs for the four economic sectors based on various China State Statistical Bu-
reau (SSB) publications.
Note: N.a. means not available.potential for expansion (World Bank 1996).
The highlands in the center of the country
share features with Malawi and Zimbabwe.
Maize, beans, and cassava are the major
food crops, and beans and potatoes the cash
crops. In the dry season, farmers cultivate
plots in valleys; and, in the rainy season,
rainfed plots in the uplands are cultivated.
In addition, a majority of urban families op-
erate machambas and many towns are sur-
rounded by green belts (MPF/EMU/IFPRI
1998).
The country has substantial potential
energy, water, forest, mineral, and marine
resources. Except for shrimp, all of these re-
sources are either underexplored or entirely
undeveloped. The Tete highlands hold 6 bil-
lion tons
2 of known coal reserves. At Panda,
large fields of natural gas are now being de-
veloped. There might be oil as well. Foreign
mining companies are prepared to invest in
these resources. In addition, the massive
hydroelectricity potential of the Zambezi,
which flows 819 kilometers through the
country, could make Mozambique a major
source of electric power for the region. It is
as yet untapped, except for the Cahora
Bassa dam, built by the Portuguese and
completed just before independence in
1974.
Despite more-or-less uncontrolled col-
lection of fuel wood, Mozambique still has
many hardwood forest reserves. Around 25
percent of Mozambique is thought to have
capacity for producing hardwood, eucalyp-
tus, and pine timber, and private investors
are expressing interest in developing this re-
source. Mozambique has important re-
serves of high-quality iron ore and of the
rare mineral tantalite, which is used in the
electronics and steel industry. It also has
some gold. Mozambique’s pleasant climate,
long beautiful beaches, and Indian Ocean
islands—including the United Nations Edu-
cational, Scientific, and Cultural Organiza-
tion (UNESCO) heritage site Mozambique




Throughout the first half of the 1990s,
Mozambique had a lower recorded average
income than any other country for which
World Bank data is available.
3 According
to the World Bank’s World Development
Indicators, Mozambique even held the
record as the world’s poorest country with a
gross national product (GNP) per capita of
US$80 in 1995 and 1996. According to the
national accounts from the National Insti-
tute of Statistics (NIS), which are relied on
in subsequent chapters, gross domestic
product (GDP) per capita was US$121 and
US$146 in 1995 and 1996, respectively. In
the WDI tables, Ethiopia, Tanzania, and
Zaire follow closely after Mozambique.
The huge disparities in GNP per capita in
southern Africa are evident (Figure 2.1).
The GNP per capita (unweighted means)
for southern Africa and for all of Sub-
Saharan Africa is much higher, at US$1,293
and US$490, respectively. When income
statistics are corrected for differences in
purchasing power—GDPadjusted for “pur-
chasing power parity” or PPP, an index used
to reflect the purchasing power of curren-
cies by comparing prices among a broader
range of goods and services than conven-
tional exchange rates—the differences in
nominal income shrink, but Mozambique
still remains the poorest country in the 
region.
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2Throughout this report, “ton” refers to the metric ton.
3The main data source for this section is the World Development Indicators in World Bank (1997b, 1998). The
advantage of the WDI data set is that it is comparable across countries and continents. The drawback is that the
WDI national accounts figures quoted in this chapter are inconsistent with figures in later chapters. For these rea-
sons, comparisons are made whenever appropriate and feasible. During the 1990s, the economy has
gone through a recovery process, analyzed
in detail in Chapter 4. Despite a severe
drought in 1991, real GDP growth over the
period 1990–97 averaged 7 percent per year
according to the WDI, and 5.1 percent ac-
cording to NIS figures. The Mozambican
growth rate is high by regional and Sub-
Saharan African standards. Growth has
been especially good in recent years—
including 1997, where it reached 12.5 per-
cent. Growth has been broad-based, with
manufacturing, transport, energy, and serv-
ices showing high levels of change. This
has been accompanied by a fall in inflation,
which reached a record low of 5.8 percent
in 1997, as reported by the International
Monetary Fund (IMF 1999).
Foreign aid is very important. Accord-
ing to the WDI, over the period 1990–96
Mozambique received, on average, foreign
aid corresponding to 92 percent of GNP. If
instead the NIS national account estimates
are used, foreign aid was around 46.6 per-
cent of GNP. In any case, Mozambique is
one of the most aid-dependent countries in
the world. In September 2001, Mozam-
bique reached the completion point under
the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries
(HIPC) initiative and had its external debt
stock reduced by around 75 percent.
In comparing the structure of produc-
tion in Mozambique to the Sub-Saharan av-
erage (Table 2.2), the picture depends again
on the data source. According to the WDI,
agriculture contributes 32.8 percent of GDP
and employs 83 percent of the population.
According to NIS figures, agricultural
value-added was 25.3 percent of GDP in
1996. As can be seen from Table 2.2, in the
average Sub-Saharan African country only
19 percent of GDP comes from agriculture,
with 68 percent of the population employed
there. The share of industry value-added in
GDP(for 1996) was 23.8 percent according
to the WDI. According to NIS, it was 20.8
percent. This is below the Sub-Saharan
Africa average of 27.2 percent. The service
sector produced 39.3 percent of GDP ac-
cording to WDI, and 51.2 percent according
to NIS. This paints the picture of an econ-
omy where most of the population survives
in subsistence agriculture, where the indus-






















Source : World Bank 1997b and 1998.behind, but still having important commer-
cial activities relating to transport services
both internally and with neighboring coun-
tries.
Social indicators give a gloomy image
of human development in Mozambique,
even before accounting for the Acquired
Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS)
pandemic. Life expectancy at birth is low
(46.5 years), even by African standards
(Table 2.1). Infant and under-five mortality
rates are high when compared with neigh-
boring countries. Out of 1,000 children, 126
die before age one and 190 die before they
reach the age of five—50 percent more than
the average for the region. The proportion
of population with access to safe water and
sanitation is low, at 28 and 23, respectively,
a key reason for poor health. Population is
estimated to be growing at a rate of 2.4 per-
cent per year, which is normal in the region
but high when compared with any other
continent.
4
Mozambique has made gains in human
development. This reflects the priority
given by the Frente de Libertação de
Moçambique (Frelimo) government to ex-
pand public health and education services.
Public expenditures on health constitute 4.6
percent of GDP in Mozambique, a larger
share than in any other southern African
country (Table 2.1). Yet, in this kind of
comparison, Mozambique’s low level of in-
come makes even modest health expendi-
tures in absolute terms look large.
Statistics on education show that the
great gains achieved in the immediate post-
independence period from a massive educa-
tion effort have been eroded because of the
war, with primary school enrolment stand-
ing at 60 percent in 1995, down from 99
percent in 1980. This 1995 level is low
compared with neighboring countries,
many of which have primary school enrol-
ment rates close to 100 percent, reflecting
alphabetization programs that span adult
populations. Secondary and tertiary educa-
tion have shown small improvements in en-
rolment (up to 7 percent and 0.5 percent, re-
spectively, from only 5 and 0.1 percent in
1980), but remain at very low levels. Not
surprising, Mozambique achieves a very
low score on the Human Development
Index of the United Nations Development
Programme—ninth from the bottom.
Structural Transformation
Certain regularities or standard features
stand out in development processes. A
key regularity is that, as countries grow,
they experience sectoral shifts in the 
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Table 2.2  Structure of production and employment, 1996
Value-added 
(percentage of GDP) Agricultural 
share of labor
Region/Country Agriculture Industry Services (percentage)
Sub-Saharan Africa (average) 19.0 27.2 46.6 68.0
Mozambique
World Development Indicators (WDI) estimate 32.8 23.8 39.3 83.0
National Institute of Statistics (NIS) estimate 25.3 20.8 51.2 n.a.
Source: Fan, Zhang, and Robinson 2001. They constructed GDPs for the four economic sectors based on var-
ious China State Statistical Bureau (SSB) publications.
Note: N.a. means not available.
4However, with a prevalence of Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) of about 12 percent of the adult popula-
tion, all human development indicators are set to decline dramatically. For example, NIS projects life expectancy
to decline to 35 years by 2010.composition of output and employment. In
their pioneering work, Chenery and
Syrquin (1975) studied this transformation
process on the basis of cross-sections of
countries. They worked with three stages of
economic transformation: primary produc-
tion, industrialization, and the developed
economy. They described regularities of
each stage—including shifts in the sectoral
composition of income, employment, and
trade—and analyzed the sources of growth.
Chenery, Syrquin, and Robinson (1986) ap-
plied and expanded the framework to study
a wide range of issues related to growth,
structural change, trade patterns, and devel-
opment strategy.
In this section, Chenery and Syrquin’s
regression analysis is repeated on a panel
data set that is multicountry and up-to-date.
The major difference from their work is the
use of a different and more recent data set
and the use of a GDP measure corrected for
differences in purchasing power across
countries. The results are used to illustrate
where Mozambique stands in the transfor-
mation process by comparing the data for
Mozambique with an average or standard
pattern of transformation derived from the
cross-country estimation. Mozambique is
also compared with the nine other countries
in southern African. The average cross-
country pattern estimated from the panel
data set is a useful benchmark for compari-
son. It captures the historical and cross-
sectional experience of a large number of
countries at different levels of development.
Panel data are cross-country and time-
series data that are pooled. The strategy is to
include observations on all the countries
with available data for the period 1980–96
or a part of the period. The model to be es-
timated—with a range of endogenous vari-
ables describing the processes of resource
accumulation, allocation, distribution, and
demographic change—is identical to Chen-
ery and Syrquin’s model:
Zit = α+β11n(Yit) + β2(1n[Yit])
2+β3(1n[Nit])
+ β4(1n[Nit])
2+ β5T1 + β6T2+ ui+εit
where the endogenous, Z, is expressed as a
share (for example, investment share of
GDP).
The explanatory variables are per capita
income, Y, and population size, N. Sub-
script i denotes countries, and t, years. Per
capita income is a measure of the stage of
development of the country. Population size
is a proxy for market size and scale
economies, taking account of the fact that
small and large countries develop differ-
ently. The variables T1 and T2 are time dum-
mies for the first and second half of the
1980s, respectively. T1 is equal to 1 for
1980–84 and to 0 in all other years, and T2
is equal to 1 in 1985–89 and to 0 in other
years. The reference period (no dummy de-
fined) is 1990–96. The variable ui is a 
country-specific error component estimated
with random effects, and εit is a random
error.
Analysis is carried out for the following
endogenous variables, chosen among those
used by Chenery and Syrquin (1975) and
for which information is readily available
for Mozambique: investment, saving, pri-
vate consumption, government consump-
tion, sector value-added (agriculture, indus-
try and services), education expenditures,
total imports, total exports, and service ex-
ports—all expressed as shares of GDP. In
addition, analysis is performed on enrol-
ment in primary school as a portion of the
total population in the relevant age group,
on the share of labor in agriculture and on
the degree of urbanization.
The equation is estimated in quadratic
logarithmic form to provide maximum flex-
ibility, as well as to avoid heteroscedastic-
ity. Using ratios on the left-hand side also
helps to mitigate problems of heteroscedas-
ticity. Chenery and Syrquin (1975) and Ch-
enery, Syrquin, and Robinson (1986) distin-
guish among countries according to their
size (large and small countries) and export
orientation (manufacturers and primary ex-
porters). This is not done here. Instead,
focus is limited to one overarching regres-
sion (for each of the endogenous variables)
8 CHAPTER 2for the entire sample of countries. This is
judged to be the best way to provide a sim-
ple yet powerful cross-country comparative
overview.
Data are taken from World Bank (1998),
in which data for 229 countries and territo-
ries are listed. After exclusion of missing
data, around 150 countries remain with
valid data. (The sample size and number of
countries vary across equations.) The panel
is unbalanced, since a number of countries
have valid data for a subset of the sample
period only. For income, GDP per capita in
constant 1987 U.S. dollars corrected for dif-
ferences in PPP is used. The advantage of
using the PPP measure of national income
is that it facilitates comparison across coun-
tries, by showing the real purchasing power
of per capita GDP. In fact, Chenery and
Syrquin had envisaged that use of PPP-
adjusted GDP measures would be a means
of improving their estimates once such a
data series became available.
Table 2.3 lists the results. Generally, 
the equations fit the data well, and the in-
cluded explanatory variables explain in a
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Table 2.3  Chenery–Syrquin regression results
Standard deviation
Sample
Dependent variable Ln Y (Ln Y)
2 Ln N (Ln N)
2 T
1 T
2 Constant size e u
Investment/GDP 39.62 -1.99 -4.6 0.20 1.45 -0.57 -147.78 2,194 5.08 8.45
(10.0) (9.1) (3.6) (3.4) (4.8) (2.0) (3.1)
Saving/GDP 29.27 -0.92 -2.56 0.15 2.36 0.80 -154.21 2,250 6.54 12.23
(4.7) (2.4) (0.6) (1.0) (6.6) (2.5) (3.5)
Imports/GDP 47.05 -2.97 -24.11 0.52 -3.02 -4.49 109.14 2,258 8.44 20.34
(4.8) (4.9) (2.9) (1.9) (5.4) (8.9) (1.4)
Exports/GDP 10.11 -0.20 -14.71 0.32 -2.84 -3.29 121.01 2,257 7.24 19.94
(1.3) (0.4) (1.9) (1.3) (6.4) (8.4) (1.7)
Agricultural value-added/GDP -47.29 2.34 -0.94 0.03 0.30 1.26 251.84 2,053 3.55 8.13
(15.8) (12.6) (0.3) (0.3) (1.8) (8.7) (9.2)
Industry value-added/GDP 20.37 -0.65 12.11 -0.31 3.10 0.94 -201.48 1,992 4.28 9.77
(4.9) (2.5) (3.1) (2.5) (13.3) (4.6) (5.7)
Service value-added/GDP 26.03 -1.61 -12.88 0.34 -3.34 -2.25 63.51 1,991 4.88 11.34
(5.5) (5.5) (3.1) (2.5) (12.7) (9.7) (1.7)
Private consumption/GDP -39.24 1.45 6.59 -0.23 2.62 1.00 241.13 2,219 6.22 13.56
(6.9) (4.1) (1.4) (1.5) (8.2) (3.5) (5.4)
Government consumption/GDP 9.09 -0.57 -4.12 0.08 0.03 0.13 25.64 2,280 3.44 5.48
(2.9) (2.9) (1.7) (1.1) (0.2) (0.8) (1.1)
Education spending/GDP 6.83 -0.40 2.33 -0.08 -0.04 -0.09 -40.97 624 0.91 1.75
(5.2) (4.9) (2.8) (3.0) (0.4) (1.1) (4.9)
Gross primary enrolment/
Population in relevant age group 64.06 -3.47 -25.4 0.82 -3.08 0.46 2.31 755 7.45 15.91
(6.1) (5.4) (2.9) (3.0) (4.0) (0.62) (2.3)
Birth rate  -7.33 0.54 20 -0.72 3.73 2.14 -83.22 1,384 1.92 15.17
(3.7) (4.4) (7.6) (8.5) (30.7) (19.4) (3.8)
Mortality rate -9.29 0.52 5.77 -0.22 0.80 0.28 14.34 1,383 0.93 4.48
(9.3) (8.6) (4.8) (5.7) (13.2) (4.9) (1.4)
Agricultural labor share -6.15 0.17 14.70 -0.66 -2.7 1.07 9.98 1,452 1.57 28.21
(2.99) (1.3) (3.9) (5.4) (17.9) (8.7) (0.3)
Urbanization 14.57 -0.72 18.4 -0.38 -3.77 -2.21 -212.86 2,441 2.32 25.68
(7.09) (5.68) (5.8) (3.6) (26.1) (19.6) (8.4)
Sources: Authors’ calculations based on the adjusted Chenery-Syrquin model and data from World Bank (1998).
Notes: Data indicate random effects estimation of equation 1; t–statistics are shown in parenthesis. ε is a random error term; u is the 
country-specific error component estimated with random effects.statistically significant way a substantial
part of the observed process of structural
change. The R-squared statistic is not a
good measure of fit in the random effects
model. Instead, the estimated standard er-
rors of ui and eit are reported.
The estimated functional relationships,
normally referred to as Kuznets curves,
were plotted (Figures 2.2 through 2.7). The
lines in the figures show the regression
functions from the random effect models.
The data points show the latest available
(normally 1996) actual value for 10 south-
ern Africa countries. Note that the marked
data points only represent a very small sub-
set of the total data points used to generate
the regressions. According to the WDI,
Mozambique’s PPP-adjusted GDP per
capita for 1996 is US$414, the lowest in the
region and third lowest worldwide. For ease
of exposition and comparability, only the
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Figure 2.2 Investment and savings regression results




Zambia. PPP means purchasing power parity—an index used to reflect the purchasing power of
currencies by comparing prices among a broader range of goods and services than conventional
exchangerates.MozambiqueappearswithaPPP-correctedGDPvalueof3701987U.S.dollarsbecause
fixedpricesareused.here (obviously the NIS national account
estimates would yield a somewhat different
picture).
The Kuznets curves are drawn for a
country with a population of 15.3 million to
provide comparability with Mozambique.
Hence, the vertical distance between the
data point for Mozambique and the regres-
sion line indicates the extent to which
Mozambique is different from the expected
or average, given its level of development
and population size. Hence, the figures are
useful for providing a comparative illustra-
tion of Mozambique’s current development
position both with respect to the “average”
long-run transformation process and with
respect to its neighbors in the region. For
the other countries, caution is necessary
when making vertical comparisons between
actual country data points and the 
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE IN PERSPECTIVE 11
















100 1,000 10,000 100,000
Per capita gross domestic product in constant PPP dollars










Zambia. PPP means purchasing power parity—an index used to reflect the purchasing power of






























AGOregression lines, since the lines depend on
population size and shift up or down ac-
cording to the population of each country.
The shift is largest for countries that are ei-
ther substantially larger (South Africa) or
smaller (Lesotho or Swaziland) than
Mozambique. The effect of population size
is most pronounced with respect to trade re-
lationships, where the import and export
propensities exhibit a strong tendency to
decline with size of the country. Most other
variables considered here are not very sen-
sitive to population size.
In terms of accumulation of physical
capital (Figure 2.2), the savings rate appears
to be increasing almost linearly with in-
come, while investment increases in a con-
cave functional form. Countries with low
and lower-middle incomes show a strong
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Zambia. PPP means purchasing power parity—an index used to reflect the purchasing power of
currencies by comparing prices among a broader range of goods and services than conventional
exchangerates.richer countries have a savings surplus. The
actual investment ratios for the southern
African countries for 1996 are plotted with
a dot; and actual savings, with a cross. It
can be seen that Mozambique, which in-
vests 48 percent of its GDP according to
WDI, has the largest investment ratio in the
region, substantially above the average at
its income level. With savings running at 
20 percent of GDP, it is clear that this ex-
traordinarily high level of investment is
only possible because of aid inflows.
Mozambique’s large investment rate may in
part be a result of aid donor reluctance to fi-
nance recurrent government expenditures.
The development pattern of trade (Fig-
ure 2.3) shows the import ratio to be first in-
creasing in income and later decreasing,
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Zambia. PPP means purchasing power parity—an index used to reflect the purchasing power of





GDPwhile the export ratio is increasing in in-
come throughout the relevant range. The re-
sult of subtracting the two lines is a pattern
of trade balance deficit at low levels of in-
come and surplus at higher levels, which is
consistent with the patterns of savings and
investment (Figure 2.2). Trade and savings
deficits at low levels of income are financed
by capital imports, which are, on average,
replaced by capital exports at higher levels
of per capita GDP. Chenery and Syrquin
(1975) reported the same in their data for
1950–70. Mozambique’s large aid volume
manifests itself as an export share that is
somewhat higher than the average, coupled
with an import share that is much higher
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Zambia. PPP means purchasing power parity—an index used to reflect the purchasing power of
currencies by comparing prices among a broader range of goods and services than conventional
exchangerates.MozambiqueappearswithaPPP-correctedGDPvalueof3701987U.S.dollarsbecause
fixedpricesareused.
Figure 2.6  Education regression results
















GDPStill, it is interesting that Mozambique’s
export performance appears relatively good
when evaluated in a framework like this
one. Mozambique exports a higher share of
its production than Malawi, Lesotho, and
South Africa. The size of the country mat-
ters a great deal for trade orientation. For
example, the international trade (exports
plus imports) of small Swaziland is very
high—around 90 percent of its GDP. As al-
ready mentioned, for countries much larger
or smaller than Mozambique the predicted
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Zambia. PPP means purchasing power parity—an index used to reflect the purchasing power of
currencies by comparing prices among a broader range of goods and services than conventional
exchangerates.MozambiqueappearswithaPPP-correctedGDPvalueof3701987U.S.dollarsbecause
fixedpricesareused.
Urban population share (1996) Labor force in agriculture (1996)
Percentage
of
populationrelationship is not well represented by the
plotted regression line. For South Africa,
with a population of 37.6 million, the pre-
dicted import share is 32 percent of GDPin-
stead of the 37 percent implied by the plot-
ted relationship based on Mozambique’s
population size.
In the plotted production structure (Fig-
ure 2.4), the Kuznets curves show a famil-
iar pattern. The share of industry value-
added strongly increases with income, the
agriculture share of value-added decreases
equally strongly, while the service sector
share of value-added increases at a slower
rate and tends to decline again at high lev-
els of income. This pattern is remarkably
similar to Chenery and Syrquin’s (1975)
findings. It appears that, although other as-
pects of economic structure and policy have
changed since their study, the factors driv-
ing the sectoral structure of production re-
main fundamentally the same.
The share of Mozambique’s value-
added derived from agriculture is 37 per-
cent (according to WDI). This is exceeded
only by Malawi within the region, but still
is less than expected for a country at its
level of development and population. In
contrast, and rather surprisingly, the share
of industry value-added is actually higher
than expected, at 24 percent, although this
is low by regional standards, where only
Malawi has a lower share of industry value-
added. Within the region, Mozambique and
Malawi stand out as rather similar, mainly
agricultural, producers with relatively little
industry. Mozambique’s share of service
value-added is 39 percent (not shown in
Figure 2.4), slightly lower than predicted.
This seems odd given the traditional role of
Mozambique as a service provider. It may
reflect the degraded state of service and
tourist infrastructure, which was not yet
fully rehabilitated in 1996, the year to
which the data refer. However, the share of
agricultural value-added was on a down-
ward trend during the economic recovery of
the 1990s. The service sector recovered
faster than agriculture.
As to the allocation of income between
private and government consumption (Fig-
ure 2.5), the average panel data pattern
shows that government consumption tends
to lie within a rising but fairly flat band—
roughly between 10 and 20 percent of GDP.
This is not very different from the level
found by Chenery and Syrquin (1975) for
1950–70. Mozambique’s share of govern-
ment consumption, at 12 percent, is the
lowest in its region and close to the ex-
pected. If in fact government recurrent
spending is being financed by donors over
the investment budget, this figure may well
understate the actual rate of government
consumption. Private consumption is de-
creasingly tied to income, which correlates
to the increasing savings rate (Figure 2.2).
Mozambique’s rate of private consumption
is similar to that of other countries in the re-
gion, although below the predicted value.
Another aspect of the accumulation
process is education (Figure 2.6). The
analysis of education is based on two data
series: enrolment in primary school and ed-
ucation spending as a share of GDP. Differ-
ences in the quality of education unfortu-
nately are not captured in this type of data.
The average pattern is that countries spend
an increasing share of their income on edu-
cation up to a point, after which spending
declines somewhat. Mozambique is spend-
ing considerably above the level predicted
by its GDP, but the high levels of education
spending do not as yet show up in the sta-
tistics on school enrolment for Mozam-
bique. Not only is the proportion of
Mozambican children attending school
slightly lower than predicted based on in-
come level (60 percent), it is also the lowest
in the region. The poor state of rural infra-
structure and the destruction of schools dur-
ing the war may account for the apparent
paradox of high education spending and
few children attending schools, although
16 CHAPTER 2enrolment rates are on the rise. Predicted
primary gross enrolment increases from 66
percent of children at Mozambique’s level
of income to slightly more than 100 percent
at Botswana’s and South Africa’s levels of
income.
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The strong education record of many
southern African countries is apparent (Fig-
ure 2.6). Zimbabwe, Swaziland, Namibia,
Botswana, and South Africa all spend more
than predicted on education, around 6 to 8
percent of GDP. Malawi and Zambia, in
contrast, spend several times less on educa-
tion and well below their predicted level.
Furthermore, with the exception of Mozam-
bique, all countries in the region are above
their predicted level for gross enrolment. 
It is interesting to compare the predicted
relationships in Figure 2.6 with the results
of Chenery and Syrquin (1975). On the
basis of data from 1950–70, they reported
much lower levels of enrolment at all in-
come levels—around 20 to 30 percentage
points below the enrolment curve in Figure
2.6. This probably reflects the increased
awareness worldwide, during recent
decades, of the importance of basic educa-
tion. Higher enrolment rates do not seem to
have translated into markedly higher educa-
tion spending than what Chenery and
Syrquin reported for 1950–70. If anything,
education spending in the poorest countries
has gone down since that period.
The last Kuznets curve is concerned
with demography and the distribution of the
labor force. The share of total labor force
employed in the primary sector and the de-
gree of urbanization (Figure 2.7) are closely
related, but not identical, measures. These
data further underscore the well-known fact
that the agricultural labor share (Figure 2.4)
decreases as development proceeds, al-
though at a decreasing rate. The decline in
primary sector employment is far less steep
than the decline in the sector’s share of
value-added. In Mozambique, the primary
sector employs 83 percent or more of the
workforce (according to 1990 data). This is
around 41 percentage points above the pre-
dicted share. This again demonstrates the
crucial importance of agriculture in em-
ploying people in Mozambique. It is inter-
esting to compare expected primary em-
ployment with the actual values for the
southern African region. With the exception
of South Africa, all the countries of the re-
gion have higher primary employment
shares than predicted by the random effects
model—many of them substantially.
6 This
may be related to the other finding that all
of southern Africa (except Botswana) is less
urbanized than predicted and by implication
has relatively low shares of employment in
industry and services.
The high degree of agricultural employ-
ment in southern Africa is striking when
comparing labor by sector (Figure 2.7) with
structure of production (Figure 2.4), which
indicates that most of the countries in the
region derive a comparatively low share of
total value-added (relative to the expected
at that income level) from the primary sec-
tor. This finding means that productivity per
worker in the primary sector is low in most
of the Southern African countries, not only
relative to other sectors, but also when com-
pared with the average pattern at similar
levels of development. Low productivity 
in agriculture translates into poverty 
and chronic food insecurity. Increased 
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5Primary gross enrolment is the proportion of all primary students to all primary school aged childred in the pop-
ulation. Percentages over 100 percent indicate that over-aged children are attending primary school. 
6The flat line for agricultural employment (Figure 2.7) reflects the choice of estimator. Use of ordinary least
squares (OLS) estimation results in a much steeper relationship, more in accordance with Chenery and Syrquin’s
findings (also based on OLS estimation). The random effects estimator is a weighted average using OLS and es-
timates from fixed-effect parameters, where the weights applied depend on the number of countries and the vari-
ances. In this particular regression, this procedure results in estimates very close to the fixed-effect estimates.agricultural productivity is a key priority
and would help raise incomes, enhance
food security, raise foreign exchange earn-
ings and provide momentum to the trans-
formation of the country.
Looking Ahead
Given favorable external and climatic con-
ditions and proper domestic policies, based
on the review in this chapter there would
seem to be chances for sustained, poverty-
alleviating growth—based on natural re-
sources—that could bring Mozambique’s
economic, social, and poverty indicators on
par with or in excess of the average for Sub-
Saharan Africa. Thus, a necessary, overall
policy objective over the coming years will
be to sustainably develop the country’s nat-
ural resource potential to provide export
earnings, employment, and government
revenue.
Production of food and cash crops can
increase either by expanding cultivated area
or by yield growth (production per hectare).
In spite of the generally plentiful land re-
sources, land constraints are emerging in
certain parts of the country (Tschirley and
Weber 1994; Marrule 1998). This under-
lines the importance of ensuring land tenure
rights. Average crop yields in Mozambique
are substantially lower than yields in other
African countries. By transferring success-
ful varieties and ensuring that fundamental
farming practices are improved through ex-
tension services it should be technically
possible to achieve a substantial yield
growth within a short period of time in
Mozambique. In addition to better technol-
ogy, agricultural development requires bet-
ter marketing channels, as further discussed
in Chapters 4, 9, and 10. Cost-effective and
competitive means of moving agricultural
products from farms to consumers (either
nationally or internationally) are needed to
integrate subsistence farmers into the cash
economy.
If appropriate policy action is backed by
sufficient investment from domestic and
foreign sources, the future of Mozambique
may indeed look bright, as explained in
Chapters 4 through 14. First, Chapter 3
places Mozambique’s experience in histori-
cal context.
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The Path to Economic Collapse
M
ozambican people of Bantu origin were in contact with Indonesian and Arab traders
as early as 300 A.D., and from 700 A.D. Mozambique became fully integrated into
the Indian Ocean trade network. From approximately 1100 A.D., trade increased;
Mozambican culture still bears distinct evidence of the Arab influence in this activity. Trade
in gold, particularly with the Shona kingdoms in present-day Zimbabwe—but also in ivory,
other metals, and hides—attracted the Portuguese. From 1505 the Portuguese became 
established at Sofala and started over the next 125 years to expand inland, especially up the
Zambezi.
The early colonial economic system, aside from trade in gold, was based on a so-called
prazo system whereby Portuguese settlers were granted land and absolute power and author-
ity over the local people. This system was abandoned before 1700, as indigenous resistance
toward the Portuguese pushed the colonialists out of rural areas. Yet, the rise in slave trade fol-
lowed soon after, and a variety of policies to ensure an ample supply of cheap labor were put
into place once slavery was officially abolished, around 1850. Portuguese colonialism inten-
sified at the end of the nineteenth century, but Portugal did not have sufficient capital and
power to enforce the occupation. This became possible instead through the investment of for-
eign capital and a variety of British, Rhodesian, and South African companies. These compa-
nies were given extensive concessions and administrative rights so that by 1917—when the
occupation was complete—Mozambique was to a large extent run by foreign capital.
Forced labor and taxes, which could only be settled in cash, were institutionalized by the
Portuguese. This left the rural populations with little alternative but to try to increase their pro-
duction of marketed crops, such as cashews and cotton, or work as wage labor on plantations,
in major investment programs in Mozambique, or in the mines in South Africa. Regarding
work wage, the colonial power received payments in gold directly from South Africa, whereas
the migrant mine workers, who in some periods amounted to 25 percent of the total active
male labor force, were paid in escudos at a much lower rate. With Mozambique’s unique ge-
ographical location, the Portuguese also managed to generate substantial amounts of foreign
currency receipts through the provision of transit services.
Soon after the Salazar government came to power in Portugal in the mid-1920s, substan-
tial numbers of Portuguese settlers were sent to Mozambique to work either as farmers or in
public and private services, including the marketing system. The presence of the large num-
ber of Portuguese settlers led to an increase in imports of consumer goods from Portugal. In
addition, some manufacturing industries were established. Yet they were—with the exception
This chapter was written by Channing Arndt, Henning Tarp Jensen, and Finn Tarp.
19of processing of agricultural export crops—
typically based on the manufacture of im-
ported raw materials, geared primarily to-
ward the needs of the Portuguese. Thus, ad-
jacent growth effects benefiting the local
population were relatively limited, although
their purchasing power and the supply of
manufactured goods did increase some-
what. In parallel, a tightening of the labor
law system meant that practically all
Mozambican men had to work at least six
months a year as unskilled wage labor until
the abolition of forced labor laws in 1961.
Finally, smallholder cash cropping
(cashews and cotton in particular) in-
creased, but this was because of pressure to
generate funds for tax payments.
Consequently, the traditional food-
producing activities in the rural sector (such
as cassava and maize) were increasingly
left in the hands of women and children.
Support services for food crop production
were absent, so the potential economic im-
pact of this sector was not developed. Focus
in agricultural research, extension, and mar-
keting was instead on export crops (includ-
ing, in addition to cashews and cotton,
crops such as sugar, tea, coconuts, and cit-
rus) and on food crop production under-
taken by commercial settlers and in large
plantations. Similarly, little credit reached
smallholders, who continued to be ex-
tremely dispersed.
Even by the standards of colonial ad-
ministration in Africa, little investment was
made in social infrastructure in Mozam-
bique, especially in the rural areas, and jobs
requiring even minimal skills were re-
stricted to Europeans. In other words, the
economy catered to the needs of the Por-
tuguese, who assumed responsibility for a
broad range of functions. Local people were
left without access to education and train-
ing, except for the teaching carried out by
missionaries. Thus, the accumulation of
human capital was extremely limited during
the colonial period, and black Mozambican
literacy remained at less than 10 percent
(Green 1991). Secondary and technical ed-
ucation grew after 1960, and a newly estab-
lished university enrolled up to 1,500 stu-
dents. Yet, these institutions almost exclu-
sively served the settler community, which
had gradually grown to approximately
200,000. As a result, at independence the
number of Mozambicans with university
training amounted to only approximately 40
according to the Food and Agriculture Or-
ganization of the United Nations (FAO
1982).
Regarding physical infrastructure, basic
communications were, as discussed in
Chapter 2, either lacking or designed to
connect the hinterland with the ports on the
coast. The north–south links within the
country were not developed, and neither
were marketing networks to move grain
from the surplus-producing areas in the
north to traditional food-deficit areas in the
south. Instead, the urban areas in the south
were in large part fed through imports of
wheat, which reached more than 100,000
tons per year before independence. The
country was generally self-sufficient in
maize and rice, and it appears that the rural
population practicing traditional agriculture
managed to maintain its self-sufficiency
conditions, except in emergency situations
or as a consequence of forced cash crop-
ping. Yet, calorie supplies were far below
nutritional requirements (FAO 1982).
The last 15 years of colonial rule were
characterized by the struggle for independ-
ence, particularly in the north; the removal
of much of the racially discriminating legis-
lation, such as the labor laws; the continued
inflow of Portuguese settlers; and an in-
crease in foreign investments. In addition,
Portugal was for the first time transferring
substantial financial resources to Mozam-
bique. Consequently, industries oriented to-
ward the internal market—such as food
processing, textiles, and machinery and
equipment—increased much more than in-
dustries geared toward exports. Moreover,
the focus in the composition of imports
shifted from consumption to capital goods.
Hence, this period saw capital accumulation
20 CHAPTER 3and growth until 1973, but the boom rested
on relatively shaky political and economic
foundations. Accordingly, the basic con-
tours of the colonial system outlined above
remained unchanged. Thus, the economy
depended heavily on imports and rested on
agricultural exports, migrant worker remit-
tances, and transit and tourist services.
Added to this were widespread administra-
tive controls (reviewed further below) and a
phenomenal reliance on Portuguese human
capital.
The struggle for liberation from the
colonial power gained its modern expres-
sion with the formation of the liberation
movement, Frelimo, in 1962. The initial
outlook was based on the general winds of
change, which swept the African continent,
and the movement was in essence constitu-
tionalist and nonviolent. However, Frelimo
opted for armed battle from 1964, under the
leadership of its first president, Eduardo
Mondlane, and with military and material
support from Eastern Europe and some
African countries. The Nordic countries and
the Netherlands gave humanitarian assis-
tance, whereas many western countries sup-
ported the Portuguese colonial power.
Mondlane was assassinated in 1969,
shortly after the Second Congress of the
Frelimo party in 1968, and was succeeded
by the charismatic Samora Moises Machel.
Frelimo effectively controlled a third of the
country, mainly in the north, and had pene-
trated as far south as the Manica and Sofala
provinces when the Portuguese Armed
Forces overthrew the Portuguese govern-
ment in April of 1974. An agreement was
reached shortly after in Lusaka that
Mozambique would become independent
on June 25, 1975, under the leadership of
Frelimo.
During the 1974–75 transition period
and the first year of independence, some 90
percent of the settlers, or an estimated
200,000 people, left Mozambique. This left
the country with deserted and damaged cap-
ital stock and seriously depleted numbers of
skilled and semiskilled workers as well as
experienced professionals and administra-
tors. Moreover, external service and tourist
receipts started dropping dramatically.
South Africa took steps to cut back severely
the number of migrant laborers, abolish the
gold payments of miners’ deferred wages,
and divert transit cargo elsewhere. Mozam-
bique also incurred heavy financial losses
because of the application of the United Na-
tions Resolution on Sanctions against
Southern Rhodesia and Support to the Pa-
triotic Front.
The events described above clearly
highlight the vulnerable situation of the
Mozambican economy after independence,
including the dependence of the balance of
payments on migrant labor and transport
services to neighbors, which viewed the
changes in Mozambique with hostility. In
1975–77, the attention of key—but very in-
experienced and, in some cases, rather dog-
matic—policymakers focused on trying to
come to grips with the management of the
economy, including specifically feeding the
cities, particularly in the southern part of the
country; dealing with the balance of pay-
ments squeeze; arresting the economic de-
cline of the years immediately proceeding
independence; and planning for the future
on the basis of socialist principles. The last
was based on the assumption that industry
should be a leading sector, with agriculture
playing a more passive supporting role.
Thus, the early post-independence years
can be described as a period of crisis man-
agement. In spite of the enormous difficul-
ties of the hectic transition, these years were
also full of idealistic optimism and a sense
of national reconstruction and consolida-
tion, fueled by the speed with which Fre-
limo came to power. Added to this, eco-
nomic decline immediately before and after
1975 was actually halted (Green 1991), and
a recovery started during 1977–81 helped
by foreign capital inflows (FAO 1982;
World Bank 1996).
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Socialism, and Central 
Planning
At independence, a new constitution was
introduced with a 230-member People’s
Assembly as supreme state authority. Yet,
effective control of the highly centralized
political and executive system of govern-
ment was vested in the dominant organ of
the ruling Frelimo party, the 10-member
Standing Political Committee. The drive to-
ward centralized decisionmaking in these
years appeared for many—at both national
and international levels—to be the only
practical way out. The departure of the Por-
tuguese left an administrative vacuum in
Mozambique, which had also been tightly
governed during colonial times.
Government intervention in agricultural
pricing and marketing, for example, was
well established in pre-independence
Mozambique. The colonial Portuguese gov-
ernment set producer and consumer prices
as well as marketing margins for an exhaus-
tive list of products at the various stages of
the production and marketing chain. Pro-
ducer prices were differentiated according
to origin (by region) and quality, and profit
margins varied by groups of products and
marketing agents. Finally, a state marketing
board for cereals, which acted as wholesaler
and operated a network of warehouses, had
been created in the 1960s. The political pre-
mium on keeping prices stable in post-
independence Mozambique was no doubt
considerable. Therefore, it is hardly surpris-
ing that Frelimo initially chose to adopt this
price-setting and marketing system—
although in an expanded, yet simplified
form, where panterritorial pricing was ap-
plied.
The focus on centralized decision-
making was also in line with the ideological
preferences of the members of the new gov-
ernment. They were obviously influenced
by their experiences during the liberation
struggle, where the only material support
came from Eastern European countries, in
combination with a dedication to the pro-
motion of national unity and the elimination
of colonial exploitation and domination.
Accordingly, the rationale for government
intervention started changing, and subse-
quent policy actions were conceived within
the framework of a centrally planned econ-
omy. All land, banks, schools, and medical
services were nationalized; and administra-
tors were appointed by the state to run the
more than 2,000 abandoned commercial
farms and industrial companies.
The desirability of these initial steps
was strongly reaffirmed by the Third Con-
gress of Frelimo in 1977. On the same oc-
casion, the establishment of a people’s
democracy and the construction of the ma-
terial and ideological basis for a socialist
society became basic political aims. The
Congress also outlined the strategy and
policies for a radical transformation of 
socioeconomic structures (Frelimo 1977).
Focus was put squarely on the role of the
state in savings, investment, production and
trade, and the annual central state plan—the
so-called Plano Estatal Central—which
contained detailed investment and output
targets that acquired the status of law. Meet-
ing targets, set by the central planning au-
thorities, became obligatory, with little ref-
erence to costs and profits, and state control
started permeating almost all commercial
activities in the economy. Private compa-
nies remained in existence, but as small-
scale entities subject to strict regulation.
Four key programs, which were further
detailed in the 10-year Indicative Perspec-
tive Plan, Plano Prospectivo Indicativo,
launched in December of 1981 (Govern-
ment of Mozambique 1981), made up the
core of the longer-term development strat-
egy. This strategy comprised creation and
development of heavy industry, develop-
ment of a state agricultural sector, coopera-
tive transformation of the countryside, and
massive human resource development. The
plan was meant to ensure that the 1980s
would be the “decade for the victory over
underdevelopment.” Annual GDP growth
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fold increase in agricultural production by
1990 were hoped for. Accordingly, the in-
vestment component of the plan was formi-
dable, and a series of projects that were
highly capital-intensive were pursued, in-
cluding plants to produce iron and steel,
aluminum, chemicals, fertilizers, paper, and
heavy engineering goods (Economist Intel-
ligence Unit 1996).
In the rural sector, government started
to make tenuous efforts at transforming the
countryside. The provision of public serv-
ices to the dispersed rural population was
expanded in a remarkable manner in the
late 1970s to make a real breakthrough in
smallholders’ livelihood (Tarp 1984). Nu-
merous communal villages were estab-
lished to help in this process. Nevertheless,
focus in the allocation of investment re-
sources in the agricultural sector remained
on the state farms. Safeguarding the infra-
structure left behind by the Portuguese ap-
peared a sensible goal to strive to achieve,
and further consolidation and expansion
was enthusiastically planned with the assis-
tance of large numbers of foreign advisers
from Eastern European countries as well as
a range of multilateral and bilateral donor
agencies (FAO 1977).
The state farms were meant to serve as
centers of excellence for the promotion of
rural development in their respective areas
of influence. They were also expected to
provide badly needed employment as well
as urban food supplies and export products,
underpinning in this way the government’s
transformation strategy. Yet, Mozambique
completely lacked the necessary human and
capital resources to achieve growth rates
such as those foreseen in the Indicative Per-
spective Plan. Investments did not yield ex-
pected economic returns, and a critical for-
eign debt burden started accumulating.
Moreover, the inability of the government
to provide adequate support on a continu-
ous basis for smallholder development
gradually started affecting confidence in
Frelimo.
With the benefit of hindsight, the over-
all economic development strategy decided
upon at the Third Congress can certainly be
assessed as misguided. This was not, how-
ever, quite as obvious at the time, given the
overall political Cold War climate and the
relative macroeconomic stability, which
meant that centrally planned, state-led de-
velopment appeared as an option—which it
does not today. Moreover, urban bias as tra-
ditionally defined was not characteristic of
this period. This is evidenced not only by
the investments made in rural development
and state farm units already referred to
above, but also by the fact that real agricul-
tural producer prices in Mozambique were
in 1981 and 1982 significantly above the
1976 level for all crops (Tarp 1990). 
The Fourth Congress of 
Frelimo and the Economic
Action Program
Frelimo had already started, during the
preparations of the Fourth Congress held in
April of 1983, to reassess previous eco-
nomic policies and the general economic,
social and geopolitical situation of the
country. The government readily recog-
nized that the course of events was most
distressing, and that previous economic 
policy—which had generated an inefficient
use of resources, in particular in the infla-
tionary environment that started to develop
after 1981—had to be revised (Frelimo
1982, 1983). Attention was drawn to the
neglect of the smallholder farm subsector in
the allocation of basic inputs and invest-
ment resources. The government identified
“giantism” of state farms, excessive central-
ization of decisionmaking, and the manage-
ment system’s rigidity and inability to ad-
just quickly to changing needs as the main
problems to be resolved. It also recognized
that planning as so far practiced, on the
basis of a set of material balances, had left
the economic system inflexible and ex-
tremely vulnerable to exogenous shocks in-
volving sudden decreases in efficiency of
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duction. Attention was furthermore called
to the need for taking account of overall
macroeconomic resource constraints.
Consequently, Frelimo called for a re-
ordering of priorities and the preparation of
an economic action program for the
1984–86 period. Mozambique committed
itself to initiating a set of reforms, including
greater economic flexibility and decentral-
ization as well as reliance on market forces.
The country put renewed emphasis on the
importance of the smallholder sector. Pri-
vate initiative was to be promoted in all sec-
tors of the economy, and reforms were in-
stituted in labor legislation and in the regu-
lation of foreign investment. The govern-
ment also took measures to strengthen pub-
lic finances, including curtailing the mount-
ing deficits of state farms. Anew system for
management of foreign currency was intro-
duced that, among other things, made it
legal for companies to retain some foreign
currency earnings. Moreover, export re-
sponsibility was delegated from the central
state export company, Empresa Nacional de
Comercialisação Moçambicana (ENA-
COMO), to some of the factories or pro-
cessing companies for crops such as cotton,
cashews, and tea.
The government also promoted the role
of the private sector in marketing, stressing
that the state marketing company Agricom,
which purchased around 40 percent of the
total amount of crops marketed, should act
as a buyer of last resort and not as a monop-
sonist in the procurement of crops from
smallholder farmers. Moreover, nominal
consumer and agricultural producer prices
were raised significantly; and prices of
some crops, such as fruits and vegetables,
were liberalized. Producer incentives also
came more into focus as an issue and over-
all objective—exemplified partly through
the increasing use of the rural terms of trade
as a criterion in price setting, and partly
through preoccupation with the availability
of consumer items.
Nevertheless, the measures actually
taken were not sufficient to reverse the neg-
ative economic trend, and the centralized
control and structure of the economy re-
mained intact. Hostilities in rural areas es-
calated, as further discussed below; and the
government was forced to rely on direct ad-
ministrative allocation of resources, as is
normally the case in circumstances of war.
Thus, despite the pragmatic guidelines em-
anating from the Fourth Congress and sum-
marized in an action plan, relatively little
could in fact be done. In spite of a decisive
political move by Samora Machel to stop
the war by signing the “Nkomati Accord
between the Governments of South Africa
and Mozambique” in 1984, South African
backing of the rebel movement Resistencia
Nacional de Moçambique (Renamo) con-
tinued unabated.
Economic Collapse
Misguided economic policy was not the
only force undermining economic progress
after the Third Congress in 1977. Mozam-
bique became a vocal member of the group
of frontline states in opposition to the
Rhodesian and South African governments,
and by the early 1980s Renamo initiated se-
rious efforts to topple the Frelimo govern-
ment. Renamo had been created by the
white regime in Rhodesia in the late 1970s,
but was mainly financed and trained by
South Africa after Zimbabwe gained inde-
pendence in 1980. The South African
apartheid regime’s backing of Renamo
formed part of the overall regional strategy
to destabilize neighboring countries; and
the social, human, and economic impact of
the war can only be characterized as disas-
trous. A 1988 U.S. State Department report
(the so-called Gersony report) led U.S. offi-
cials to conclude that what happened in
Mozambique was one of the most brutal
holocausts against ordinary people since the
World War II.
The United Nations Children’s Fund
(UNICEF 1989) estimates were shocking.
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bique during the 1980s; close to 5 million
were displaced from rural areas inside and
outside of Mozambique; and a large part of
the country’s infrastructure was destroyed,
including most of the social and economic
investments Frelimo had initiated in the
second half of the 1970s. Accordingly,
some 1,000 clinics and health posts as well
as 3,000 schools were destroyed or closed
down, and no less than 400 teachers were
killed. Road communications were totally
disrupted throughout the country; and the
marketing system, which had started to re-
gain momentum during 1977–81, was again
seriously affected. Hence, the number of
traders, estimated at about 6,000 at inde-
pendence, continued to drop to fewer than
2,000 in 1990. The traders were mostly con-
centrated in provincial or district capitals,
as their shops and transport means had been
destroyed.
Rural smallholder farmers were, in
other words, practically cut off from mar-
kets for their output, inputs, and essential
consumer goods. Marketed production fell
drastically, and subsistence agriculture was
seriously disrupted also, as most areas were
affected by insecurity and killings. Esti-
mates vary, but it is illustrative that direct
and indirect 1980–88 economic losses from
the war were calculated in the late 1980s at
US$15 billion (Green 1991), three times
Mozambique’s total foreign debt or 20
times what Mozambique received in loans
and grants from abroad in 1988. Moreover,
defense expenditures by the government
surged, leaving little or no room to rehabil-
itate depleted human and physical capital
resources.
As if war and destabilization were not
enough, along with other southern African
countries, Mozambique suffered from a se-
ries of repeated droughts from the late
1970s, and other natural disasters came in
the form of floods and typhoons. The
droughts in 1982 and 1983 had, for exam-
ple, a devastating additional negative effect
on agricultural output.
By 1986, the events described above
caused complete economic collapse. The
industrial sector was unable to cope with
the large investment projects initiated. Cen-
tralized control of prices and distribution,
lack of foreign exchange, shortage of in-
puts, the disruptive effects of war, irregular
power supplies, and the world recession in
the early 1980s made it impossible to main-
tain production levels. Thus, industry oper-
ated at 20–30 percent capacity only, and by
1986 industrial output was less than half its
1981 level. A similar downward trend oc-
curred in the agricultural sector. The offi-
cially marketed production of agricultural
products fell by more than 50 percent dur-
ing the first half of the 1980s, and food aid
grew to some 500,000 tons on an annual
basis, or more than 85 percent of the total
official grain supply. In spite of the food aid
inflows, which became an important source
of government revenue, per capita food
consumption fell by more than one-third
from 1979 to 1986.
The government budget deteriorated
from a small surplus in 1980 to a 48 percent
deficit in 1986, and defense gradually came
to account for no less than 30 percent of
total outlays. On average, public deficits
amounted to 16.6 percent of GDP during
this period, while the fiscal deficit—includ-
ing grants from foreign donors—averaged
11.1 percent of GDP. More than 40 percent
of the public deficits, including grants, were
financed by expanding the domestic money
supply and the rest by foreign loans, as do-
mestic bond financing could not be relied
on. Hence, domestic credits tripled from
1981 to 1986. 
Meanwhile, the official exchange rate of
the metrical (Mt) was kept fixed in relation
to the U.S. dollar, and exchange rate adjust-
ments hardly ever occurred. Thus, parallel
markets for goods and foreign exchange
emerged because of the combination of
fixed prices, loss of monetary control, and
an increasing excess demand for consumer
goods and marketed crops. Prices surged on
the parallel markets, and by 1986 the price
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was 50 times higher than the official rate.
The recession and the grossly overvalued
exchange rate had, in combination with the
war and destabilization, disastrous effects
on exports. South African traffic through
Maputo harbor had, for example, by 1986
been reduced to only 10 percent of the 1973
level, and by the middle of the 1980s total
exports of goods and services were less
than 30 percent of the 1980 level.
Imports contracted as well, but the drop
was more limited than that of exports.
Hence, while total exports covered 50 per-
cent of imports in 1981, they covered less
than 25 percent in 1986. Consequently, the
country developed a heavy dependence on
foreign grants and loans. At the end of
1986, total outstanding international debt
amounted to US$3.4 billion compared with
US$750 million in the early 1980s. Sched-
uled debt service reached 275 percent of ex-
ports in 1986. Moreover, aid flows ac-
counted for more than half of GDP, and
capital expenditures—which remained
stagnant in nominal terms during
1981–86—were almost completely donor
financed by 1986, leaving little room for the
government to maneuver.
In sum, GDPfell at 6 percent per year in
real terms from 1981 to 1986, and the 
accumulated per capita probably amounted
to about 45 percent during the same period
(Tarp 1990; World Bank 1996). Moreover,
internal and external economic balances
had by 1986 become close to impossible to
manage, while the majority of the small-
holder sector was left in an extremely vul-
nerable situation. The overwhelming share
of the population was poor in absolute
terms (Green 1991), and social indicators
were among the worst in the world. Gener-
alized shortages were endemic, parallel
markets grew rapidly, the exchange rate
was grossly overvalued, and dependency on
donors for financial assistance and food aid
excessive.
Hence, by 1986 it was clear that the
government was losing effective control of
the economy. The nation-building efforts of
Frelimo had not succeeded as originally de-
signed, and popular support was dwindling.
The social fabric of the country was threat-
ened and crisis management had become
the order of the day with little attention to
needs in the medium and long term. Eco-
nomic reforms were clearly required, but
even more so was the need for peace. This
was repeatedly stressed by Samora Machel,
who died in a plane crash in 1986 and was
succeeded as president by Joaquim
Chissano.
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Stabilization and Structural Adjustment
T
o counteract the widespread economic collapse discussed in Chapter 3, the Govern-
ment of Mozambique introduced the comprehensive Economic Rehabilitation Program
in 1987. Subsequently, the reform effort was renamed Economic and Social Rehabili-
tation Program (ESRP) in 1989 to put focus on the social dimension of the effort.
7 The stated
intention of the program was to lay the foundation for economic growth through a shift to a
more market-based economy. ESRP, as originally conceived, was fairly standard in design. It
responded to an economy that was failing to maintain monetary control, consuming beyond
its means, focusing production excessively on nontraded goods, and relying on inefficient and
inflexible microeconomic structures. Moreover, ESRP included a series of standard stabiliza-
tion measures, such as fiscal adjustment, monetary restraint, and devaluation of the exchange
rate. To enhance microeconomic efficiency and the capacity of the economy to withstand ex-
ternal shocks, substantial price and trade liberalization was pursued. Similarly, institutional re-
forms of the financial sector and a privatization program for state enterprises were included as
key components of the program.
External agencies played a major role in the design of ESRP. The IMF and World Bank
took the lead in program formulation and implementation. Conditionality was phrased in stan-
dard terms, as suggested above, and the policy framework papers in which initiatives to be un-
dertaken were outlined were mainly drafted in Washington, D.C. The ability of the Mozambi-
can government to enter into effective dialogue was severely constrained, and issues of own-
ership of the program were quickly glossed over. In sum, the IMF and the World Bank exerted
massive influence on the policymaking process. In the early years of program implementation,
bilateral donors fully supported the line pursued by these agencies and remained largely pas-
sive in the macroeconomic policy dialogue. Instead, bilateral donors continued to pursue the
implementation of their respective aid programs over which the government had some—but
by no means exclusive—control. Gradually the position of the World Bank and IMF began to
change, and criticism of the orthodox approach surfaced. The introduction of a social dimen-
sion of adjustment in the reform program is an early illustration of this, but during the 1990s
the restrictive nature of the fiscal tightness of ESRP also came under fire. Moreover, internal
disagreements between the IMF and the World Bank emerged in the second half of the 1990s,
and little by little a more unorthodox—and much less monolithic—policy line gained influ-
ence. In parallel with this process, the large number of mainly foreign nongovernmental 
This chapter was written by Channing Arndt, Henning Tarp Jensen, and Finn Tarp.
7For simplicity, adjustment programs ongoing since 1987 are collectively referred to in this report as ESRP.
27organizations (NGOs)—in some years
numbering more than 70—remained
largely without influence on macroeco-
nomic policy. Instead, they continued im-
plementing a wide variety of humanitarian,
reconstruction, and development projects at
field level in a large number of localities
throughout Mozambique.
Policy Measures
As a result of the forces referred to above,
considerable price liberalization occurred in
the three years following the initiation of
the reforms. While products with fixed
prices accounted for about 70 percent of
GDP in 1986, this proportion had fallen to
about 30 percent by 1989. Four years later,
in July 1993, the government took the sub-
stantial step of liberalizing prices for major
food products, such as maize meal, cooking
oil, and rice. Price liberalization continued
such that early in 1996 administered con-
sumer prices were limited to wheat flour,
bread, rents, fuels, utilities, and certain
transportation fares. By the end of 1996,
these few remaining controls had either
been removed or a regular update system
had been put in place, usually referencing
world prices (World Bank/Republic of
Mozambique 1996).
However, minimum producer prices for
nine agricultural products—including white
maize, beans, groundnuts, sunflower, raw
cashews, cotton, mafurra, paddy, and to-
bacco—persisted into 1996 (World Bank
1996). Particular concern was attached to
the impacts of minimum prices on maize
markets, even though the minimum prices
were not generally enforced. Thus, there
were reports of selective sanctions against
traders purchasing at prices below mini-
mum price levels (Moll 1996). Since risk of
sanction works against the development of
private trading activities, the World Bank
and other donors continued to push for abo-
lition of de jure minimum prices. Conse-
quently, the government transformed food
crop minimum prices to so-called indicative
prices in 1997. In sum, domestic price lib-
eralization was carried out closely meeting
ESRP intentions.
Evidence on how producer price liberal-
ization affected consumer prices is scarce
and mainly qualitative. Definitive conclu-
sions, therefore, cannot be drawn. Looking
at how marketing margins for agricultural
goods evolved from 1991, it would appear,
however, that margins for traded agricul-
tural products (including maize, raw
cashews, and other export crops) have de-
creased, while margins for several non-
traded products (such as cassava and other
basic food crops) have increased.
8 Accord-
ingly, for traded agriculture it would appear
that falling producer prices have led to even
greater decreases in consumer prices. The
evidence is less clear in nontraded sectors.
Trade liberalization, including a move
from a system of managed trade toward a
liberal trade regime with imports subject to
ad valorem tariffs, has been more gradual.
Since 1987, quantitative restrictions on im-
ports and exports have been scrapped, the
number and average level of tariff rates sub-
stantially reduced, and licensing procedures
simplified or rendered automatic. Accord-
ingly, the import tariff structure imple-
mented in November 1996 contained only
three rates: 2.5, 7.5, and 35 percent (Min-
istry of Planning and Finance 1996). De-
spite the simplified tariff rate structure, it
still implies significant effective protection
for some agricultural processing industries.
For example, the rate applied to wheat is 2.5
percent, while the rate applied to wheat
flour is 35 percent. This implies that the ef-
fective protection afforded to wheat milling
activities is quite high. Also an export tax of
20 percent has been in place for raw
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8These margins have been calculated based on revised national accounts for 1991–96, discussed later in this 
chaptercashews to protect the domestic cashew
processing industry.
The area of trade policy that caused the
gravest concerns was customs administra-
tion. In 1995, the Maputo port authority re-
ported that between 300 and 400 import
containers had been sitting at the port for
more than 180 days, and that the average
time in port was 114 days (Castro 1995).
Available evidence suggests, moreover, that
traders were able to use illicit means to
speed up the importing process, and even
avoid import duties. The unsustainable situ-
ation in Maputo port gave momentum to
ongoing efforts to reform the customs ad-
ministration.
A key component of ESRP was a com-
prehensive privatization program initiated
in 1989. Progress was slow initially but ac-
celerated in the mid-to-late 1990s, with 125
public firms privatized in 1994 and 261 pri-
vatized in 1995 (Sowa 1996). By mid-1999,
more than 1,200 firms had been privatized,
87 of these categorized as large enterprises.
Relatively few large enterprises, such as the
national airline, remain in state hands. It is
difficult to assess the efficacy of the pro-
gram by the usual means—dividing the
scheduled number of enterprises to be sold
by the specified date by the number actually
sold—because the number of firms slated
for privatization rapidly grew over the
length of the privatization process.
An important nonprice objective in the
privatization process was the preference for
Mozambican buyers over foreign buyers.
The most tangible indicator of this policy
was the difference in financing require-
ments. Typically, foreign investors were re-
quired to pay cash, while Mozambican in-
vestors were offered installment plans. Fig-
ures from early 1996 indicate that Mozam-
bicans played a significant role in purchas-
ing state assets, with the overwhelming ma-
jority of firms (many of them very small)
purchased by Mozambicans and a slight
majority of the amounts agreed to be paid
coming from Mozambicans (Sowa 1996).
While these differential financing require-
ments seem to have augmented the level of
participation of Mozambican business peo-
ple, this result came at a considerable cost.
Sowa (1996) found that approximately half
the installment funds due were in default.
Despite these problems, the privatiza-
tion program was successful based on how
many assets moved from the state into pri-
vate hands. Even by mid-1996, the World
Bank referred to the program as “one of the
largest in Africa” (Sowa 1996, 1). Contin-
ued rapid privatization since 1996 implies
that the vast bulk of economic activity is
now in private hands. A joint study by the
World Bank and the Government of
Mozambique found that enterprises had in-
creased output four times over in the three-
year period following privatization (World
Bank and Republic of Mozambique 1997).
Some cautionary words are in order how-
ever. First, this figure refers to firms priva-
tized very early in the process Most firms—
particularly large firms—were privatized
later, and their performance has yet to be
formally assessed. Second, privatization oc-
curred within a generally improving macro-
economic environment, and it is difficult to
assess the counterfactual: how well the
firms would have done had a credible com-
mitment been made to keep them in state
hands.
Another key component of ESRP was
the privatization of the commercial finan-
cial sector. In 1989, the banking system ef-
fectively consisted of two state-owned
banks, Banco de Moçambique (BM) and
Banco Popular de Desenvolvimento (BPD).
In efforts to gain control over money cre-
ation, the commercial banking functions of
the BM were extracted in 1992 through the
creation of Banco Commercial de Moçam-
bique (BCM). Privatization of the BCM
was contemplated shortly after, but audits
of its accounts for 1992 revealed “substan-
tial losses,” mainly because of soft loans to
parastatals. Continued poor performance of
both the BCM and BPD impaired the 
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control; faced with the consequences of
slow and partial banking reform, in March
1995 the government decided to proceed as
quickly as possible with the privatization of
both financial institutions (World Bank
1995a). Subsequently, BCM was privatized
in the summer of 1996, while privatization
of BPD occurred in late 1997.
The agricultural marketing system is
now to a large extent in private hands, and
major markets for agricultural output, par-
ticularly in the central region, appear to be
active. Thus, circuits for treating marketed
agricultural production have been develop-
ing, while state involvement in purchase,
storage, and transport of marketed surplus
has been declining, particularly in the
southern and central parts of the country. In
1994, the state marketing enterprise, Agri-
com—which was entrusted with a broad
mandate for purchasing, storing, and trans-
porting a wide array of agricultural prod-
ucts—was restructured and renamed Insti-
tuto de Cereais de Moçambique (ICM).
The reconstructed institution was subse-
quently given a mandate to act as a buyer of
last resort, to manage strategic stocks to en-
sure food security, and to contribute to the
stabilization of producer and consumer
prices. Despite the official status, ICM has
effectively operated like a private organiza-
tion given no budgetary allocations, work-
ing capital, or donor support have been re-
ceived (Coulter 1996). Yet, it is still an im-
portant player in the procurement of agri-
cultural output, with a storage capacity of
approximately 235,000 tons.
Since the cessation of hostilities in
1992, the use of agricultural production in-
puts has remained rudimentary. It is diffi-
cult to determine whether the negligible use
of purchased inputs is a result of lack of ef-
fective demand or limited supply. An exam-
ination of Sementes de Moçambique
(Semoc), the major seed company of
Mozambique, provides some insight into
the current state of input markets. As a for-
mer state enterprise, Semoc was privatized
as part of the privatization program. Since
1994, the company had made substantial ef-
forts to develop a retail network, but re-
tracting donor support for resettlement of
displaced people meant that weak sales
failed to cover costs. The company survived
by downsizing, generating revenue through
trading activities, and converting land pre-
viously allocated to seed production activi-
ties to straight agricultural production. As
of the mid-1990s, Semoc estimated that the
market for seed would grow slowly and that
it would be forced to rely on other income
sources for several years before being able
to focus exclusively on its core, seed-
producing business (Bay 1996).
While substantial infrastructure invest-
ments have resulted in a distinctly im-
proved primary and secondary road system,
serious problems remain in transporting
agricultural surplus from the farm gate to
the roads. This difficulty is compounded by
a war-induced shortage of animal traction.
The fertile northern parts of the country re-
main poorly integrated with the rest of the
country, while distinct improvements have
been made in the southern regions. The ex-
tent of the road network improvements in
the south can be measured in part by a de-
tailed study of maize market integration be-
tween Maputo and Chimoio (a major mar-
ket on the Beira corridor). It suggests that
significant price linkages exist between
these two markets (Donovan 1996).
The marketing of raw cashews has been
the focus of intense policy debate in recent
years. Having raised a ban on exports in
1991, the government set and abided by a
schedule for eliminating the export tax on
raw cashews by 2000. Previous lack of
competition in export markets and extraor-
dinary inefficiency in domestic cashew pro-
cessing permitted the domestic price for
raw cashews to fall to 16 percent of the ex-
port price or about one-third the level re-
ceived by farmers in neighboring Tanzania
(Castro 1995). More recently, privatized
cashew processors have realized efficiency
gains. Accordingly, increased competition
30 CHAPTER 4between processors and exporters allowed
producer prices to increase to 40 percent of
the export price in 1996.
Macroeconomic reform efforts in
Mozambique formed the core of ESRPpro-
gram over the past decade. Nevertheless,
despite stated intentions from the outset,
fiscal adjustment on any significant scale
only began more recently. Effects of ESRP
are visible on the expenditure side. Initia-
tives to raise government revenue collec-
tion included the privatization of the cus-
toms administration and the planned intro-
duction of a value-added tax (VAT). Over-
all, the key recommendation of the World
Bank’s first public expenditure review in
1989, to increase government revenues, has
so far not been achieved. The persistent in-
flows of substantial amounts of aid have
therefore been essential in financing public
expenditure. Efforts toward retrenching the
government workforce have not been suc-
cessful, but the so-called peace dividend did
materialize. In combination with strict lim-
its on wages and salaries of civil servants,
spending on public administration and de-
fense has been reduced significantly.
On the monetary side, ESRP was very
specific in recommending monetary re-
straint. However, the entanglement of the
central and commercial banking functions
of the BM was a stumbling block. Thus,
while the BM performed central bank func-
tions, it also held more than two-thirds of all
commercial loans, with the majority of its
portfolio directed toward parastatals. Direct
subsidies to these companies, amounting to
12 percent of GDP in 1987, had been sub-
stantially reduced by 1992, but indirect sub-
sidies through soft loans from the BM
proved difficult to control. A survey of in-
dustrial companies in 1993 found that most
state-owned companies had nonperforming
loans with the banking system (Castro
1995). Privatization of the BCM coincided
with the regaining of monetary control in
1996. The annual inflation rate dropped to
single-digits, having hovered around 50
percent over most of the previous period.
Although adjustment to the new low-infla-
tionary environment was slow, nominal in-
terest rates started to provide market-
oriented signals from the mid-1990s as evi-
denced by real interest rates turning positive
after 1995.
Overvaluation of the exchange rate in
1987 was of major concern, and devalua-
tion of the exchange rate was one of the es-
sential building blocks in the structural ad-
justment program. Between 1987 and 1995,
the exchange rate continuously lost value
relative to major currencies in nominal
terms. Whether these devaluations were
large enough to bring the real exchange rate
to an equilibrium level is debatable. Parallel
markets existed throughout this period;
however, parallel and official rates have
converged. In 1987, parallel markets traded
the metical at 50 times the official rate. By
1995, this differential had narrowed to ap-
proximately 10 percent. With the establish-
ment of monetary control in 1996, the ex-
change rate came into line with the rate on
parallel markets. Subsequently, these paral-
lel markets have all but vanished.
Reform efforts have also been directed
toward the social sector, in particular the
health and education networks. Educational
rehabilitation has focused on primary edu-
cation, where nearly all the school network
has been rebuilt after massive war-induced
destruction. Rehabilitation of health care
has also seen some progress, with the recent
initiation of a six-year health program. In
line with the general liberalization efforts,
private education was reintroduced in 1990,
while private health care has been allowed
since 1992. A variety of safety net initia-
tives has also been pursued, but the need for
concerted attention to social issues is
widely recognized.
Economic Performance
Given the momentous economic and politi-
cal changes over the past decade, the scope
for recuperation and improvement in eco-
nomic performance has, particularly since
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such change critically depends on the avail-
ability of reliable data. The National Insti-
tute of Statistics has produced coherent sets
of national accounts in accordance with the
United Nations System of National Ac-
counts (NIS 1997).
9 The NIS figures differ
from the previous official national accounts
published by the National Directorate of
Planning (NDP). These differences reflect
that the NDP data are based on problematic
estimation and cross-checking procedures
(Johnson 1995). More specifically, the NDP
national accounts rely heavily on data from
technical ministries and public enterprises,
and they do not capture a variety of activi-
ties in the services sector. In contrast, the
NIS data are based on a variety of surveys,
10
and adjustment is made for items that go
unnoticed in the NDP approach, including
imputed values for a variety of informal
sector activities. Accordingly, the more reli-
able NIS data is the main data source used
in what follows. Yet, because data on bal-
ance of payments are compiled in accor-
dance with NDP national accounts only,
both data sets are needed for a coherent as-
sessment.
In terms of the evolution of real GDP
(Table 4.1), it appears that overall growth of
real GDP was respectable in the period
1991–96, according to NIS data. Adramatic
drought-induced fall in real GDP in 1992
was reversed the following year, marking
the beginning of a period with continuous
growth. NIS and NDP growth rate esti-
mates, as expected, paint different pictures
of the evolution of GDP. Thus, NIS data
imply a significant drop and consequent re-
bound in 1992–93, and reasonably high and
stable growth rates during 1994–96. The of-
ficial NDPfigures, on the other hand, imply
that the drought did not affect real GDPsig-
nificantly, while an unprecedented 19 per-
cent growth rate followed in 1993. After
this jump, the NDP recorded more modest
growth rates in 1994–95, while the 1996 es-
timated performance matches that of NIS.
In sum, the two sets of data share some sim-
ilarities, including low growth in the
drought-stricken year of 1992, followed by
high growth in 1993, a leveling off through
1995, and a resumption of high growth in
1996. Nevertheless, the NIS data tell a story
of an economy that has maintained stability
and continuity in the adjustment process,
while the NDP figures indicate more erratic
movements. The NIS data are judged to be
a more adequate picture of the post-1992
period.
Changes in the component shares of real
value-added indicate that the agricultural
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Table 4.1  Real gross domestic product (GDP), 1991–96
GDP (100 billion metical in 1991 prices)
Indicator 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Real gross domestic product (NIS) 29.0 26.6 28.9 31.1 32.5 34.8
Growth rate (NIS) (percentage) … -8.1 8.4 7.8 4.3 7.1
Growth rate (NDP) (percentage) … -0.8 19.3 4.4 1.4 6.4
Source: MPF (1997); Banco de Moçambique 1997; and NIS 1997.
Notes: MPF means Ministry of Planning and Finance; NIS means National Institute of Statistics; NDP means
National Directorate of Planning; and ellipses (…) mean not applicable.
9Officially, the NIS was only established in 1998, superceding the National Directorate of Statistics; for sim-
plicity, however, the acronym NIS is used here to reflect both institutions.
10These include demographic, expenditure, and production surveys.sector share increased from 1994 to con-
tribute almost one-third of total real GDPin
1996 (Table 4.2). The investment-related
construction sector and export-oriented
transport and communications sector also
increased during the period, whereas shares
for the commerce, service, and manufactur-
ing sectors (excluding food processing) de-
clined.
The changing structure of nominal
value-added (Table 4.3) sharply contrasts
the structure of real value-added. By 1996,
the nominal share of agricultural value-
added declined to 25 percent, while the
commerce share increased to 25 percent.
Changes in real GDP shares show that the
relative movements of value-added across
sectors differ significantly. Accordingly, the
price of labor-intensive agricultural value-
added has decreased relative to other sec-
tors. This is most likely a result of down-
ward pressures on agricultural producer
prices given increased production. Thus, re-
peated depreciation of the exchange rate in
Mozambique has been unable to counteract
the general downward pressures on agricul-
tural prices. The decline in the price of rel-
ative agricultural value-added appears espe-
cially steep compared with the price in the
capital-intensive commerce sector.
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Table 4.2  Sectoral shares of real value-added, 1991–96
Share of real value-added (percentage)
Sector 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Agriculture 30.7 26.8 30.4 28.1 31.5 32.6
Fisheries 3.5 3.3 3.3 2.9 2.8 2.8
Agricultural processing 6.5 6.6 5.6 5.5 5.7 7.1
Mining 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.3
Manufacturing 2.8 2.7 2.5 1.6 1.7 0.8
Construction 6.5 7.1 6.7 8.1 9.0 9.6
Transport and communication 7.0 9.3 10.3 10.1 10.9 11.3
Commerce 23.3 23.2 19.9 21.4 19.9 18.2
Other services 19.3 20.8 21.1 21.9 18.1 17.3
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: NIS 1997.
Note: The base year for real value-added is 1991.
Table 4.3  Sectoral shares of nominal value-added, 1991–96
Share of nominal value-added (percentage)
Sector 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Agriculture 30.7 25.7 28.0 24.2 23.3 25.3
Fisheries 3.5 4.0 3.5 3.0 3.9 3.1
Agricultural processing 6.5 5.7 4.8 5.6 5.7 5.9
Mining 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.4
Manufacturing 2.8 2.7 2.1 1.1 1.3 1.3
Construction 6.5 8.3 7.7 11.4 12.5 12.8
Transport and communication 7.0 7.5 8.1 7.5 6.9 6.0
Commerce 23.3 21.9 17.5 22.3 23.9 25.3
Other services 19.3 23.9 27.9 24.4 22.0 19.9
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: NIS 1997.In the evolution of the expenditure com-
ponents of real GDP, the share of private
marketed consumption declined signifi-
cantly from almost 75 percent to less than
60 percent of GDP in the period 1991–96
(Table 4.4). Moreover, government con-
sumption declined as a share of real GDP.
These developments imply that the overall
contribution of consumption toward GDP
has decreased significantly.
The mirror image of the large drop in
the share of real consumption is a signifi-
cantly reduced ratio of the negative trade
balance to GDP. Thus, the export share in-
creased during 1995–96 to almost 20 per-
cent, while the import share decreased to 34
percent. This reflects a drop in imports of
consumer goods, while the share of real in-
vestment (which is import heavy) increased
in more recent years. It is uncertain whether
the increasing share of real investment can
be characterized as robust. Nevertheless,
data indicate that the share remained at 25
percent in 1997.
Nominal GDP shares (Table 4.5) are
only slightly different from real GDPshares
(Table 4.4), reflecting that changes in rela-
tive prices among the different expenditure
components of GDP were minor. Consis-
tent with price movements in the agricul-
ture and commerce sectors, the imputed
price of home-consumed production fell
relative to marketed consumption. From the
real GDP shares, it is clear that this shift in
relative prices was accompanied by a shift
in the consumption pattern away from mar-
keted consumption toward home-consumed
production. It is also clear that the relative
price of investment goods rose signifi-
cantly. This fits well with a similar increase
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Table 4.4  Real GDP expenditures, 1991–96
Real GDP expenditure (percentage)
GDP component 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Home consumption 23 20 23 22 23 23
Marketed consumption 73 70 64 61 62 59
Government consumption 12 12 14 19 10 9
Gross investment 23 23 22 25 28 25
Exports 12 15 13 14 17 19
Imports -42 -40 -36 -41 -40 -34
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
Source: NIS 1997.
Table 4.5  Nominal GDP expenditures, 1991–96
Nominal GDP expenditure (percentage)
GDP component 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Home consumption 23 19 22 19 19 19
Marketed consumption 73 73 65 63 65 62
Government consumption 12 14 16 21 10 9
Gross investment 23 27 27 32 36 30
Exports 12 15 13 13 19 19
Imports -42 -49 -43 -48 -49 -39
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
Source: NIS 1997.in the relative price of imports. Nonethe-
less, real investment expenditures increased
over time, indicating that the increased rel-
ative prices on imports primarily had a neg-
ative effect on imports of consumer goods.
The lack of a discernible trend in the
trade balance deficit until 1995 caused
much concern. Nevertheless, a significant
improvement of the trade balance deficit
was recorded in 1996, mainly caused by im-
port compression (Table 4.5), and data sug-
gest that the trade balance as a share of
GDP fell to a new low in 1997. The main
driver behind the improvement in 1996 was
a significant decline in the imports of pri-
mary agriculture and agricultural process-
ing, while a smaller contribution came from
a fall in imports, unrelated to agriculture.
The significant decrease in imports of agri-
culturally related goods is related in partic-
ular to the bumper crop that resulted from
the generous weather conditions in 1996.
Thus, imports of maize as food aid, reduced
significantly in 1995, all but vanished in
1996. The decrease in nonagricultural im-
ports can also be traced to decreases in im-
ports of consumption-related items, while
imports of, for example, construction mate-
rials and industrial machinery, increased.
The increase in exports can be attributed in
large measure to processed cashews.
A summary of developments in public
finances indicates that the total deficit fell
significantly in real terms in 1995 and 1996
(Table 4.6). Moreover, the emphasis on ex-
penditure cutbacks over the adjustment
process shifted the recurrent fiscal deficit to
a surplus from 1995. Given real govern-
ment investment also fell, the deficit on the
total balance decreased. Nevertheless,
falling grants imply that the deficit after
grants remained high.
Concerning recurrent expenditures, de-
fense spending made up an overwhelming
34 percent of the recurrent budget in 1992,
increasing even further to a staggering 38
percent in 1994. That year was character-
ized by large, externally funded mine re-
moval and disarmament programs, counter-
acting the ongoing process of downsizing
military capacity. In contrast, defense ex-
penditures were 23 to 24 percent of recur-
rent expenditures in 1995–96. The cutback
in defense spending—that is, the peace div-
idend—therefore proved to be a major pre-
condition for the recurrent budget surplus
and accompanying reduction in the overall
budget deficit.
A significant drop in the real value of
grants caused 1996 real investment expen-
diture to fall back to its 1992 level. It is im-
portant to note, however, that the invest-
ment budget likely contains recurrent ex-
penditure items. For example, all aid-
funded spending, including spending on
technical assistance, is categorized as in-
vestment. Hence, the 1994 investment fig-
ure is very likely inflated, so the balance 
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Table 4.6  Public receipts and expenditures, 1992–96
Public receipts and expenditures (billion metical in 1992 prices)
Receipts and expenditures 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Tax receipts 661 768 660 675 669
Current expenditures 765 820 855 612 592
Current balance -104 -52 -196 62 77
Investment expenditures 694 771 916 801 711
Total balance -798 -823 -1,111 -738 -633
Grants 690 655 803 584 441
Balance after grants -108 -168 -309 -154 -193
Source: MPF (various years).between recurrent spending and investment
expenditures should be interpreted with
caution.
Turning to revenues, total tax receipts in
real terms essentially remained constant
throughout 1992–96, indicating a decline in
tax receipts by 1996 to a very low 12 per-
cent of GDP. The poor revenue perform-
ance is consistent with relatively strong
growth in sectors of the economy that do
not form part of the tax base. Thus, tax per-
formance supports the observation that real
growth was relatively strong in the informal
agricultural sector in Mozambique and that
major tax reforms have yet to be imple-
mented.
Inflation and money-stock growth rates
for the period 1991–96 (Table 4.7) indicate
that greater monetary stability emerged in
1996 after a period of being clearly out of
control. Inflation surged at the onset of the
adjustment period in 1987, resulting from
currency devaluation and deregulated
prices, which hit rates of around 200 per-
cent per year. However, annual inflation,
measured by the GDP deflator, had already
been reduced to around 50 percent by the
end of 1988, and inflation, measured by the
calendar-year change in the Maputo con-
sumer price index (CPI), remained at ap-
proximately this level until 1996, when in-
flation dropped considerably. However, the
numbers for money stock, Maputo CPI, and
exchange rate growth do not provide a clear
picture of the actual speed with which price
inflation was brought down. Thus, almost
complete price stability was registered be-
tween April 1996 and April 1997, with an
inflation rate of no more than 4.6 percent.
The monetary authorities did not man-
age to control the money stock immediately
after the initiation of ESRP. Money stock
and inflation rates soared until the banking
reform in 1995. The narrow money supply
(M1) and CPI were closely correlated in
this period, becoming even closer during
1996. Thus, the annual growth rates of M1
and CPI were very similar for 1996, and
both were significantly down from the pre-
vious year. The relationship between M1
and CPI growth rates suggests that, in this
period, inflation was to a large extent a
monetary problem, although this is a debat-
able issue. In any case, neither general pres-
sures on wages, expansion of private sector
credit, nor growth in government expendi-
ture appear to be plausible causes for the
observed inflation rates (Economist Intelli-
gence Unit 1997).
The metical to U.S. dollar exchange rate
was devalued several times after the incep-
tion of ESRP in 1987 and, following a very
large initial jump, moved more or less in
line with the domestic inflation rate. De-
spite an initial depreciation of around 700
percent, the overvaluation at that time is
likely to have been much greater. This im-
plies that the depreciation of the metical
continuously lagged behind the rate of do-
mestic inflation and, consequently, that
Mozambique experienced an overvalued
exchange rate during much of the structural
adjustment period. This may well have con-
tributed to the impressive return to price
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Table 4.7  Money stock, Maputo CPI, and exchange rate, 1991–96
Growth (percentage)
Monetary and price indicator 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
M1 35.7 59.3 78.8 57.6 56.2 19.9
CPI 35.2 54.5 43.6 70.1 55.0 16.2
Exchange rate growth 54.4 69.6 53.1 58.9 50.2 25.3
Source: MPF (various years); Banco de Moçambique (various years).
Note: The consumer price index is for Maputo city, and the exchange rate is for meticais to U.S. dollars. The
growth rates for M1 and CPI refer to calendar year changes measured in December.stability in 1996 and 1997. Although it is
likely that the metical was still overvalued
in 1996, it stabilized along with prices. Ac-
cordingly, during a six-month stretch in
1996, the metical was depreciated by only
3.6 percent against the U.S. dollar, implying
a further real appreciation.
11
The current account components indi-
cate improved balance of trade, according
to official figures
12 (Table 4.8). Moreover,
the service balance has improved in recent
years because interest payments have stabi-
lized and service account income has in-
creased. Despite these improvements, the
current account balance has remained es-
sentially unchanged because of develop-
ments of capital transfers. The dollar value
of foreign capital transfers decreased by 60
percent from its peak in 1994, and because
the majority of these transfers were not re-
turned, this drop represents a major de-
crease in grant-aid allocations. However, a
large part of this decrease can also be re-
lated to the completion of aid-financed spe-
cial programs, as well as to the inflow of
food aid related to the 1992 drought. Since
these externally financed projects are likely
to have been very import-intensive, a large
share of the concurrent decrease in imports
was probably caused by the discontinuance
of these projects. Nevertheless, the picture
of a significant decrease in direct transfers
of grant aid still remains.
The capital account balance improved
significantly in terms of U.S. dollars (Table
4.9). Accordingly, the capital account
STABILIZATION AND STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT 37
11It is likely that part of the currency overvaluation problem was related to “Dutch disease” effects stemming
from the substantial inflows of foreign aid, which increased the demand for local currency and therefore exerted
upward pressure on the exchange rate.
12The trade balance data included in the balance of payments are the official data compiled by the NDP. Ac-
cordingly, the current account closely resembles the NDP estimate of the trade balance deficit. Even though the
official data are presented in U.S. dollars, they also represent the trends of real domestic currency. Furthermore,
they are comparable with the general trends of the NIS national accounts data.
Table 4.8  Current account balance, 1991–96
Current account balance (millions of U.S. dollars)
Current account item 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Exports 162 139 132 150 174 226
Imports -899 -855 -955 -1,018 -727 -802
Trade balance -736 -716 -823 -869 -553 -576
Service balance -110 -133 -127 -160 -127 -89
Capital transfers 609 609 628 702 339 283
Current account balance -237 -239 -321 -327 -341 -382
Source: MPF (various years); Banco de Moçambique (various years).
Table 4.9  Capital account balance, 1991–96
Capital account balance (millions of U.S. dollars)
Capital account item 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
New external loans 144 170 186 260 282 347
Amortization -354 -350 -324 -317 -270 -196
Direct investment 22 25 32 35 45 72
Capital account -188 -155 -107 -22 58 224
Source: MPF (various years); Banco de Moçambique (various years).changed from a large deficit in 1993 to a
large surplus in 1996. Mozambique was
able to attract external loans on an increas-
ing scale since 1993, reaching a level that
surpassed capital transfers in 1996. Accord-
ingly, this makes up the lion’s share of the
big improvement in the capital account bal-
ance when combined with the 40 percent
decrease in amortization payments. Such
payments have been decreasing, stemming
from a combination of debt rescheduling
and reductions. The direct investment com-
ponent showed significant progress, reach-
ing a peak in 1996, when it climbed to more
than 20 percent of the value of new external
loans.
The financing requirement for the 
balance-of-payments deficit decreased dra-
matically in 1996, while the current account
remained unchanged and the capital ac-
count significantly improved (Table 4.10).
Despite the fall in the financing require-
ment, debt relief remained high, making it
possible to increase foreign exchange re-
serves yearly from 1994 to 1996. Further-
more, changes in arrears were an important
source of finance in several years.
Social sector rehabilitation shows some
progress. From the observations regarding
immunization against diphtheria and
measles, it is clear that extension of health
care improved during 1991–96 (Table
4.11). The infant mortality rate is another
indicator of the revitalized health system,
which declined after the 1992 ceasefire.
Nevertheless, absolute 1996 levels were
still among the worst in the world. The re-
construction of the educational system
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Table 4.10  Financing the balance of payments, 1991–96
Balance of payments (billion metical in 1992 prices)
Balance of payments item 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Change in reserves -13 -40 46 -53 -60 -158
Debt relief 385 669 212 232 125 310
Change in arrears 86 -222 178 168 191 -61
Financing 458 407 436 347 256 90
Source: MPF (various years); Banco de Moçambique (various years).
Table 4.11  Social indicators, 1991–96
Balance of payments item 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Immunization, DPT
(percentage of children under 12 months) 46 50 49 55 57 n.a.
Immunization, measles 
(percentage of children under 12 months) 55 56 62 65 71 n.a.
Mortality rate, infant 
(per 1,000 live births) n.a. 134 n.a. n.a. 126 123
School enrolment, primary 
(percentage gross) 67 n.a. n.a. 57 58 60
School enrolment, secondary 
(percentage gross) 8 n.a. n.a. 7 7 7
School enrolment, tertiary 
(percentage gross) n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.4 0.4 0.5
Primary education, teachers 22,236 22,474 22,396 n.a. 24,575 n.a.
Pupil-teacher ratio, primary 54.7 53.4 54.8 n.a. 57.6 n.a.
Source: World Bank 1997b.
Note: N.a. means not available.made only slow progress over the period, as
witnessed by gross school enrolment. Thus,
the enrolment rate of the priority sector of
primary education only modestly increased,
while enrolment rates in secondary and ter-
tiary education remained essentially un-
changed. The increasing number of primary
school teachers and the concurrent increase
in the pupil–teacher ratios show, however,
that total enrolment in primary education
increased significantly. Thus, the slow
progress in the gross enrolment rate can be
attributed mainly to a significant increase in
the number of school age children.
Future Challenges
The IMF and World Bank singled out major
macroeconomic reform issues at the begin-
ning of the adjustment process. Issues in-
cluded consumption beyond Mozambique’s
means, production focused excessively on
nontradable goods, and lack of monetary
and credit control. In addition, the economy
was characterized as inefficient and inflexi-
ble because of government failures in terms
of interventionist measures and outdated
legislation. It is clear that action was subse-
quently taken to address each of these prob-
lem areas. Hence, most of the available pol-
icy measures that were perceived to be pre-
conditions to achieving economic stability
and growth were in fact deployed.
In terms of GDP performance, re-
spectable rates of growth occurred in
Mozambique up until the mid-1990s. More-
over, it is clear that established targets of
4–5 percent growth on an annual basis were
in general surpassed (Arneberg 1996;
World Bank 1997a). Nevertheless, consid-
ering the very low initial level of GDP fol-
lowing the collapse in 1986, the virtual
standstill of the economy in 1987–91, and
the drought in 1992, the recorded growth
actually appears less impressive.
Real investment expenditures, which
grew quickly from 1992 to 1996, appeared
to stabilize thereafter at a reasonable 25 per-
cent of GDP. In the past, concern was ex-
pressed over the effectiveness of invest-
ment expenditures. One explanation for the
apparently low impact of investment was
that investment figures were too high be-
cause of the common practice of including
foreign-funded items of a recurrent nature
in the investment budget. This practice has
previously given an upward bias to official
investment figures.
13 Yet, NIS allocates ex-
penditure between consumption and invest-
ment on the basis of expenditure categories.
As such, the NIS investment figures are
representative of actual investment levels.
This implies that statistical considerations
are not likely to form part of the explanation
as to why growth rates in real GDP per
capita stayed low before 1996. Accordingly,
it seems that the productivity of past invest-
ment undertaken was lower than could rea-
sonably be expected. Nevertheless, with
reference to the apparently good 1997 GDP
performance, it may be that a turning point
had been reached.
During the adjustment period, invest-
ment expenditures relied heavily on aid
grants for financing, particularly because of
the poor performance of government rev-
enue. Advancements in attracting foreign
direct investment and foreign loans indicate
that Mozambique has taken tentative steps
toward lowering its dependence on foreign
aid transfers. Moreover, some externally fi-
nanced, so-called mega projects have been
identified by potential investors, in particu-
lar including the Caharro Bassa dam, an
aluminum smelter, and a reduced-iron
plant. Nevertheless, in general, aid transfers
will continue to play a big role as a source
of investment finance in at least the
medium-term. This is underpinned by 
the critical fact that relative prices of 
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13Official government investment figures amounted to about 45 percent of total investment in 1995, as estimated
by NIS.investment goods rose during the adjust-
ment period.
Regarding consumption, the overly high
1991 private consumption share of GDP, at
96 percent, had been reduced to slightly
more than 80 percent in 1996. Since the
government consumption share of GDP
also fell over this period, reasonable
progress was made in reducing the initial
consumption to GDP imbalance. This trend
was confirmed in preliminary data for 1997.
One of the major features of the seemingly
stable and continuous economic growth in
the mid-1990s was that growth in the infor-
mal agricultural sector had been high.
Apertinent issue of macroeconomic sta-
bilization yet to be addressed effectively is
fiscal adjustment. Despite improvements in
the government budget balances to 1996,
the development of the government revenue
side remained unsatisfactory. Poor perform-
ance in most of the government revenue
items meant that, overall, government rev-
enue consistently failed to keep pace with
GDP. Data has yet to confirm whether the
privatization of the much-criticized cus-
toms administration has increased the effi-
ciency and attractiveness of the Maputo
port as a provider of transit services to
South Africa, but import tariffs should have
risen with better custom declarations con-
trol. Nevertheless, widespread tax exemp-
tions that in the past detracted substantially
from the revenue-generating capability of
the important goods related taxes, is a
thorny issue. Furthermore, since it is diffi-
cult to tax the growing informal sector ac-
tivities, government clearly needs to pursue
further fiscal reforms, including the design
of more efficient mechanisms for generat-
ing revenue in the growing market-oriented
part of the economy.
Given the poor performance of the gov-
ernment revenue side, all of the budget ad-
justments to 1996 took place on the expen-
diture side of the budget. Alarge part of the
adjustment was achieved through the so-
called peace dividend. However, instead of
cutting back on the work force, the govern-
ment compressed wages and salaries of
civil servants as part of the process of re-
turning to a recurrent budget surplus. This
led to the double-edged challenge of wage
decompression and the need to reduce em-
ployee numbers. Furthermore, much atten-
tion should be directed toward the modern-
ization of budgetary and financial adminis-
trative procedures. Corruption was on the
increase both as a consequence of inappro-
priate legislation and the failure of the legal
system to address this issue in the transition
from a command-type to a market econ-
omy. In sum, while fiscal adjustment took
place over the adjustment period, this re-
mains a fragile area of the reform efforts.
Throughout the adjustment period, the
balance of payments was strongly affected
by developments in debt rescheduling, debt
reductions, and aid grants. Foreign debt
originally started accumulating in the late
1970s and early 1980s, and the buildup in-
tensified during the war. In the early 1990s
all debt indicators reached massive and
clearly unsustainable levels, and despite
debt relief, new loan financing of the con-
tinuing current account deficits meant that
in 1995 the debt stock stood at US$5.78 bil-
lion, or 16 times export earnings. The debt
service obligations related to this huge for-
eign currency debt continuously strained
the balance of payments.
The debt-reduction initiative was made
all the more important given decreases in
foreign capital transfers in general and aid
grants in particular. The sharp negative
trend observed in the 1994–96 data can
largely be explained by the external funding
of special programs in 1994. Nonetheless,
an additional downward movement is ap-
parent in aid grants awarded to Mozam-
bique. Increasing loan inflows and reduc-
tions in amortization payments led to de-
creasing grants and increasing investment
expenditures. This situation should have
improved in recent years; nevertheless, to
avoid a recurrence, continued aid inflows at
a high level and on grant and concessionary
40 CHAPTER 4terms are indispensable in helping to close
the financing gap from the current account.
In the past, the large deficit on the for-
eign trade account, with imports and ex-
ports hovering around 50 and 15 percent,
respectively, of GDP were a cause of con-
cern to policymakers. More recently, ex-
ports have been picking up, and since the
import-GDP ratio declined in 1996–97, the
ratio of trade balance deficit to GDP was
brought down substantially. Encouragingly,
import compression was achieved without
impairing GDP growth or investment
spending. Yet, while some transformation
of production took place on the import side,
possibilities for relatively easy import sub-
stitution and recovery are limited to a few
sectors, including grain milling. Moreover,
progress on the export side cannot be attrib-
uted to a structural shift in the transforma-
tion of production. Accordingly, major
breakthroughs are needed on the export side
to continue the trend of reducing the 
dependency on net capital transfers—
including aid from abroad.
Furthermore, the decreasing consump-
tion share of GDP has not been associated
with the necessary shift in consumption pat-
terns toward a better balance between pri-
vate and public consumption. For example,
expenditures need to increase, particularly
in the educational sector, where pressure
has mounted from a quickly expanding
population.
The excessive monetary growth and
high inflation rate were two of the problem
areas identified by ESRP. Although lack of
monetary control was identified as a prob-
lem from the outset, progress toward stabi-
lizing monetary growth was made only late
in 1996–97, when reconstruction and priva-
tization of the commercial parts of the for-
merly state-owned financial institutions
were carried out. The fact that monetary
growth essentially made up for nominal
GDP growth means that the velocity of
money circulation of M1 remained fairly
constant after 1992.
Very high monetary growth rates have
generated substantial seigniorage revenue
over the years. This income corresponds to
the amount of real resources appropriated
by the government by means of printing
money, and it adds up to around 10 percent
of GDPper year. This income has, however,
been directed mainly to the state enterprise
sector through the previously mentioned
soft loans. The new low-inflationary envi-
ronment is likely to be associated with a
gradual lowering of inflationary expecta-
tions. Accordingly, the velocity of circula-
tion should have begun to fall since the late
1990s, enabling the government to capture
some seigniorage revenue without risking a
renewed spurt in inflation.
The developments of the sectoral in-
come shares of GDP show that the relative
price of value-added across sectors changed
significantly during 1992–96. The relative
price of value-added in capital-intensive
sectors, such as commerce and construc-
tion, rose, while prices in agriculture de-
clined. This is a clear indication that capital
remained a scarce and constraining factor
during the period.
Following the drought of 1992, major
emergency packages of food aid flowed
into Mozambique from abroad. Good
weather conditions thereafter meant that
domestic production was increasingly able
to substitute for this emergency assistance.
Thus, the large decreases in food imports of
maize were associated with concurrent in-
creases in the real value of production of 30
to 40 percent, in 1995 and 1996. Following
another bumper crop in 1997, Mozambique
achieved self-sufficiency in maize, and
some progress was even made toward ex-
porting surplus production. However, the
potential for relatively easy import substitu-
tion as part of the recovery process was ex-
pended, requiring the exploration of more
fundamental changes in the development
constraints faced by agricultural producers.
In this regard, significant efforts and 
resources were invested in improving 
primary and secondary roads as well as 
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forts were first steps to promoting Mozam-
bique as an efficient provider of transport
services to neighboring countries, and as
such they provided Mozambique with pos-
sibilities for generating additional foreign
exchange earnings. Transit services after
1991 were Mozambique’s major export ar-
ticle, surpassing even the critically impor-
tant fisheries sector.
Nevertheless, extension of infrastruc-
ture to underdeveloped rural areas remained
inadequate as of 1996. While improve-
ments in infrastructure are likely to boost
the livelihood of some smallholders, this is
by itself insufficient to reduce poverty on a
major scale. The production technology,
used in small-scale agricultural production,
continues to be very rudimentary. Since lit-
tle was achieved over the adjustment period
in this area, technological improvements
thereafter are critical for ongoing agricul-
tural development. Nevertheless, the finan-
cial needs associated with improved pro-
duction methods mean that technological
extension on any larger scale must go hand
in hand with an extension of the branch
network of the financial system to the rural
areas. However, this will be likely to mate-
rialize only in the longer perspective, and
then only in connection with increased mar-
keting opportunities and better enforcement
of contract laws. Small-scale agricultural
development also depends on a proper solu-
tion to the problem of land entitlements, as
mentioned in Chapter 2.
Developments in the production of
processed food also bear evidence to the
poor state of the road network. Overall,
grain-milling production remained at
roughly the same level during 1993–96, and
since the real value of grain milling imports
still made up almost 75 percent of domestic
production, this sector seems to have poten-
tial for domestic expansion and import sub-
stitution. However, grain-milling imports
consisted mainly of processed rice and
wheat flour, while domestic production was
mainly maize flour. Following the 1993
price liberalization for maize flour, output
increased in 1994 only, so domestic produc-
tion still hovered around the 1991 level.
Moreover, the large effective protection af-
forded to domestic wheat-flour milling and
the 1996 domestic price liberalization had
not, based on available data at the time of
this study, resulted in any import substitu-
tion. Accordingly, the potential for import
substitution in processed food production
remained untapped.
14
In summary, one of the primary aims of
the reform measures introduced in the ad-
justment process was to shift the composi-
tion of domestic output toward tradable
goods. In fact, while the export share of
GDP has gone up by about 50 percent, this
was in large measure because of one prod-
uct—cashews. Imported food aid had
ceased, so a major component of import
substitution occurred as part of the return to
more normal conditions, following the se-
vere drought and the cessation of hostilities
in 1992. The majority of import substitution
possibilities, associated with the recovery
of the agricultural sector, have been ex-
ploited already, so ongoing development
strategies must increasingly focus on the
tradability of Mozambican goods.
The microeconomic instruments used to
enhance efficiency under ESRP include the
privatization of state enterprises and the lib-
eralization of prices. During the period of
socialist rule, all banks and the vast major-
ity of companies had been nationalized, and
the efficiency of production declined. Thus,
great potential existed for efficiency gains
at the outset of the privatization program.
Coming from a slow start, privatization of
the important larger state companies accel-
erated in 1995 and essentially progressed to
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14In reaction to the improved incentives, a lot of investment in large-scale milling capacity was undertaken in the
major cities during 1997–99.completion. While the goal of moving as-
sets from state into private hands was
largely attained, an authoritative assessment
of the impacts of privatization remains to be
done. Nevertheless, it is fair to conclude
that the privatization of the commercial
parts of the formerly state-owned banks, to-
gether with the entrance of new banks,
helped to increase competition in the finan-
cial sector. In addition, the stated goals re-
garding domestic price liberalization was
essentially met, and domestic price liberal-
ization is no longer a major policy issue.
By the end of the adjustment period, re-
habilitation of the social sector still pre-
sented major challenges for the govern-
ment. Revitalization of the health care sys-
tem was reflected in a decreasing child
mortality rate, but a lot remained to be
done. Improvements to the devastated edu-
cational system had also taken place.
Hence, the school network, which was
closed down because of the civil war, was
close to fully reconstructed; and the number
of primary school teachers had increased.
These improvements were not, however,
able to meet the increasing requirements of
a country experiencing rapidly growing
population from significant numbers of re-
turning refugees and other displaced peo-
ple. Thus, significant budgetary realloca-
tion toward social sectors was an essential
priority.
Conclusions
More than a decade after the start of the sta-
bilization and structural adjustment pro-
gram, and after five years of peace, macro-
economic stabilization was achieved in
Mozambique by 1997. Indicators for that
time show that monetary control was effec-
tive and inflation was low. Furthermore,
stable growth was reached in the second
half of the 1990s leaving few policy-
induced distortions in its wake. As such,
key recommendations of the liberal reform
program were achieved. While some see the
results as wholly satisfactory, it is also clear
that much of the progress realized in the
mid-1990s can be attributed to economic
recovery from an extraordinarily suppres-
sive environment. In any case, it is evident
that the long climb toward greater prosper-
ity has only just begun. Many basic require-
ments for economic growth, such as physi-
cal infrastructure, functioning government
administration, and human capital still suf-
fered from prolonged neglect and underde-
velopment by 1997. In addition, structural
imbalances, including severe aid depend-
ency, continued to be endemic and the vul-
nerability to exogenous shocks remained as
large as ever. This was demonstrated
vividly in early 2000 when massive flood-
ing caused a catastrophe in southern
Mozambique.
Progress from 1992 to 1997 included re-
ducing the excessive consumption share of
GDP and improving the foreign trade posi-
tion. Yet, the composition of private con-
sumption remained highly focused on home
consumption of own production. Moreover,
it was clear that fiscal and administrative
changes were critically needed. The turn-
around in the trade balance in particular was
achieved through a decrease in the imports
of consumer goods. The actual import sub-
stitution that occurred over the period had
in large measure been related to the recov-
ery of the agricultural sector, following the
1992 drought and the cessation of hostili-
ties. Some possibilities for import substitu-
tion remain, for example, in grain-milling
activities. Nevertheless, the ongoing need
for imports of investment and essential con-
sumer goods to underpin development
strictly limits the effectiveness of additional
import compression. This highlights the
need to improve the tradability of Mozam-
bican products and their competitiveness in
domestic and international markets. 
In sum, the successful stabilization of
inflation and monetary growth as well as
the high and stable investment level re-
ported in this chapter are cause for opti-
mism. Many distorting policy-induced in-
terventions were also removed during the
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covery from the damages of war and dislo-
cation was a significant contributor to the
turnaround. The underlying real develop-
ment constraints remained much the same
by 1997, and while market forces had been
set free, the government was left with little
capacity or ability to act. The alleviation of
widespread poverty remained an elusive
goal without institutional requirements—
such as an effective regulatory framework
and the promotion of agricultural produc-
tion and food security beyond mere market
liberalization—being given top priority,
and, hence, difficult development chal-
lenges remain.
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Linkage and Multiplier Analysis Based on
the Social Accounting Matrix
T
he 1995 social accounting matrix for Mozambique—called MOZAM for short—was
developed under the project Macroeconomic Reforms and Regional Integration in
Southern Africa.
15 No up-to-date SAM for Mozambique was previously available. The
methodological approach used relies partly on a descriptive analysis grounded in MOZAM
and its aggregate macroeconomic version, MACSAM (for Mozambique Macro-SAM). This
SAM confirms the critical importance of high marketing costs, the sizeable share of agricul-
tural production consumed on-farm, and the severe capital constraint, which inhibits marketed
agricultural production particularly.
A series of multipliers is also derived from MOZAM, and a structural decomposition of
these is undertaken following the structural path procedure introduced by Defourny and Thor-
becke (1984). Finally, a novel interpretation of the multiplier for value-added by capital (re-
ferred to as the “capital multiplier”) is developed as part of the analysis to reach conclusions
about development strategy and the allocation of scarce capital.
SAM Construction
In 1991 the NIS started producing coherent sets of national accounts in accordance with the
United Nations System of National Accounts. The NIS figures differ substantially from the of-
ficial national accounts published by the National Directorate of Planning (Table 5.1). As al-
ready pointed out in Chapter 4, these differences reflect that the NDPdata have been based on
dubious estimation procedures and poor cross-checking (Johnson 1995). More specifically,
the NDP national accounts rely heavily on data from technical ministries and public enter-
prises. They do not, for example, capture the importance of home consumption of own pro-
duction in the subsistence sector and a variety of activities in the services sector. In addition,
the NDP data are not representative of economic activity in the formal private sector follow-
ing the economic reforms undertaken since 1987 in the context of the Economic Rehabilita-
tion Program. In contrast, the NIS data are based on a variety of surveys,
16 and they have been
This chapter was written by Channing Arndt, Henning Tarp Jensen, and Finn Tarp.
15Comprehensive documentation of the construction of the new 1995 Mozambican SAM is available in Arndt et
al. (1998), and can be accessed through IFPRI’s homepage, http://www.cgiar.org/ifpri/index1.htm.
16These include surveys of demographic features as well as expenditure and production patterns, which have
been used to estimate the dimensions of consumption of own production. Moreover, the careful accounting of
marketing margins, reflected in this chapter, was based on price differentials between producer and consumer
prices.
45adjusted for items unnoticed in the NDPap-
proach. Finally, the new NIS accounts pro-
vide GDP from the expenditure as well as
the income side.
MOZAM incorporates a complete and
coherent data set, based on NIS informa-
tion, which is amenable to in-depth eco-
nomic analysis. Furthermore, MOZAM
contains a reasonable amount of detail on
the production side, covering 40 activities.
With 13 agriculture and 2 agricultural pro-
cessing activities, the agricultural sector is
particularly well represented.
17 There are
also 40 commodities, 3 factors of produc-
tion (agricultural and nonagricultural labor,
and capital),
18 and 2 household types (urban
and rural).
19 In addition, government expen-
diture is divided into 2 separate accounts:
recurrent government and government in-
vestment. The division of government ex-
penditure highlights the role of aid inflows
for the financing of investment for recon-
struction purposes, and it also facilitates the
examination of recurrent expenditures rela-
tive to tax revenue. An NGO account cap-
tures transactions related to NGOs, while a
capital account reflects the private sector
savings–investment balance.
MOZAM includes a number of innova-
tive features, reflected in MACSAM labels
(Table 5.2). In household demand, home
consumption of own production is distin-
guished from private consumption of mar-
keted commodities. Home consumption
avoids trade and transport margins, which
can represent 50 percent or more of the
marketed price. Thus, MOZAM captures
prevailing incentives for households to
avoid markets and function more as au-
tonomous production and consumption
units. Marketing margins are in focus in re-
lation to decisions about production for ex-
port and domestic consumption. However,
transaction costs are also important for im-
ported commodities. Domestic, export, and
import marketing margins are therefore ex-
plicitly broken out for each activity in
MOZAM.
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17Agricultural and agriculturally related activities include maize, rice, other grains, cassava, beans, other basic
crops, raw cashews, raw cotton, other export crops, other crops, livestock, forestry, and fisheries along with grain
milling and other food processing. These activities correspond one-to-one with the commodity specification in
MOZAM. The only exception is that an additional commodity, wheat, has no domestic activity because it is only
imported.
18Land is relatively abundant in Mozambique, and data on returns to land are nonexistent. Some work (Ministry
of Agriculture 1992) does indicate that these returns are not zero, as often assumed but the cost share of land is
surely small and is therefore lumped into the returns to capital in MOZAM.
19Alarge national household survey carried out in 1996–97 facilitates further disaggregation and allows more in-
depth analyses of distributional issues.
Table 5.1  Comparison of 1994 data sources
Data source (100 billion metical)
Planning Statistics Percentage  difference
Macroeconomic indicators (NDP) (NIS) (NIS as base)
GDP 86.5 108.4 -20.2
Investment 60.1 33.0 128.6
Exports 20.2 14.9 35.4
Imports 68.4 55.7 22.6
Trade balance -48.2 -40.9 -18.0
Source: Compiled by authors.






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.Finally, to obtain the balanced MAC-
SAM, as well as the disaggregated
MOZAM, the minimum cross-entropy esti-
mation procedure proposed by Golan,
Judge, and Miller (1996) was used (Table
5.3). This method takes all the consistency
requirements of the SAM into account, and
the aggregate macroeconomic totals of
MOZAM were in all cases within 1 percent
of the previously balanced MACSAM.
Since entries were disaggregated on the
basis of different, not fully compatible data
sources, adjustments to individual cells of
MOZAM were necessary. Differences from
the original data (the estimation “prior”)
were generally small—that is, less than 1
percent—and seldom more than 20 percent




A coherent 1995 macroeconomic profile of
the Mozambican economy can be derived
from MACSAM, which confirms that
Mozambique is indeed a very poor country,
even when exact GDP estimates differ.
Using an exchange rate of 8,890 meticals
per U.S. dollar and an estimated population
of 16 million, per capita income amounted
to only US$121 in 1995 market prices.
MACSAM also documents that home con-
sumption accounts for almost 19 percent of
total GDP, and private consumption of mar-
keted commodities makes up 62 percent.
Since home consumption avoids marketing
margins, this item actually accounts for a
much higher proportion of “real” household
demand than is reflected in MACSAM, an
issue that is further pursued in “Sectoral
Characteristics and Economic Linkages,”
later in this chapter.
Turning to the external balance, imports
add up to some 49 percent of GDP, while
exports are 19 percent. This sizeable for-
eign trade deficit is financed by an inflow of
foreign capital, mainly in the form of aid.
External capital inflows to the government
and NGO budgets in MACSAM can be di-
rectly attributed to foreign donors. More-
over, a major share of net capital inflows to
the capital account, derived on a residual
basis, is in fact related to foreign aid, as
commercial borrowing from abroad is very
limited. Mozambique is therefore one of the
most aid-dependent countries in the world,
and the sustainability of these aid flows is a
matter of serious concern.
Private and government investment ac-
count for 19 percent and 17 percent of GDP,
respectively. The productivity of invest-
ment gives rise to concern, as growth of per
capita GDP was around 4 to 6 percent per
year from 1992 to 1996. Abalanced assess-
ment must, nevertheless, take into account
that some donor-funded investment may be
recurrent in practice. In any case, given the
need to reconstruct Mozambique after a
long and vicious war, the country must
maintain investment at a high level in the
years to come. When it comes to investment
financing, dependence on external sources
is daunting. Total domestic enterprise,
household, and recurrent government sav-
ings account for 11 percent of GDP, equiv-
alent to a mere 31 percent of total savings.
Hence, more than two-thirds of total sav-
ings come from external sources. Maintain-
ing a high and efficient level of investment
and lowering aid dependency is a challeng-
ing task, given the imperative of increasing
the absolute level of consumption of the
Mozambican population.
In relative terms, private consumption,
including consumption of home-produced
goods and marketed goods, makes up some
81 percent of GDP. Government and NGO
consumption amounts to almost 13 percent
of GDP. While consumption should rise in
absolute terms because of widespread
poverty, consumption in the longer term
will have to fall to a much lower relative
level, unless donors are willing to maintain
the extraordinarily high level of aid.
Aid inflows registered in the govern-
ment budget make up more than 40 percent
of total revenue. Aid is therefore the largest





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.single revenue item. Other important
sources of revenue are consumption taxes
and import tariffs, accounting for 27 per-
cent and 15 percent of the total, respec-
tively, while income taxes yield 6 percent
only. The composition of revenue clearly
reflects both the dramatic aid dependence
of the Mozambican government and the
low level of development. Trade taxes have
so far been one of the few administratively
feasible ways of mobilizing revenue from
domestic sources. Since they have been de-
creasing in line with the reform efforts,
there is now a pressing need for reforming
the income tax system. Yet, it will take time




amounts to less than 10 percent of GDP.
21
This is low given the critically important
role of the state in further development in
Mozambique. Hence, in line with the im-
plementation of public sector reforms to
improve government effectiveness and
good governance, this share should in-
crease. Finally, total government revenue
and expenditure (including investment)
imply a financing requirement of 3 percent
of GDP. This is not by itself a critical figure.
It is, nevertheless, high in light of the low
domestic household and enterprise savings,
amounting to less than 9 percent of GDP—
putting the vulnerable, aid-dependent na-




The disaggregated nature of MOZAM
makes it possible to extend the brief macro-
economic analysis based on MACSAM to a
sectoral level. More in-depth analytical in-
sights regarding the agricultural sector are
pursued in this section as SAM multipliers
are derived and decomposed. A full version
of MOZAM is available, as already noted,
in Arndt et al. (1998). Highlights only are
provided in the following discussion.
MOZAM
The activity columns of MOZAM indicate
that value-added at factor cost amounts to
56 percent of total production costs in
Mozambique (Table 5.4). The share of
value-added is particularly high in agricul-
ture, where intermediate inputs account for
less than 16 percent of total sectoral costs.
The limited intermediate input use in agri-
culture reflects the rudimentary nature of
technology used in this labor-intensive 
50 CHAPTER 5
20Ongoing reforms include the introduction of value-added taxes and revisions of the income tax system.
21If the recurrent items in government investment expenditures were taken into account, this share would be
somewhat higher. 
Table 5.4  Sectoral production costs
Production costs (100 billion metical)
Cost item Agriculture Industry Services Commerce All sectors
Intermediate inputs 8.8 49.5 47.4 15.4 121.1
Labor (wages) 41.9 13.4 25.7 10.9 92.0
Capital (profits) 5.1 16.6 18.9 23.2 63.8
Output taxes -0.2 -0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.3
Total sectoral costs 55.6 79.5 92.0 49.4 276.5
Share in total costs (percentage) 20.1 28.7 33.3 17.9 100.0
Source: Authors’ disaggregated (micro-) SAM for Mozambique (MOZAM).sector. In fact, almost 90 percent of value-
added in agriculture represent labor wages.
Amore detailed analysis of agricultural sec-
tor costs of production show that—except
for raw cotton, other export crops, and fish-
eries—the low share of value-added by cap-
ital is, indeed, a general sectoral character-
istic.
22 In contrast, the share of value-added
by labor is 45 percent in industry and 32
percent in commerce. Hence, under the rate
of return assumption already referred to, the
intensity of capital is relatively high in the
production of commerce activities.
In the activity rows of MOZAM, 
production is transformed into home-
consumed and marketed production. The
second group corresponds to 88 percent of
the value of total domestic production
(Table 5.5). Yet, in agriculture, marketed
production accounts for only 45 percent of
domestic production, valued at producer
prices (that is, excluding marketing margins
and consumption taxes). This is a startling
feature of the underdeveloped Mozambican
economy, since roughly 75 percent of the
Mozambican population depends on agri-
culture for their livelihoods. It also follows
from the sectoral domestic production data
that home consumption is mainly a rural
phenomenon (Table 5.5).
Total commodity supply in the columns
of MOZAM does not include the supply of
goods for home consumption in the activity
rows. Consequently, agriculture’s share of
total marketed supply is very low (Table
5.6). Industry plays a significant role in for-
mal sector sales, and it is also the sector in
which imports make up an overwhelming
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Table 5.5  Sectoral domestic production
Domestic production (100 billion metical)
Production item Agriculture Industry Services Commerce All sectors
Urban home consumption 3.0 0.0 0.6 0 3.6
Rural home consumption 27.4 0.2 1.3 0 29.0
Marketed production 25.2 79.2 90.1 49.4 243.9
Total sectoral production 55.6 79.5 92.0 49.4 276.5
Share in total production (percentage) 20.1 28.7 33.3 17.9 100.0
Source: Authors’ disaggregated (micro-) SAM for Mozambique (MOZAM).
Table 5.6  Composition of sectoral supplies
Sectoral supplies (100 billion metical)
Supply item Agriculture Industry Services All sectors
Domestic production 25.1 79.2 90.1 194.4
Marketing margins 12.5 37.0 0.0 49.4
Consumption taxes 0.9 7.6 2.2 10.8
Import tariffs 0.2 5.6 0.0 5.9
Imports 5.0 64.7 14.2 83.9
Total sectoral supply  43.8 194.1 106.6 344.5
Share of total supply (percentage) 12.7 56.3 30.9 100.0
Source: Authors’ disaggregated (micro-) SAM for Mozambique (MOZAM).
22Assuming that the rate of return to capital is the same across all sectors of the economy, the implication is that
capital stocks (and the implied capital intensities in production) are relatively small in the majority of the agri-
cultural subsectors. share of supply. Thus, industry is the sector
in which government has, at least in the
timeframe of this study, relatively easy ac-
cess to revenue in the form of consumption
taxes and import tariffs.
The data on composition of sectoral
supplies confirm that commercial margins
are particularly important in agriculture
(Table 5.6). In fact, they account for 29 per-
cent of the total value of the supply of mar-
keted agricultural products. In industry, the
corresponding share is 19 percent, whereas
the service sector has, by definition, no
marketing costs. The high share of com-
mercial margins in marketed agriculture ex-
plains why home consumption of agricul-
tural products is so widespread. Moreover,
it illustrates that heavily home-consumed
subsectors, such as cassava and other basic
crops, are burdened with average domestic
marketing costs of 80 percent of the market
prices. In contrast, maize faces more mod-
est margins of around 25 percent.
The demand side of the Mozambican
economy, in the commodity rows of
MOZAM, is dominated by private con-
sumption, but the two investment accounts
also make up a considerable share of final
demand (Table 5.7). Moreover, the export
share of the industrial sector is small. This
sector therefore runs a large trade deficit. In
contrast, both the marketed agriculture and
service sectors run trade surpluses with ex-
port shares of around 20 percent. Within
agriculture, more than two-thirds of exports
come from fisheries.
The disaggregation of factor and house-
hold accounts in MOZAM indicates that 80
percent of capital income is paid to urban
households, whereas 60 percent of wage in-
come goes to rural households. Given that
the large majority of Mozambicans are
rural, this depicts an unequal distribution of
income between rural and urban areas.
Poverty, though certainly acute for some
urban people, is mainly a rural phenome-
non. While urban dwellers save 12.5 per-
cent of their income, the equivalent savings
rate is only 3.8 percent in rural areas.
Finally, MOZAM implies that while
agriculture is crucial for the subsistence and
employment of the large majority of the
Mozambican population, agricultural GDP
amounts to only 28 percent of total GDP, in-
cluding marketed production at market
prices as well as home consumption at pro-
ducer prices. On the other hand, services,
industry, and commerce account for 27 per-




SAM-based multiplier models belong to the
class of general-equilibrium models that
use fixed prices in assessing the economic
effects of exogenous changes in income and
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Table 5.7  Composition of sectoral demand
Sectoral demand (100 billion metical)
Demand item Agriculture Industry Services All sectors
Intermediate consumption 15.0 57.7 48.4 121.1
Private consumption 20.1 70.9 15.8 106.8
Government consumption 0.0 0.0 16.8 16.8
NGO consumption 0.0 0.0 5.5 5.5
Private investment 0.1 30.8 2.3 33.1
Government investment 0.0 27.6 0.8 28.4
Exports 8.6 7.1 17.0 32.7
Total sectoral demand 43.8 194.1 106.6 344.5
Share of total demand (percentage) 12.7 56.3 30.9 100.0
Source: Authors’ disaggregated (micro-) SAM for Mozambique (MOZAM).demand. The common distinguishing fea-
tures of these models include three basic
sets of assumptions. First, prices are fixed.
Accordingly, conclusions about quantities
are drawn on the basis of values. Second,
functional relationships are taken as linear
in the SAM columns. This implies, among
other things, that Leontief production func-
tions are relied on in the activity columns,
and there is no substitution between imports
and domestic production in the commodity
columns.
23 Third, multiplier models are 
demand driven. Accordingly, there are no
supply-side constraints on economic 
activity.
24
In the MOZAM-multiplier application,
activities, commodities, factors, enterprises,
and households are specified as endogenous
accounts, whereas government recurrent,
indirect taxes, government investment,
NGOs, capital, and the rest of the world are
kept exogenous. Thus, only two kinds of
shocks are possible, working through the
commodity and the household accounts, re-
spectively.
25 In the analyses, reference is
made to individual as well as total and sec-
toral multipliers. The total multiplier for do-
mestic activity output following from a
shock to a commodity is defined as the sum
of the multipliers (down the column of the
multiplier matrix) for all of the affected ac-
tivity accounts. For example, a one-unit in-
crease in the demand for maize generates an
increase in total domestic production of
2.10 units (Table 5.9). Other total multipli-
ers can be defined with respect to total sup-
ply, value-added, enterprise income, and
household income.
26 Accordingly, the total
multiplier for household income following
from a shock to the cassava commodity ac-
count, for example, is defined as the sum of
the individual household income multipli-
ers with respect to cassava. The sectoral
commodity multiplier is, in turn, defined as
the weighted average of the total multipliers
belonging to a given set of commodity ac-
counts where the weights reflect 1995
shares in total sectoral supply.
27
In the analysis, particular attention is
also paid to the capital multipliers.
28 Capital
is—from an overall point of view—the crit-
ically scarce factor of production in
Mozambique. Nevertheless, some limited
capital is available for economic expansion.
As such, capital should be considered, from
an analytical point of view, as freely avail-
able when marginal expansion in specific
sectors of production is considered. This is
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23Leontief production functions are characterized by constant returns to scale as well as no substitution in fac-
tors or intermediate inputs. Moreover, consumption shares of the households in the relevant columns of the SAM
are constant.
24SAM multiplier analysis is a static analysis that cannot capture the full dynamic returns to investments.
25A more traditional input–output multiplier analysis would have to be used if home consumption were to be
made an exogenous demand component. This is not pursued here.
26Linkages to enterprise income closely match linkages to capital. This is because the MOZAM framework al-
locates all of the capital income to the enterprise account, which in turn distributes most of this income to the
household accounts. It is only because of small-enterprise taxes and retained earnings that the multipliers are not
perfectly identical. Consequently, the interpretation of the linkages to the enterprise account is the same as the
interpretation of the linkages to capital. Hence reference is not made to enterprise income multipliers in what fol-
lows.
27The total multipliers for agricultural commodities with respect to domestic production are, for example, aver-
aged to arrive at what is termed the sectoral commodity multiplier for agriculture. In other words, this sectoral
multiplier reflects the increase in domestic production that would ensue with an increase in the demand for the
“average” agricultural commodity.
28In what follows, “capital multiplier” is used as shorthand for “value-added by capital multiplier.” Note that,
since the prices of capital (the rates of return) are assumed constant, the capital multipliers actually measure the


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.exactly the assumption underlying standard
SAM-multiplier analysis, in which capital
is treated as a fully unconstrained, endoge-
nous factor. It is evident, however, that the
relative scarcity of capital at the macro-
economic level has a fundamental impact
on how the multiplier results should be in-
terpreted. Normally, large multipliers in tar-
get sectors are welcome. They signal big ef-
fects on the economy. However, capital
multipliers also measure the additional
number of capital units needed to sustain
the multiplier process. Thus, under condi-
tions of generalized capital scarcity, maxi-
mizing the overall production and income
effects presumes that capital use is mini-
mized. Assuming that the rates of return to
capital are the same across sectors, it fol-
lows that it is the ratio between the multi-
plier in focus in the target sector and the
capital multiplier, rather than the target
multipliers per se, that is the proper meas-
ure to focus on.
29
This approach is adopted in the follow-
ing discussion. While it is methodologically
different, it is similar in spirit to the con-
strained multiplier analysis proposed by
Parikh and Thorbecke (1996). Their starting
point is that well-defined, but limited, ex-
cess capacities exist in certain production
sectors. On this basis, in addition to the un-
constrained multipliers, they derive so-
called mixed multipliers, which come into
effect as capacity constraints are reached.
The final multipliers put forward by Parikh
and Thorbecke (1996) are defined as the
sum of the unconstrained and mixed multi-
pliers. However, this route is not appropri-
ate here. First, detailed data are not avail-
able on the amount of excess capital in
Mozambique. Second, a major objective of
this report is to identify the sectors in which
expansion should originate, with a view to
allocating available capital most effectively.
Hence, the multiplier methodology must




as described in Defourny and Thorbecke
(1984), are relied on to investigate the im-
portance of capital-intensive marketing
services in the transformation of domestic
production into home-consumed and mar-
keted goods. Structural path analysis is de-
signed to provide a more detailed picture of
the effects of shocks to exogenous ac-
counts. The SAM multipliers measure the
cumulative effects from a shock, while the
path analysis decomposes the multiplier
into direct and indirect components. The ef-
fect on domestic marketing margins follow-
ing a shock to the demand for a given com-
modity can therefore be divided into effects
related to the marketing of the final domes-
tic product and the marketing of intermedi-
ate inputs, respectively. Thus, the structural
path decomposition is useful in this context
in understanding the nature and strength of
linkages that work through the commerce
sector, which is the focus of the discussion
of incentives to consume on-farm rather
than supplying to the market.
31
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29The implicit assumption of a uniform rate of return to capital across sectors is relied on in the sectoral ranking
in this report. Ranking according to changes in the returns to capital (that is, the capital multiplier) as done in
what follows is only consistent with the desired ranking according to changes in the stock of capital (that is, cap-
ital used in the multiplier process) when the rate of return to capital is uniform.
30Subramanian and Sadoulet (1990) suggest the use of yet another analytical framework in which supply con-
straints are binding right from the outset, with Lewis and Thorbecke (1992) being an illustrative application.
Since the focus of the present report is on the magnitude of traditional multipliers and on the allocation of scarce
capital among the various production sectors, capital is not seen as binding for individual sectors. This is why
the constrained multiplier approach was not adopted here.
31A complete structural path analysis has been carried out as part of the research reported here. Tables with the
full set of total influences (in the notation of Defourny and Thorbecke) can be obtained from the authors. For rea-
sons of space, only selected results are given here given the focus on decomposition related to marketing.Concerning linkages from commodity
demand, it is clear that the agriculture and
services sectors have large linkages to do-
mestic production, total supply, value-
added, and household income. However, in-
dustry has in general rather small linkages
(Table 5.9). It also appears that the sectoral
commodity multiplier of services with re-
spect to domestic production, amounting to
2.56, is lower than that of agriculture (2.75).
Since the linkage from services to the 
capital-intensive activity of domestic com-
merce is relatively small (0.19), it might
seem that an increase in services could ex-
pand production without significant strain
on scarce capital. Yet, this is an incomplete
assessment, as only capital used in market-
ing services is considered. Account must
also be taken of the capital used in actual
“physical” service production, reflected in a
capital multiplier of 0.60. On this basis, it
can be concluded that an increase in overall
domestic production is most effectively 
arrived at in terms of capital used by ex-
panding the agriculture sector. This is re-
flected in the fact that the ratio between the
output and capital multipliers (that is,
2.75/0.59 = 4.66) is largest in domestic
agricultural production.
32
Agriculture has the largest sectoral mul-
tipliers when it comes to factor and house-
hold income. A one-unit expansion in the
demand for the “average” agricultural good
will create additional factor returns of 1.72
units. Furthermore, since the ratio between
value-added and the individual capital mul-
tiplier is largest for agriculture, this sector
stimulates valued-added through a more ef-
fective use of capital than is the case for the
other two sectors. Similarly, a unit expan-
sion of agriculture will increase household
income by 1.67 units. This is more (both ab-
solutely and relative to the capital multi-
plier) than what would result from stimulat-
ing the services and industry sectors. Fi-
nally, the increase in income following
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32Assuming a rate of return to capital of 10 percent, the additional domestic production per unit of capital used
in the multiplier process can be calculated as 2.75/(0.59/0.10) = 0.47. Assuming—as previously mentioned—a
uniform rate of return to capital across sectors, it follows that ranking based on the capital multiplier is the same
as ranking based on capital used in the multiplier process.
Table 5.9  Sectoral commodity multipliers
Measure Agriculture Industry Services
Activities and commodities
Noncommerce 2.03 1.34 2.17
Domestic commerce 0.45 0.21 0.19
Export commerce 0.03 0.03 0.02
Import commerce 0.23 0.24 0.18
Total activities 2.75 1.81 2.56
Total commodities 3.14 2.47 3.08
Factors and enterprises
Agricultural labor 0.79 0.25 0.34
Nonagricultural labor 0.33 0.29 0.51
Capital 0.59 0.47 0.60
Total factors 1.72 1.01 1.44
Total enterprises 0.58 0.46 0.59
Households
Urban households 0.76 0.56 0.79
Rural households 0.91 0.42 0.60
Total households 1.67 0.97 1.39
Source: Authors’ calculations and the disaggregated (micro-) SAM for Mozambique (MOZAM).from a demand shock to the agriculture sec-
tor are directed relatively more toward rural
areas.
Turning to the multipliers, following
shocks to the demand for specific agricul-
tural commodities, they span a broad spec-
trum of combinations of linkages (Table
5.8).
33 The commodities can be grouped
into categories with markedly different
characteristics as regards their potential for
furthering domestic production, value-
added, and household income, including a
more equal distribution of income. These
characteristics are, in turn, largely deter-
mined by the size of the total multipliers.
The amount of capital necessary to fuel the
multiplier process does, however, also play
a role in ranking the commodities, espe-
cially in the case of maize.
Rice is the crop with the highest link-
ages. It faces reasonably low domestic mar-
keting costs, reflected in a multiplier of
0.30. In addition, capital costs for rice that
are associated with the multiplier process
are relatively low.
34 In addition, the total
value-added to the capital multiplier ratio
(2.51/0.50 = 5.02) is very high, and the
same goes for the relative domestic activity
and household multipliers. Thus, MOZAM
implies that expanding rice production ap-
pears attractive. Yet, current rice production
cannot expand much in reality because of
existing land and water constraints, which
would eventually be felt.
Maize is the second-largest individual
crop in MOZAM when both marketed and
home-consumed production are taken into
account, and the production of marketed
maize has relatively small overall linkages
(Table 5.8). Yet, the multiplier process fol-
lowing an expansion of this crop also faces
relatively low domestic marketing and cap-
ital constraints. The path multiplier analysis
shows that 52 percent of the marketing
costs pertain to the marketing of the final
domestic product, and that 48 percent can
be attributed to the multiplier process asso-
ciated with the marketing of intermediate
inputs. It follows that the total structural
path influence associated with the market-
ing of the final domestic product is 0.15
(0.29 * 0.52). This is relatively low com-
pared with other commodities, such as cas-
sava and other basic food crops, where the
share of home-consumed production is also
high. Thus, the potential to transform home-
consumed maize into marketed maize ap-
pears promising relative to other agricul-
tural products.
Maize is also characterized by high ra-
tios between the different total multipliers
and the capital multiplier (Table 5.8), im-
plying that an expansion of this crop might
be an attractive policy option in formulating
agricultural development strategies. This is
particularly so since maize has significant
natural potential for expansion. Further-
more, the high linkage to agricultural labor
income, relative to nonagricultural labor
(0.77/0.25 = 3.08) and capital (0.77/0.42 =
1.83) means that it is the rural population
that benefits most from expanding maize
production. Nevertheless, given the limita-
tions of the multiplier analysis, it should be
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33Official government investment figures amounted to about 45 percent of total investment in 1995, as estimated
by NIS. For reasons of space, comments are not included on other grains (mainly sorghum), beans, other export
crops (citrus fruits, copra, and sugar crops), and other crops (various minor crops, sunflower, and mafurra). These
commodities represent crops that have either low multipliers (beans and other crops) or high capital multipliers
(other grains and other export crops). Their importance is clear from the main text. The two agricultural pro-
cessing commodities—flour milling and other food processing—have multipliers similar to those of industry.
Textiles, often considered of interest because they use raw cotton as an input, do not perform better than the other
industrial commodities in terms of multipliers.
34Terms such as “marketing costs” or “use of capital” include both the direct costs related to the expansion of a
particular commodity that is shocked and the derived use of marketing services and capital in the multiplier
process.noted that the possibility of relatively easy
import substitution has essentially been ex-
hausted. Further growth in production will
most likely have to be accompanied by ex-
pansion of investments in small- and large-
scale milling, or expansion of exports,
which would require developing export-
oriented institutions. In Chapter 6, the ca-
pacity of export institutions, measured by
an elasticity of transformation between ex-
ports and domestically marketed maize, is
estimated to be quite low, implying that ex-
ports must be accompanied by development
of export institutions.
Livestock and forestry are characterized
by high linkages to noncommerce domestic
production, while the domestic marketing
and capital multipliers are of intermediate
size. The path multiplier analysis reveals
that the influence associated with the mar-
keting of the final domestic products is
around 0.13, which is rather low. Increasing
the share of marketed production of these
goods (including particularly activities such
as small ruminants and firewood collection)
is therefore a promising option. Further-
more, livestock and forestry have very high
multiplier ratios relative to the capital mul-
tipliers, and high linkages to agricultural
labor mean that an expansion of these mar-
keted commodities will benefit rural over
urban households. Thus, livestock and
forestry are sectors of considerable interest
in future agricultural development in
Mozambique, particularly since they are as-
sociated with considerable potential for ex-
pansion. This last observation reflects both
the natural-resource endowment of
Mozambique and the elimination of live-
stock herds during the war period.
Raw cashews show high linkages to
noncommerce domestic production, but this
sector is also associated with relatively high
domestic marketing and capital multipliers.
The result is that value-added and house-
hold-income multipliers relative to the cap-
ital multiplier are lower than that of live-
stock and forestry, but still relatively high
and—in this respect—comparable with
maize. Yet, the path analysis shows that the
marketing costs of the final domestic prod-
uct are high (0.34). Thus, the potential for
shifting the balance between home-
consumed and marketed raw cashews is not
very promising in contrast to, for example,
maize. Nevertheless, a caveat to the multi-
plier analysis is that the cashew processing
sector is relatively inefficient, as it stands in
the data set. Accordingly, a more efficient
processing sector could possibly spur struc-
tural changes and raise the creation of
value-added in the primary production 
sector.
Home consumption as a share of do-
mestic production ranges between 38 and
80 percent for the 5 agricultural products
singled out above.
35 However, despite these
shares of home-consumed production, the
associated marketing constraints are not
particularly large, with the possible excep-
tion of raw cashews. It follows that the
share of home, consumed production could,
and should, decline. This is not true for cas-
sava and other basic crops (largely vegeta-
bles), which face very high domestic mar-
keting constraints. Furthermore, the exces-
sive marketing costs are the main reason for
the high capital multipliers since these
crops are certainly among the least capital-
intensive in production. The path analysis
shows that the influences associated with
the marketing of final domestic production
of cassava and other basic crops are 0.89
and 0.60, respectively. Consequently, these
commodities have very limited potential for
market development. Low ratios of total-to-
capital multipliers are also characteristic.
Nevertheless, insurance, or safety-first,
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35The shares of home consumption in total production valued at producer prices are rice, 80 percent; maize, 63
percent; livestock, 50 percent; forestry, 48 percent; and raw cashews, 38 percent. In comparison, home-consumed
cassava and other basic crops make up 92 percent and 62 percent of total production, respectively.considerations, which are not captured in
the SAM multiplier analysis, are particu-
larly important for cassava production, as
further discussed in Chapter 10.
The fisheries sector
36 has high linkages
to noncommerce domestic production and
is associated with a low domestic marketing
multiplier. However, both the dependence
on intermediate inputs and the high share of
capital in total value-added imply that the
capital multiplier ends up quite high. This
lowers the ratio between the total multipli-
ers and the capital multiplier considerably.
Expansion of fisheries does therefore not
appear particularly attractive in a situation
where capital is scarce and natural re-
sources are constrained. This result is fur-
ther underlined by the fact that a low ratio
between rural and urban household multi-
pliers for fisheries implies that an overall
expansion of this sector does not seem to
carry attractive equity and poverty allevia-
tion effects.
Finally, raw cotton has some attractive
characteristics, such as a low capital multi-
plier, because of its role as a direct input
into the textile industry. As such, raw cotton
has relatively high total multipliers per unit
of capital. Thus, it comes out as a borderline
case between fisheries on the one hand and
livestock and forestry on the other. Yet, the
multiplier process associated with an ex-
pansion of the textile sector, which drives
the demand for raw cotton, is not attractive
according to the 1995 MOZAM. Again, a
caveat to the multiplier analysis is that a
more efficient processing sector could pos-
sibly raise the creation of value-added in the
primary production sector, or that the devel-
opment of trade links could allow the raw
cotton production sector to tap into export
markets.
37
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36The activity “fisheries” is treated here as an aggregate, and subsectors such as small-scale fisheries, which have
substantially different characteristics in terms of imported intermediates, are not accounted for separately. 
Furthermore, if the generation of exports was the exclusive focus, it is relevant to recall that both raw cotton and
fisheries are important. Yet expanding them will, in the Mozambican situation of scarce capital, take place at a
substantial cost to other sectors. Moreover, exports are exogenous in the SAM framework applied here. They are
therefore set at a level provided by the analyst rather than being an endogenous response, as in a fully specified
CGE model.
37While no raw cotton was exported in 1995, exports rose considerably in later years.
Table 5.10  Household multipliers
Measure Urban households Rural households
Activities and commodities
Noncommerce activities 1.44 2.03
Domestic commerce 0.26 0.32
Export commerce 0.03 0.03
Import commerce 0.21 0.25
Total activities 1.94 2.63
Total commodities 2.36 2.55
Factors and enterprises
Agricultural labor 0.38 0.86
Nonagricultural labor 0.30 0.33
Capital 0.45 0.51
Total factors 1.13 1.70
Total enterprises 0.44 0.50
Households
Urban households 1.57 0.71
Rural households 0.52 1.95
Total households 2.09 2.66
Source: Authors’ calculations and the disaggregated (micro-) SAM for Mozambique (MOZAM).The second category of exogenous
shocks that can initiate a MOZAM multi-
plier process—that is, shocks to household
income—can be implemented either by in-
creasing social security transfers from gov-
ernment or transfers from abroad (Table
5.10). Such shocks have uniformly higher
multipliers when they work through rural
rather than urban households. People in
rural areas demand more agricultural prod-
ucts, and the feedback mechanism for ex-
penditures and income has fewer leakages
because of the lower rural savings rate. In
addition, value-added and household-
income multipliers are in all cases higher
relative to capital multipliers when rural
rather than urban income expands.
Conclusions
The macroeconomic situation of Mozam-
bique leaves much to be desired, as dis-
cussed above. Poverty is widespread, and
the room for income redistribution is non-
existent. Thus, growth must form the core
of any future development strategy to in-
crease consumption in absolute terms. Yet,
investment is only being maintained at a
reasonable level because of the influx of
aid. It follows that mobilizing savings and
changing the consumption-investment bal-
ance, as well as making the best of capital
investments actually undertaken, are critical
macroeconomic challenges in promoting
longer-term growth in Mozambique. More-
over, government revenue needs to in-
crease. To overcome these problems, the
economic reform program must shift its
focus from the macroeconomic stabilization
achieved in the 1990s, to addressing the
fundamental need for structural change and
development.
The sectoral GDPfigures, especially the
low share of agriculture, are unusual given
the low level of development of the
Mozambican economy. They are, however,
a reflection of geography, poor infrastruc-
ture, and the role of Mozambique as a
provider of services to neighboring coun-
tries. In any case, agricultural development
is currently the only way of providing a
livelihood for the vast majority of the pop-
ulation. It is also a particularly effective
way of increasing the extremely low rural
savings rate and might enable the govern-
ment to diversify revenue sources away
from the present excessive dependence on
import related consumption taxes and im-
port tariffs.
The critical importance of agriculture
also clearly emerges from the multiplier and
structural path analysis discussed above.
Agriculture has much larger sectoral link-
ages than industry, and agriculture is more
effective than either industry or services in
generating additional value-added under the
conditions of scarce capital. In addition, the
sectoral commodity multipliers confirm that
agricultural expansion is the most appropri-
ate way of reducing the inequality in the
rural-urban income distribution. Growth
strategies for reducing poverty must focus on
the agricultural sector. This observation is
further reinforced by the fact that exogenous
income transfers have, in the case of
Mozambique, higher multiplier effects when
they are channeled through rural people.
While agriculture has high average mul-
tipliers, the specific agricultural commodity
multipliers and path analyses demonstrate
large intrasectoral differences. For example,
agricultural development in Mozambique
cannot rely in any significant way—from a
strictly economic perspective—on expand-
ing or shifting the balance between home-
consumed and marketed production of cas-
sava and other basic crops. Similarly, the
raw cotton and fisheries sectors do not ap-
pear to be very promising, while livestock
and forestry present reasonably well, partic-
ularly in terms of smallholder production.
In addition, as demonstrated here, maize
and to a lesser degree rice must form part of
the very core of any short-to medium-term
Mozambican development strategy. Cas-
sava is added to this list in Chapter 10 
because of its particular insurance charac-
teristics.
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A CGE Model for Mozambique
A
s previously discussed, a computable general-equilibrium model was developed for
Mozambique. A complete list of the equations of the model are in Appendix A.
38 In
many ways, the Mozambican model employed for the simulations described in Chap-
ters 7–11 is standard; however, it also exhibits a number of important departures from stan-
dard neoclassical CGE models. These departures include taking explicit account of the costs
associated with marketing goods.
The large costs associated with marketing agricultural production imply that much of the
rural population consumes a large part of their own produce. The explicit inclusion of home
consumption of own production represents another departure from standard neoclassical mod-
els. This feature is important because it enables poor rural households to avoid the marketing
costs associated with marketed agricultural products. The combined modeling of home con-
sumption and marketing costs is important because it represents two sides of the same coin.
Other nonstandard features of the Mozambican CGE model include imperfect mobility of
labor between agricultural and nonagricultural occupations and minimum production levels
for certain agricultural crops given safety-first considerations. The discussion of the Mozam-
bican CGE model in this chapter focuses on these special characteristics.
The empirical foundations for the departures from more standard models vary in strength.
Those departures thought to have the strongest empirical basis are incorporated into a base
CGE model developed from the 1995 base-year SAM presented in Chapter 5. This model is
then subjected to a novel and rigorous empirical testing procedure (see “Validation and Esti-
mation,” below; and also Arndt, Robinson, and Tarp 2002). The procedure essentially ad-
dresses two questions. First, can the model reproduce recent historical economic performance
in Mozambique? Second, for which values of behavioral parameters, chosen from an accept-
able prior distribution, does the model best reproduce the historical record?
In sum, this chapter presents an empirical and theoretical hypothesis concerning the struc-
ture of the Mozambican economy in the form of a CGE model, tests this hypothesis against
the historical record, and estimates acceptable parameter values that best fit the historical
record. This exercise provides both a basis on which to judge the capacity of the model to track
economic events and an empirical foundation for behavioral relationships. The validation and
This chapter was written by Channing Arndt, Henning Tarp Jensen, and Finn Tarp.
38The model presented here was developed under the project Macroeconomic Reforms and Regional Integration
in Southern Africa, and applied for the first time by Arndt et al. (2000) in the study underlying Chapter 9. Sub-
sequently, many of the new features—including marketing margins and home consumption—were included in
the so-called standard IFPRI CGE model (Lofgren, Harris, and Robinson 2001).
61estimation procedure used here for a macro-
economic model is in the spirit of Hansen
and Heckman (1996). They argue that the
distinction between calibration (estimation)
and verification (validation) is often con-
trived and that what is needed is a clearly
stated criterion for picking the parameters
of a model and assessing the quality of that
selection. The procedure presented below
provides both.
It is asserted, on the basis of the results
from the estimation and validation proce-
dure, that the model adequately reproduces
the historical record. Consequently, the esti-
mated vector of behavioral parameters is
accepted, and the implications of these 
parameter-value estimates are discussed.
Finally, the basic model structure, parame-
terized with the estimated vector, is deemed
suitable for policy analysis. 
Model Characteristics
The standard neoclassical CGE model as-
sumes (1) perfect competition, profit, and
utility maximization by firms and con-
sumers, respectively; (2) no transactions
costs; and (3) perfect mobility of factors of
production (land excepted). This model is
used regularly as benchmark in economic
modeling. From this basic structure, a large
number of models with differing character-
istics can be developed (see Dervis, de
Melo, and Robinson 1982).
In the Mozambican economy, cross-
hauling involving two-way trade of the
same commodity can be found in many sec-
tors, examples being food processing and
other services. Cross-hauling is efficiently
dealt with in the context of the 1-2-3 model
by Devarajan et al. (1997). This model is at
the core of the Mozambican CGE model.
Imperfect substitution between domestic
and foreign commodities are dealt with
through an Armington constant elasticity of
substitution (CES) function on the import
side and a constant elasticity of transforma-
tion (CET) function on the export side.
Furthermore, the core 1-2-3 model can
be extended easily to reflect conditions in
the economy that contradict the assump-
tions underlying the standard neoclassical
model. For example, unemployment can be
modeled easily by assuming a fixed nomi-
nal wage and a variable supply of labor, as
opposed to the standard case of a variable
wage and a fixed, fully employed supply of
labor. In addition, the model can be altered
relatively easily to accommodate fixed fac-
tors of production or factors of production
that move sluggishly between being em-
ployed in various activities.
The choice of macroclosure imposed on
the model often receives considerable
scrutiny. Since the model is a closed sys-
tem, it must satisfy Walras’law. Walras’law
states that if all but one equation in a closed
system are satisfied, the final equation must
be satisfied as well. In addition, basic
macroeconomic balances imply that private
savings + government savings + foreign
savings = aggregate investment. One of
these elements must be allowed to adjust,
unencumbered by any behavioral equation,
if the model is to simultaneously satisfy this
identity and Walras’law.
Theoretical perspectives on the opera-
tion of the macroeconomy also play a key
role. The “neoclassical” closure views in-
vestment as endogenous and determined by
available savings. This is the most com-
monly employed closure. Since aid flows
are such a dominant driver of investment in
Mozambique, this is the closure employed
for most of the simulations in this report as
well as for the estimation and validation ex-
ercise. However, alternative choices of
macroclosure exist. One alternative is a
“Keynesian” closure, which views invest-
ment as exogenous. In this specification,
total savings must adjust to attain the spec-
ified level of investment. An adapted 
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version of this closure is used for parts of
the trade policy analyses in Chapter 8.
39
Here, the primary concern is with eluci-
dating key elements in the structure of the
Mozambican economy and fashioning a
CGE model that reflects these elements.
Extensions to the core 1-2-3 model are pre-
sented below. The departures from the stan-
dard neoclassical model are present in some
(but not all) of the models employed for
analysis in Chapters 7–11. The importance
of these features follows directly from the
structure of the Mozambican economy
(Table 6.1) and the discussion in Chapter 5.
As mentioned, Appendix Acontains the full
set of equations.
39Much literature exists on the implications of alternative macroeconomic closures. Refer to, for example, Tay-
lor (1990) and Sen (1963). The choice of external closure is mainly driven by the policy environment. It depends
in particular on whether the country pursues a fixed or a flexible exchange rate regime. The choice of macro-
economic closure affects model behavior and results.
Table 6.1  Production structure of the economy
Activity (percentage)
Export share Import share Domestic
Sector/Category Value-added Exports Imports of output of absorption margin
Grain 5.7 0.2 4.0 0.8 42.4 27.4
Cassava 6.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 302.5
Raw cashews 0.7 0.2 0.0 5.7 0.0 44.2
Raw cotton 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Other export crops 0.6 2.4 0.1 54.8 8.2 52.3
Basic food crops 6.8 0.3 1.6 0.9 10.9 111.2
Livestock 2.4 0.1 0.2 0.4 7.4 13.6
Forestry 3.3 1.7 0.0 9.3 0.2 14.9
Fisheries 4.3 21.3 0.0 71.5 0.0 44.3
Mining 0.5 2.6 0.3 77.6 41.1 8.9
Food processing 2.8 8.6 18.8 13.7 26.9 58.7
Textiles and leather 1.0 6.8 2.8 67.8 39.5 36.2
Wood 0.5 1.2 0.6 21.7 19.9 26.0
Paper and packaging 0.1 0.0 1.4 1.2 40.7 37.4
Fuels and chemicals 0.5 1.1 18.5 15.4 54.2 46.7
Nonmetals 0.3 0.0 3.1 0.7 39.9 31.6
Metals 0.2 0.7 1.4 41.3 56.2 23.4
Machinery and equipment 0.2 0.6 28.7 17.5 76.2 14.0
Electricity and water 0.6 0.0 1.4 0.0 21.0 0.0
Construction 12.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Transport and communication 6.8 23.9 4.8 21.7 12.3 0.0
Banking and insurance 7.2 0.9 0.2 2.2 1.2 0.0
Dwellings 1.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Public administration 3.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Education 1.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Health 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Other services 7.5 27.3 12.0 39.5 40.0 0.0
Commerce 21.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 … …
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 … … …
Average … … … 12.5 26.9 11.9
Source: Authors’ calculations and the disaggregated (micro-) SAM for Mozambique (MOZAM).
Note: An ellipsis (…) means not applicable.Four significant departures from the
standard neoclassical model stand out: mar-
keting margins, home consumption, agri-
cultural versus nonagricultural labor, and
agricultural household behavior. These are
discussed below; their implications are pur-
sued in subsequent chapters.
Marketing Margins
Marketing margins reflect storage and
transportation costs, as well as risk associ-
ated with trading activities and limited op-
portunities for diversification. Since the
CGE model is created with a medium-term
focus, it is assumed that marketing tech-
nologies remain fixed over the experiment
horizon. The marketing margins are intro-
duced into the static CGE model by assum-
ing that each unit of a given production
good requires a fixed amount of marketing
services to reach the market. Since the cur-
rent model framework treats imported and
exported goods as inherently different from
domestically consumed production, mar-
keting margins related to exports, imports,
and domestic goods were accounted for
separately. The commercial services needed
for marketing purposes are all produced do-
mestically and considered to be similar in
nature, that is, the same trucks and storage
facilities were considered to be used for
marketing each of the three different types
of goods. Accordingly, a single production
activity provides the commercial services
associated with the marketing of commodi-
ties. Transaction costs vary among sectors,
as emphasized in Chapter 5. They are zero
in service sectors, by definition, while they
are nonzero and can become very large in
other goods sectors. The data indicate that
the cost of delivering certain agricultural
crops to domestic consumers surpasses the
cost of the product at the farm or factory
gate (Table 6.1).
All versions of the model are extended
to include marketing margins. Marketing
costs vary depending on whether the prod-
uct is imported, exported, or domestically
produced and marketed. Different margin
rates are therefore specified for imports, ex-
ports, and domestically marketed produc-
tion. As shown in Appendix A, marketing
margins enter equations (A1) through (A3),
which determine domestic market prices for
imports, exports, and domestically mar-
keted production. The parameters MRMim,
MREie, and MRDi (where the last is tabu-
lated in percentage terms in Table 6.1) de-
note the quantity of commercial services re-
quired to market one unit of imported, ex-
ported, and domestically produced com-
modities, respectively. These fixed quanti-
ties of commercial services are multiplied
by their price, PQAimr, to obtain nominal
wedges between border and factory or
farm-gate prices, on the one hand; and to
obtain domestic prices for imports, exports
and domestically marketed commodities,
on the other. In relation to domestically
marketed production, this implies that com-
mercial services are treated as another inter-
mediate input. Production of commercial
services is capital intensive. As a result, a
strong relationship exists between returns to
capital and the commercial service price.
Home Consumption
Almost all Mozambican households have
some money income, either from goods
sales or from factor remunerations. This in-
come is used for purchases of essential
goods that cannot be produced by the
households themselves. Nevertheless, the
possibility of home consumption enables
households to bypass the market in so far as
they can produce consumption goods them-
selves. The presence of high marketing
margins implies the existence of significant
wedges between farmgate sales prices and
market prices. Rather than sell at a low
price and purchase at a high price, house-
holds—particularly rural agricultural
households—can opt to consume at least
some of what they produce. In this way, ex-
plicit modeling of the interaction between
marketing costs and home consumption 
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aspects of the economy, such as poverty al-
leviation and welfare improvements for the
poorest households.
Home-consumed and marketed con-
sumption of all commodities are captured in
a linear expenditure system (LES) formula-
tion. This is illustrated in equations (A42)
through (A43) of Appendix A. The parame-
ters gammahi,hh and gammami,hh indicate
minimum consumption levels for home-
consumed and marketed commodities, re-
spectively. Supernumerary income—
defined as household income less savings,
taxes, and the cost of minimum consump-
tion levels—is allocated across commodi-
ties through the share parameters betahi,hh
and betami,hh, Elasticities of substitution be-
tween home-consumed and marketed com-
modities are determined by the minimum
consumption parameters gammahi,hh and
gammami,hh, If these minimum consumption
parameters are set at zero, cross-price elas-
ticities are of the Cobb-Douglas type and
equal to one. The price equation (A3) indi-
cates that the home-consumed price,
PDCH, is not laden with marketing mar-
gins. In contrast, the marketed consumption
price, PC, is laden with both marketing
margins and consumption taxes. In this
way, the model fully captures the avoidance
of marketing-related costs through home
consumption.
Finally, the estimated parameters of the
utility function (the estimation procedure is
outlined in the next section) set the quantity
of home consumption to be relatively in-
sensitive to changes in price through rela-
tively high values on gammahi,hh, especially
for rural households. This implies that mar-
keted production of agricultural commodi-
ties would tend to be more variable than
total production volume, as rural house-
holds sell more in good years and retain a
greater share of harvest to meet family




Existing evidence suggests that gener-
ally substitution between agricultural and
nonagricultural labor is imperfect in devel-
oping countries. This is even more the case
in Mozambique, where agricultural labor
consists mainly of smallholder farmers liv-
ing in rural areas (Naeraa-Nicolajsen 1998).
Accordingly, the skill levels of these farm-
ers are so different from what is required in
nonagricultural production that any
changeover to nonagricultural activities is
highly unlikely over the medium term.
In spite of the fact that the majority of
the rural population has no means of work-
ing in a nonagricultural production activity,
it is clear that urban households are also
supplying some agricultural labor to the
factor market. This labor supply is mainly
associated with the maintenance of the so-
called Machambas. Since agricultural pro-
duction from these small plots is already
maintained as a side occupation in most
cases, this part of the supply of agricultural
labor is not likely to substitute for nonagri-
cultural labor either, at least over the
medium term. Changeover from the nona-
gricultural to the agricultural labor category
is not likely either, since the flow of people
away from refugee camps and urban zones
back to the countryside following the end of
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40The presence of a significant share of home consumption potentially has profound implications for the response
of home-consuming households to exogenous shocks. If a household avoids markets for at least one commodity,
household decisionmaking becomes nonseparable in the sense that production decisions are linked to the house-
hold’s utility-maximization problem rather than being the solution to a pure profit-maximization problem. Pro-
duction decisions for subsistence goods depend on shadow values rather than on market prices. As a result, shifts
in policy variables that affect market prices for subsistence goods, such as import tariffs, might have no effect on
the household’s optimal production levels (Sadoulet and de Janvry 1995). An attempt to model nonseparable
household behavior within the framework of a 1-2-3 model can be found in Lofgren and Robinson (1999).the civil war has ended by now. Overall, the
most representative specification of labor
mobility over the medium term is to set the
substitution elasticity between agricultural
and nonagricultural labor to zero, thereby
fixing labor supplies inside each of the two
categories. This implies, among other
things, that wage rates are allowed to di-
verge between agricultural and nonagricul-
tural labor.
Nevertheless, the possibility for some
(imperfect) labor mobility was introduced
into the model through a constant elasticity
of transformation function between agricul-
tural and nonagricultural labor. The CET
function and its first-order condition for in-
come maximization are illustrated in equa-
tions (A15) through (A16). The CET speci-
fication differs from migration models in
the Harris–Todaro tradition. In these mod-
els, urban labor is often assumed to be sub-
stantially more productive than rural labor.
Urban migration can, as a consequence, in-
crease average labor productivity and thus
welfare.
If imperfect substitution between agri-
cultural and nonagricultural labor is permit-
ted, a pertinent general-equilibrium ques-
tion is to which households does the income
generated by those units of labor—which
have moved category—accrue? Little em-
pirical data exist on migration patterns and
remittances, although remittances are re-
garded as important in some regions
(Naeraa-Nicolajsen 1998). In the SAM, in-
come generated by agricultural labor ac-
crues primarily, but not exclusively, to the
rural household, while income generated by
nonagricultural labor accrues primarily, but
not exclusively, to the urban household. For
the sake of simplicity, rural and urban
households can be assumed to receive con-
stant shares (those shares implied by the
SAM) of income generated by agricultural
and nonagricultural labor. This implies
equally proportioned shifts in labor be-
tween categories across households. Thus,
if the agricultural labor force declines by 1
percent, causing a 2 percent rise in the
nonagricultural labor force, these same per-
centage changes are assumed to apply to the
labor endowment of each type in each
household.
It is a relatively simple matter to drop
the equations relating to the CET specifica-
tion and fix labor supplies in agriculture and
nonagriculture. As noted above, all model
versions used this factor market closure in
the end. In the validation and estimation ex-
ercise, quantities of labor were fixed in
agriculture and nonagriculture on the basis
of rural and urban population data. As a re-




Two perceptions of agricultural household
behavior merit investigation, and they both
appear to have strong potential general-
equilibrium effects. First, there is evidence
suggesting differing sex roles in agricultural
production (NDR 1992; Ministry of Agri-
culture and Fisheries/Michigan State Uni-
versity 1997; Liberman 1989; Pehrsson
1993; Pitcher 1996; Waterhouse 1997;
ZADP 1997). While there are wide varia-
tions across regions as well as some contra-
dictory results from separate studies carried
out in the same regions, the general story
runs as follows: Men clear land and tend
livestock. In addition, they are more in-
volved in production of cash crops than
food crops. Women perform household
chores, tend the food crops, and are respon-
sible for a substantial share of cash crop
production. Second, safety-first considera-
tions are likely to play an important role in
relation to agricultural production. The
modeling of safety-first considerations can,
as further discussed in Chapter 10, be im-
plemented through the parameter RISKj,
which enters equations (A12) and (A25).
Ample evidence exists to support the
first three departures from the standard neo-
classical model. However, it should be em-
phasized that the deviations from the 
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agricultural household behavior rubric are
of a more stylized nature. It should also be
emphasized that all of these deviations from
the standard neoclassical model, including
the deviations listed under the agricultural
household behavior rubric, are potentially
applicable to numerous regions across the
African continent.
Validation and Estimation
Despite their popularity, CGE models are
frequently criticized for resting on weak
empirical foundations (McKitrick 1998; de
Maio, Stewart, and van der Hoeven 1999).
Criticism focuses, in particular, on weak
empirical foundations for estimates for be-
havioral parameters. The problem is not
confined to CGE models but has been rec-
ognized for complex simulation models in
general (Schmalensee, Stoker, and Judson
1998).
For developed countries, major micro-
econometric exercises have been under-
taken to estimate behavioral parameters,
notably trade parameters. These include ef-
forts by the IMPACT project, the U.S. In-
ternational Trade Commission, and the U.S.
Central Intelligence Agency (Alaouze
1976, 1977; Alaouze, Marsden, and Zeitsch
1977; Shiells, Stern, and Deardorff 1989;
Shiells 1991; Shiells and Reinert 1991;
Shiells, Roland-Holst, and Reinert 1993;
and Goodman 1973). Despite these and
other efforts, the microeconometrics litera-
ture is widely viewed as providing only
spotty coverage of the parameters of inter-
est (Hansen and Heckman 1996; McKitrick
1998). In addition, it is far from clear that
results from microeconometric studies can
be applied appropriately to the more aggre-
gate sectoral and household representations
usually present in CGE models. For devel-
oping countries, the lack of an empirical
basis for behavioral parameters is even
more severe. As a result, debate over appro-
priate values for behavioral parameters re-
mains highly contentious. This is particu-
larly true for trade parameters in CGE mod-
els employing Armington-type trade as-
sumptions, such as the one employed in this
study.
The dearth of estimates of behavioral
parameters has generally led analysts to
specify functional relationships that require
relatively few behavioral parameters.
Hence, the ubiquity of the CES functional
form in applied general-equilibrium analy-
sis. This parsimony with respect to the
number of behavioral parameters comes at
a cost in terms of flexibility in representing
technology or preferences (Jorgenson 1984;
Uzawa 1962; McFadden 1963).
Direct econometric approaches to esti-
mating CGE models have been used (Jor-
genson 1984; Jorgenson and Slesnick 1997;
McKitrick 1998). However, lack of data,
computational and conceptual difficulties in
estimation, and uncertainty concerning the
validity of resulting estimates have been
formidable barriers to application of the
econometric approach. Existing applica-
tions reflect these difficulties. First, econo-
metric estimates are almost always obtained
using annual data. The elasticities obtained
are thus short run. However, many CGE
analyses consider a significantly longer ad-
justment timeframe, often three to five
years. Short-run elasticities are likely to un-
derstate the response capacity of agents
over this longer time frame. Second, given
the large number of parameters to be esti-
mated, long-time series data for numerous
variables are required to provide sufficient
degrees of freedom for estimation. In many
cases, the economy is likely to have under-
gone structural changes over the period,
which may or may not be reflected appro-
priately in the estimation procedure.
Finally, even those econometric esti-
mates designed specifically to feed parame-
ter estimates to CGE models undertake es-
timation without imposition of the full set
of general-equilibrium constraints. While
the estimated parameters might provide a
highly plausible description of historical
production and consumption data sets, the
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estimated values will not be fully compati-
ble with the general-equilibrium system
they are designed to represent. For exam-
ple, predicted values from separate econo-
metric production and consumption sys-
tems have the potential to grossly violate
product balance conditions for some years
of historical data.
As an alternative to the econometric ap-
proach, some CGE researchers employ a
simple “validation” procedure by which
they run a model forward over a historical
period and compare results for some vari-
ables. The results can provide a basis for re-
vising estimates of some important parame-
ters, recalibrating the model in a kind of in-
formal Bayesian estimation procedure. Ex-
amples of this approach include Gehlhar
(1994); Kehoe, Polo, and Sancho (1995);
and Dixon, Parmenter, and Rimmer (1997).
Unlike econometric approaches, this ap-
proach makes limited use of the historical
record and provides no statistical basis for
judging the robustness of estimated param-
eters.
In this study, a maximum-entropy ap-
proach was employed to estimation of be-
havioral parameters for a CGE model. This
approach is similar to the econometric ap-
proach of Jorgenson (1984) in that the full
historical record can be employed, and sta-
tistical tests for estimated parameter values
are available. It is similar to the multiperiod
validation and calibration approach in that
the full model tracks the historical record of
exogenous variables, and the maximum-
entropy approach can be applied in the ab-
sence of copious data. This approach en-
ables researchers to use all available data,
take into account all relevant constraints,
employ prior information about parameter
values, and apply variable weights to alter-
native historical targets. Available informa-
tion does not need to be complete or even
internally consistent. The philosophy of the
maximum-entropy approach is to use all
available information and to avoid assum-
ing any information not available (such as
strong assumptions about the distribution of
error terms).
Maximum-Entropy 
Estimation for a CGE Model
The maximum-entropy approach is moti-
vated by “information theory” and the work
of Shannon (1948), who defined a function
to measure the uncertainty, or entropy, of a
collection of events. The approach is now
widely used to estimate and make infer-
ences when information is incomplete,
highly scattered, or inconsistent (Kapur and
Kesavan 1992). Golan, Judge, and Miller
(1996) bring the general regression model
into the entropy and information framework
by specifying an error term for each equa-
tion, without assuming any specific form
for the error distribution. In addition, the
framework allows specification of a prior
distribution for the parameters to be esti-
mated. The result is a flexible estimation
framework that supports the use of infor-
mation in many forms and with varying de-
grees of confidence. The power of the
framework stems from its efficient use of
scarce information.
In the entropy estimation formulation
applied here, the static CGE model attempts
to track the historical record over a series of
time periods. Historical statistics are di-
vided into three groups. The first group
contains exogenous variables (variables
whose values are determined outside of the
model) observable from historical data.
This group would typically contain histori-
cal data on tax rates, employment, world
prices, and government spending. The sec-
ond group contains exogenous variables not
observable from historical data. Rates of
technical change by industry are prominent
members of this group for most developing
countries, including Mozambique. The
third group contains endogenous variables
(variables whose values are determined by
the model) observable from the historical
record. This group would typically containinformation on items such as GDP, exports,
imports, and household consumption.
If the known exogenous variables and
arbitrary values for the unknown exogenous
variables and behavioral parameters (such
as Armington substitution elasticities) are
imposed on a CGE model, the model gen-
erates a “prediction” for a large number of
endogenous variables whose actual values
are also available from the historical record.
The values predicted by the model can then
be compared with the historical record. The
maximum-entropy approach provides a
framework for formally comparing a di-
verse set of model-predicted values with
their corresponding historical values for a
series of time periods. The entropy criterion
can then be used to choose parameter val-
ues, such as Armington substitution param-
eters and rates of technical change, that per-
mit the model to best track the historical
record. In addition, economic theory, em-
pirical experience with CGE models, and
the econometric literature provide some
guidance on likely values and acceptable
ranges for parameter estimates. This infor-
mation can be imposed in the form of prior
distributions. When prior distributions are
imposed, the maximum entropy approach
strikes a balance between tracking the his-
torical record and respecting the prior dis-
tributions.
An Application to 
Mozambique
Data and estimation. The primary data
source employed for estimation is the NIS
national accounts data for the period
1991–96. Product balance statements for
184 commodities are available for the pe-
riod and provide information on imports,
exports, tariff revenue, total production,
marketing margins, intermediate consump-
tion, and household consumption (split be-
tween the rural and urban sectors as well as
home versus marketed consumption).
Value-added and additional tax information
is also available for 26 sectors. These data
are supplemented by data from the Mozam-
bique Anuário Estatístico (MPF various
years). This source provides information on
exchange rates, government expenditure
(broken between recurrent and investment),
government tax revenues, remittances, and
aid in the government budget.
In the model to be estimated, the data
are aggregated to 6 commodities (food,
cash crops, processed food, seafood, manu-
factures, and services) and 7 activities,
which correspond one-to-one to the com-
modities plus the commerce activity. The
base year for the model is 1995, which cor-
responds to the base year for the SAM. In
1991, war was ongoing and data quality is
thought to be exceedingly poor. As a result,
this year is excluded from the analysis. The
data set thus comprises five years
(1992–96), including the base year. The
paucity of time-series data implies that an-
nual observations must be employed in es-
timation. The estimated elasticities apply to
this relatively short time frame.
The GDP deflator is used to convert all
data to real 1995 values. The following his-
torical data series from the observed exoge-
nous variables vector are imposed on the
model: the exchange rate (metical to U.S.
dollars),
41 total nongovernmental organiza-
tion activity, total government expenditure
and government investment, subsidies to
enterprises, social security payments, net-
remittances, tariff rates by commodity, and
world price changes for exports and imports
by commodity. Indices of world prices for
imports and exports are derived from 
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41Even though Mozambique conducts very little direct trade with the United States, the exchange rate of metical
to U.S. dollars was chosen. Three reasons underpin this choice. First, the value of aid flows, which are extremely
important, and remittances, which are somewhat important, are recorded in U.S. dollars. Second, many interna-
tional transactions are denominated in dollars even if the United States plays no part in the transaction. Third, the
metical-U.S. dollar exchange rate behaved similarly to a trade-weighted exchange-rate index over the estimation
period.national accounts data presented in Chapter
4. The indices exhibit considerable price
variation for most commodities, which
bodes well for identifying trade parameters.
Data are not available on the evolution
of the stock of labor and capital. Agricul-
tural and nonagricultural labor stocks are
assumed to vary proportionately with rural
and urban population respectively. Rural
and urban population estimates are derived
from Bardalez (1997). Estimates for the
capital stock were obtained using a variant
of the perpetual inventory method of Nehru
and Dhareshwar (1993). They describe the
evolution of the capital stock as follows:
(1)
where K0 is the initial capital stock, It is in-
vestment in period t, and φ is the rate of
geometric decay.
Unfortunately, neither a long series of
investment data nor an estimate of an initial
capital stock is available. An estimate of the
capital stock in 1995, the base year, was ob-
tained by dividing total payments to capital,
derived from national accounts data, by an
assumed rate of return to capital. An annual
rate of return of 0.17 was assumed, which
accords with the high rates of return to cap-
ital experienced over the period and simple
growth accounting equations. Remaining
capital stocks can then be determined by
applying the evolution equation for capital
stock under an assumed rate of decay.
Nehru and Dhareshwar (1993) apply a rate
of decay of 0.04 to all countries in their
sample. However, they admit that develop-
ing countries are likely to have higher rates
of decay. For Mozambique, rapid rates of
decay can be expected for road investment,
which claims a relatively high share of total
investment. A rate of decay of 0.075 was
applied.
Finally, some exogenous parameters,
derived from the 1995 SAM, are held con-
stant throughout the estimation period.
These include input-output coefficients; in-
come, enterprise, factor, and consumption
tax rates; most output tax rates; household
and enterprise savings rates; commodity
cost shares in government consumption and
investment; and commodity cost shares in
private investment. In these cases, either
time-series data on these coefficients are
unavailable or the coefficients are small and
have remained relatively constant through-
out the period.
Eight sets of variables are targeted. An
error term measures the difference between
values predicted by the model and the value
of the historical targets. Historical target
variables include GDP(a), total sales by ac-
tivity (b), the value of imports by commod-
ity (c), value of exports by commodity (d),
consumption tax revenue (e), value of total
private investment (f), the value of home
consumption by commodity and household
type (g), and value of marketed consump-
tion by commodity and household type (h).
For example, the relationship between ac-
tual and predicted GDP determines the




Table 6.2  Support set end points on predicted values for imports





Sources: Authors’ calculations and the disaggregated (micro-) SAM for Mozambique (MOZAM).
Note: Predicted values in 1995 always equal actual values because 1995 is the base year.
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=− + − ∑where GDPt
a is actual GDP in period t and
GDPt
p is predicted GDP in period t.
In the entropy estimation formulation,
support sets on error terms set the maxi-
mum divergence of the predicted value
from the historical target. The upper and
lower support points for predicted values of
imports are represented by commodity as a
percentage of historical targets (Table 6.2).
These support sets are typical of those em-
ployed for almost all target variables ex-
cepting GDP.
42 Support sets are relatively
wide. In addition, because data quality is
believed to be poorer for 1992 and 1993
than for subsequent periods, support sets
are widened for these periods. The support
sets on the error for GDP are significantly
tighter—the error in predicting GDP can be
no larger than 15 percent of actual GDP for
all periods. All support sets, on error terms,
are symmetric three-point (lower, upper,
and zero) prior distributions.
Prior distributions for parameters were
set wide to contain all possible parameter
values. For trade parameters associated
with the CES aggregator functions, three-
point prior distributions (Table 6.3) were set
on elasticities, with the lower point set at
0.3, the central point set at 1.5, and the
upper point set at 9.0. The central point,
which corresponds to the prior, was given a
weight of 0.5. Weights on the upper and
lower points were set such that the expected
value of the prior distribution was 1.5.
43The
support set is the same for the CET except-
ing the upper point, which is set at five
rather than nine to reflect the limited export
capacity of the economy. 
On the consumption side, estimation 
focused on minimum consumption levels 
in the linear expenditure system. Other 
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Table 6.3  Trade parameter support sets and estimates
Export elasticity Import elasticity
Activity Estimate Prior value High Low Estimate Prior value High Low
Food 0.72 1.50 5.00 0.30 5.54 1.50 9.00 0.30
(0.500) (0.128) (0.372) (0.500) (0.069) (0.431)
Cash crops 2.20 1.50 5.00 0.30 0.69 1.50 9.00 0.30
(0.500) (0.128) (0.372) (0.500) (0.069) (0.431)
Fish 0.74 1.50 5.00 0.30 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
(0.500) (0.128) (0.372)
Processed food 0.33 1.50 5.00 0.30 0.57 1.50 9.00 0.30
(0.500) (0.128) (0.372) (0.500) (0.069) (0.431)
Manufacturing 0.56 1.50 5.00 0.30 0.87 1.50 9.00 0.30
(0.500) (0.128) (0.372) (0.500) (0.069) (0.431)
Services 2.84 1.50 5.00 0.30 1.85 1.50 9.00 0.30
(0.500) (0.128) (0.372) (0.500) (0.069) (0.431)
Sources: Authors’ calculations and the disaggregated (micro-) SAM for Mozambique (MOZAM).
Notes: Prior weights for each point in the support sets are shown in parentheses below each point. N.a. means
not available.
42For some very small flows, support points are set very wide, such as with small but positive imports of cash
crops, which occur in each year. 
43The CES import aggregator function is not defined numerically for an elasticity of one. To permit estimation,
the import elasticities were bounded initially to be greater than one. If an elasticity estimate struck its bound, the
bounds were shifted to the elasticity range less than one. This process continued until an interior solution (no im-
port elasticities on bounds) was found. Prior distributions remained the same for all solutions.parameters of the linear expenditure system
are implied by choice of minimum con-
sumption levels and base-year data. Equally
weighted three-point prior distributions for
minimum home and marketed consumption
levels were centered on one-third and one-
fifth of base-year consumption levels, re-
spectively, for all households and com-
modities. Lower and upper limits on the
prior distributions were set at 50 percent
and 150 percent of these central levels.
Equally weighted two-point support
sets for prior distributions were set on pa-
rameters for technical change. Rates of
Hick’s neutral technical change over the es-
timation period were calculated for manu-
factures and services–the two activities
where weather or other external factors do
not play a major role in determining pro-
ductivity levels. These support sets were set
quite wide, with the lower point set at –20
percent per year and the upper point set at
24 percent per year, implying a prior mean
value on technical progress of 2 percent per
year. For agricultural activities (food and
cash crops) and for the fishing activity in
1993, technology parameter support sets
were specified for each year, reflecting sig-
nificant variation in climatic conditions
over the estimation period.
44 Lower and
upper points on technology parameters
were set at 25 percent and 250 percent, re-
spectively, of the level observed in 1995.
Weights on support set points were chosen
so that the prior value for the technology
parameter was exactly the 1995 level.
Finally, some elements of the unob-
served exogenous variables vector were 
estimated without any prior distributions. In
particular, levels for output subsidies to
food processing and manufacturing activi-
ties were set as free variables with no prior
levels for the years 1992–94. This choice
reflects subsidies in the form of soft loans
from state-run banks (or the central bank it-
self) directed toward these activities over
this period.
45 The soft loans permitted se-
lected firms in manufacturing and food pro-
cessing to pocket the inflation-induced in-
crease in product price over the period (if
they repaid the loan, which they often did
not). Since inflation rates hovered around
50 percent over the period, easy access to
low-cost credit represented a large subsidy
at that time. This subsidy appears to have
manifested itself in the national accounts in
the form of reduced input costs. Failure to
account for implicit state subsidies to man-
ufacturing and food-processing industries
implies rapid technological regress over the
estimation period—a highly implausible re-
sult.
Allowing net capital inflows to adjust
endogenously closes the model. The ex-
change rate is fixed to the historical target.
Thus, net capital inflows expand or contract
depending on the gap between domestic
savings and nongovernment investment.
46
Measures of fit. This section examines
some measures of goodness of fit between
actual and predicted values. This study fol-
lows Kehoe, Polo, and Sancho (1995) in
employing simple correlations and pseudo
R-squared measures to determine goodness
of fit.
47 Movement of macroeconomic 
aggregates over the estimation period 
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44Use of data on climatic conditions (for example, rainfall) as instrumental variables in estimation of agricultural
technology parameters would be an interesting extension.
45To the extent that subsidization of certain industries through the banking system continued into 1995, this sub-
sidization is inadequately captured in the available social accounting matrix. However, by 1995, it had become
clear that the banking system had been a conduit for subsidies to state enterprises, and steps had been taken to
minimize the flow (Castro 1995).
46This is also the only feasible closure. Credible data on capital inflows is nonexistent. Official capital inflow
data correspond with a different (and lower-quality) set of national accounts, as discussed in Chapter 4. The two
sets of national accounts differ substantially in levels for almost all aggregates of importance—such as GDP, ex-
port, imports, and the trade balance—as well as trends in these aggregates.correlates nicely with the historical data
(Table 6.4). Values for the pseudo R-
squared tend to be substantially lower than
the correlations. Unlike linear regression,
which forces the sum of the error terms to
equal zero, predicted values in this maxi-
mum entropy procedure can consistently di-
verge from actual values by either a positive
or negative amount. All of the predicted
values for the aggregates studied, excepting
total imports, exhibit a tendency toward ei-
ther positive or negative consistent diver-
gence from the actual value.
As to goodness of fit for exports and im-
ports (Table 6.5), performance in terms of
correlation and R-squared varies substan-
tially from more than 0.9 to negative values.
For the major import commodity (manufac-
tures with a 53 percent share) and export
commodity (services with a 52 percent
share), predicted values track historical val-
ues quite closely. Small flows, such as ex-
ports of food and imports of cash crops,
tend to be predicted with a lesser degree of
accuracy. This result is intuitive. General-
equilibrium models perform best in 
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Private investment 0.92 0.83
Value of intermediate consumption 0.97 0.84
Total sales 0.97 0.55
Total exports 0.80 0.62
Total imports 0.62 0.65
Sources: Authors’ calculations and the disaggregated (micro-) SAM for Mozambique (MOZAM).
aThe pseudo R-squared measure employed is simply ESS/TSS, where ESS is the error sum of squares and TSS
is the total sum of squares.
Table 6.5  Measures of fit for exports and imports
Processed Weighted
Measure Food Cash  crops Fish food Manufactures Services average
a
Exports
Share in 1995 0.01 0.04 0.21 0.17 0.05 0.52 n.a.
Correlation 0.35 0.91 0.14 -0.48 0.60 0.91 0.50
R-squared
b 0.10 0.96 -2.03 -0.66 0.39 0.76 0.46
Imports
Share in 1995 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.22 0.53 0.18 n.a.
Correlation 0.87 -0.60 n.a. 0.51 0.90 0.89 0.81
R-squared
b 0.79 -0.08 n.a. 0.43 0.92 0.63 0.75
Sources: Authors’ calculations and the disaggregated (micro-) SAM for Mozambique (MOZAM).
aFor the cases of negative R-squared in the export row, these values were set to zero for the purposes of the
weighted R-squared calculation, with the weights corresponding to 1995 export or import shares as appropriate.
bThe pseudo R-squared measure employed is simply 1 – ESS/TSS, where ESS is the error sum of squares and
TSS is the total sum of squares.
47The pseudo R-squared measure employed is simply 1 – ESS/TSS, where ESS is the error sum of squares, and
TSS is the total sum of squares. The use of ordinary least squares imposes conditions on error term estimates that
imply various properties for R-squared. These properties are not present in the maximum-entropy estimator. For
example, estimation by ordinary least squares implies that RSS/TSS = 1 – ESS/TSS, where RSS is regression
sum of squares. The maximum-entropy procedure employed does not impose this relationship.analyzing issues where general-equilibrium
feedbacks matter. As a result, the model
should be more adept at predicting larger
flows.
Two prominent exceptions to this rule
of thumb are exports of seafood and
processed food. Each commodity’s share of
total exports is significant; nevertheless,
correlations are small or negative and R-
squared is negative for each commodity.
These poor performances probably indicate
that exogenous factors, operating outside of
the model, had a stronger impact on exports
of seafood and processed food than the fac-
tors contained within the model. In the case
of seafood, exports are materially affected
by weather and ocean conditions, particu-
larly for shrimp. Regarding processed food,
exports of this commodity are composed
primarily of sugar, cashews, and cotton
fiber. As discussed in Chapter 4, each of
these constituent industries operated in a
complex and rapidly evolving regulatory
environment over the estimation period.
These policy constraints and shifts are im-
possible to incorporate into the model at
this level of aggregation, but they have
clearly affected export performance for
cashews and sugar and quite likely have af-
fected export behavior for cotton fiber.
Under this criterion, model predictions
of import behavior perform well with a
weighted correlation of 0.81 and a weighted
R-squared of 0.75 (Table 6.5). Model pre-
dictions of export behavior are less favor-
able, with a weighted correlation of 0.50
and a weighted R-squared of 0.46 (with the
truncation of R-squared measures at zero).
In sum, the model is capable of explaining
many salient aspects of the performance of
the Mozambican economy in the period fol-
lowing the civil war. This is remarkable
given the tumultuous changes that charac-
terized the period and the relative paucity of
good information on economic perform-
ance. The fit of the model was deemed to be
adequate enough to proceed to estimating
behavioral parameters.
Trade parameter estimates. Estimated
export elasticities for four commodities
(food, seafood, processed food, and manu-
factures) are low. For services and cash
crops, estimated export elasticities move
substantially above the prior levels. Since
services made up more than half of exports
in value terms in 1995, the elastic transfor-
mation estimate is interesting. A statistical
test was conducted by the authors to deter-
mine if the prior elasticity of 1.5 is consis-




shown in Table 6.3) was 2.2 and fails to re-
ject the null hypothesis.
49 The basic story
emerging from the estimates is that
Mozambique is an economy with little ca-
pacity to shift production between domestic
and export markets for many export com-
modities. The loss of contact with export
markets that occurred during the civil war
period appears to have restricted the capac-
ity of firms to access export markets. In ad-
dition, the structural changes brought about
by the economic reform program have
harmed some traditional exporters, such as
cashew processors, and opened export op-
portunities in other sectors, such as food.
For example, Mozambique has begun ex-
porting small quantities of maize. However,
a lack of well-established export institu-
tions hinders export capacity in maize and
other commodities (World Bank 1996). The
export elasticity estimates indicate that, for
most commodities, similar difficulties exist
in tapping export markets.
While economic collapse and war pro-
foundly affected export volumes, import
volumes remained substantial thanks to
large influxes of foreign aid. As a result, im-
porting institutions functioned throughout
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48Full details are available from the authors.
49Imposing an export elasticity of 1 for services results in failure of the routine to find a feasible solution with
the optimal solution as starting values.the estimation period. In the circumstances
of Mozambique, calamities strike regularly.
This causes substitution of food aid imports
for domestic production, reflected in high
substitution elasticities between domestic
and imported food. Substitution elasticities
between domestic and imported nonfood
items appear to be smaller.
Yellow maize contributed a substantial
portion of food imports, particularly in the
early postwar period. For example, in 1993
maize constituted approximately 60 percent
of food imports, with the vast bulk of maize
imports coming in the form of yellow maize
as food aid (NIS 1997; Donovan 1996).
Even though Mozambican consumers ex-
press a clear preference for white maize,
substitution possibilities (in times of crisis)
appear to be strong. A test of the null hy-
pothesis, of an import elasticity on food of
three, was rejected by the data at the 95 per-
cent confidence level (χ
2
1 statistic of 5.9).
This result agrees with available micro-
economic evidence. The Ministry of Agri-
culture and Michigan State University
(1994) conducted a study of white versus
yellow maize consumption. They found
that, with equal prices, consumers over-
whelmingly favor white maize. However,
when presented with a hypothetical game of
maize purchasing, consumers indicated that
they would switch rapidly to yellow maize
if its price fell relative to white maize. Low-
income consumers, who make up the bulk
of the population, indicated the greatest de-
gree of price sensitivity.
Manufactures represent a second inter-
esting case. (Note that, as previously men-
tioned, this category does not include food
processing, which is a separate industry.)
Manufactures claimed by far the largest im-
port share in 1995 (Table 6.5). In addition,
domestic manufactures production is small,
accounting for less than 2 percent of value-
added at factor cost in 1995. On the basis of
volume alone, domestic manufactures can-
not substitute substantially for imported
manufactures. However, this does not nec-
essarily imply that the degree of substi-
tutability between existing domestic manu-
factures and imported manufactures is
small. Estimation results indicate an elastic-
ity that is slightly lower than one. This is
within the range of values frequently em-
ployed in the context of developing country.
However, a statistical test fails to reject the
null hypothesis of an elasticity of 2. The χ
2
1
statistic is only 0.1, indicating reasonable
consistency of the data with a wide range of
possible values for the import elasticity for
manufactures.
Conclusions
The Mozambican CGE model presented
here accounts for imperfect substitution be-
tween imports and domestically marketed
production and imperfect transformation of
production into exports. The 1-2-3 core
model is extended to take account of mar-
keting margins and home consumption of
own production. These features are essential
to capture Mozambican characteristics,
such as vast distances and an underdevel-
oped economic infrastructure. Other exten-
sions to the standard model include the pos-
sibility of allowing for imperfect labor mo-
bility between agriculture and nonagricul-
ture and allowing for special household
characteristics, such as safety-first consider-
ations and differing sex roles in agricultural
production.
The extended 1-2-3 model has also been
subjected to an estimation and validation
procedure. The reasonable fit between val-
ues predicted by the CGE model and actual
values strengthen confidence in the model
for policy simulation purposes. The esti-
mated trade parameters for Mozambique
point strongly to the need for development
efforts to aid in the transformation of do-
mestic products into export products. It also
indicates that substitution elasticities be-
tween imported and domestically produced
goods are relatively high. This is especially
so for food crops after times of natural 
disasters.
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Aid Dependence
M
ozambique remains, as demonstrated in Chapter 5, dependent on the goodwill of bi-
lateral and multilateral donor agencies to make aid transfers on a large scale; and
the analyses in this chapter further illustrate the critical support that foreign capital
inflows in general and aid transfers in particular provide to the Mozambican economy. The
analyses are based on simulations using the CGE model in Chapter 6. Special characteristics
and specifications necessary for the analysis of aid dependence are discussed below. Although
this chapter includes a discussion of the overall importance of foreign capital inflows, the
focus is on the impact of reducing Mozambican aid dependence. The experiments are de-
signed to reflect a gradual lowering of total net foreign capital inflows through a gradual uni-
form lowering of the different items of foreign capital inflow. The decision to lower all capi-
tal inflows simultaneously and uniformly was based on a desire to maintain comparability
across experiments. It is, however, not essential to the analysis that the items are lowered 
uniformly.
The fact that most aid inflows are channeled through government accounts is reflected in
the specification of the CGE model, where aid inflows are accounted for on the revenue side
of the government investment budget. In contrast, foreign savings inflows are accounted for
on the revenue side of the capital account.
50 Since government investment expenditures are de-
termined from the macroclosure as discussed below, the government investment budget will
not balance in general. The deficit is financed by drawing on the capital account. It follows
that foreign savings inflows act as a source of financing for government investment, in the
same way as foreign aid inflows. This implies that foreign savings and aid inflows are indis-
tinguishable in this model as far as the impact on the rest of the economy is concerned.
The fact that foreign savings and aid enter the model indistinguishably implies that the ini-
tial decline in foreign capital inflows can be interpreted as reflecting the impact of a pure re-
duction in foreign aid inflows. Such an interpretation is reasonable because foreign savings
and aid constitute the main components of foreign capital inflows. Yet, this point of departure
implies that the design of the experiments and the macroclosure must accord with this char-
acteristic. A basic feature of any attempt at reducing aid dependence in Mozambique is that
This chapter was written by Henning Tarp Jensen, and Finn Tarp.
50The remaining foreign capital inflows in the form of remittances and aid funding of the NGO budgets are of
minor importance, since they account for less than 20 percent of total transfers in the 1995 base year. Aid inflows
into the government investment budget account for more than a third, while foreign savings inflows into the cap-
ital account amount to almost half of total transfers in 1995.
76overall foreign capital inflows are going to
decline. Although some small recent
progress has been made, Mozambique still
faces large problems in tapping into inter-
national capital markets. Access to foreign
borrowing is far from being sufficient to fi-
nance the imports of essential physical pro-
ductive resources. It follows that increasing
the foreign savings inflow cannot be ex-
pected to be automatically forthcoming in
response to declining aid transfers. The aid
dependence experiments are therefore
based on the presumption that reductions in
aid inflows lead to significant reductions in
total net capital inflows.
The design of the macroclosure used in
the experiments here reflects the authors’
assessment of the government’s reaction in
relation to the erosion of a significant
source of revenue. The macroclosure en-
sures that private and government invest-
ment expenditures vary in proportion to
each other. As such, the macroclosure re-
flects the view that adjustment following a
decline in foreign aid inflows will affect
both investment components. While gov-
ernment investment expenditures are fi-
nanced mainly by foreign aid inflows, pri-
vate investment is financed by regular for-
eign savings. Accordingly, the specification
of the macroclosure for the investment
items is based on the presumption that
“crowding-out” of private investment oc-
curs when aid inflows are reduced. 
The macroclosure also specifies recur-
rent government expenditures as a fixed
proportion of absorption. This reflects the
maintained assumption that administration
expenditures are more difficult to reduce
than investment expenditures. Overall, the
macroclosure is designed to support the in-
terpretation of the initial decline in foreign
capital inflows as reflecting the impact of
reductions in foreign aid inflows.
The factor market closure is based on a
presumption that current levels of factor
employment will be maintained after a re-
duction in aid inflows. This implies that in-
creased unemployment is not allowed to be
part of the adjustment to decreases in capi-
tal inflows. One argument for choosing this
factor market closure is that the alternative
closure is hard to justify. Allowing for un-
employment would require specifying
nominal wages exogenously. Such a fixed-
wage specification would be ad hoc and
would contrast with the medium-term per-
spective of the experiments. It was there-
fore decided to retain the full-employment
factor market closure. Another argument for
maintaining full employment is that the em-
ployees associated with aid-financed proj-
ects are likely to be relatively well quali-
fied. Decreasing aid-financed expenditures
on domestic investment will mainly affect
the formal industry sector, where skills are
relatively high and employees are relatively
well equipped to find employment else-
where. Decreasing aid inflows supposedly
do not have any major impact on the em-
ployment status of the agricultural sector,
where subsistence farming is widespread.
The distinction between the agricultural and
nonagricultural labor categories is therefore
maintained, and substitution between the
two labor types is not provided for in the
simulations.
A set of experiments was conducted on
the basis of the model closure described
above (Table 7.1). Given that total aid in-
flows amounted to around 40 percent of
total capital inflows in 1995, it follows that
the first experiment can be given two dif-
ferent interpretations: a full elimination of
aid inflows combined with a significant in-
crease in net foreign borrowing, or a (large)
partial elimination of aid inflows combined
with some small increase in foreign bor-
rowing. Given that Mozambique has low
access to overseas financial markets, the
latter interpretation is used here. Moreover,
the second experiment, which includes a 40
percent reduction in net foreign capital in-
flows, is interpreted as the full elimination
of all aid inflows. The remaining experi-
ments, 3 through 5, which are based on the
same model closure consideration dis-
cussed above, are included to complete the
AID DEPENDENCE 77general picture of the importance of capital
inflows.
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Reducing net foreign capital inflows has
significant repercussions on key macroeco-
nomic indicators (Table 7.2). Each consecu-
tive 20 percent reduction in net foreign cap-
ital inflows leads to an average decrease in
nominal absorption of approximately 5 per-
cent. Nevertheless, the marginal welfare
cost of reducing foreign capital inflows in-
creases as the level of capital inflows de-
creases. Accordingly, the first and last 20
percent declines in foreign capital inflows
imply 4.8 and 5.8 percent drops, respec-
tively, in nominal absorption. It follows that
changing price incentives and reallocation
of productive resources provide some insu-
lation from the initial impact of reducing
capital inflows, but the effect gradually
weakens. Overall, it can be concluded that,
while the structure of the economy does pro-
vide for some insulation against the adverse
effects of declining aid inflows, the associ-
ated loss of welfare remains substantial.
Eliminating all foreign capital inflows
has a large negative effect on real GDP. Ac-
cordingly, the results of experiment 5 indi-
cate that the full elimination of foreign cap-
ital inflows leads to a 5.2 percent decrease
in real GDP. The sequence of experiments
shows that gradually decreasing foreign
capital inflows has an increasingly negative
impact on real value-added. This implies
that changing relative prices and realloca-
tion of productive resources are also impor-
tant in ameliorating the negative impact on
value-added. The results of experiment 1
show that this effect is particularly strong in
the initial phase, indicating that a partial
elimination of aid inflows will not have a
major impact on real GDP. Assuming that
the net result of the full elimination of aid
inflows is a 40 percent reduction in total net
foreign capital inflows, experiment 2 
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Table 7.1  Experiment descriptions for aid dependence simulations
Simulation Description
Base run Base run
Experiment 1 20 percent reduction in foreign capital inflows
Experiment 2 40 percent reduction in foreign capital inflows
Experiment 3 60 percent reduction in foreign capital inflows
Experiment 4 80 percent reduction in foreign capital inflows
Experiment 5 100 percent reduction in foreign capital inflows
Source: Authors’ static CGE-model experiment design.
Table 7.2  Macroeconomic indicators for aid dependence simulatons
Base run Change from base run (percentage)
(100 billion
Indicator metical) Experiment 1 Experiment 2 Experiment 3 Experiment 4 Experiment 5
Real GDP 172.1 -0.5 -1.3 -2.3 -3.6 -5.2
Nominal GDP 172.1 -1.8 -3.1 -4.0 -4.6 -4.9
Nominal absorption 223.3 -4.8 -9.9 -15.3 -20.9 -26.7
Source: Authors’ static CGE-model simulations.
51Given that the use and impact of net foreign borrowing and aid inflows differ, the macroclosure should in prin-
ciple be reconsidered when analyzing reductions in net foreign borrowing. This is not done here.indicates that the termination of aid receipts
will result in a mere 1.3 percent decline in
real GDP.
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Experiment 5 leads to a 4.9 percent de-
crease in nominal GDP, implying that the
GDPdeflator is almost unaffected by a total
elimination of foreign capital inflows.
However, while a gradual elimination of
capital inflows has a decreasing negative
marginal effect on nominal value-added, it
has an increasing negative marginal impact
on real value-added. It follows that the GDP
deflator suffers a strong initial decline that
is only gradually reversed. Comparing
nominal GDP and absorption, it appears
that import substitution and export transfor-
mation combined with full employment of
factors ensure that the impact on value-
added is relatively modest.
Overall, it can be concluded that signif-
icant welfare costs are associated with a
total elimination of foreign capital inflows
in Mozambique. These welfare costs come
about through the forced reduction in the
trade balance deficit. The combination of
decreasing imports and increasing transfor-
mation of domestic production into exports
reduces the quantity of goods available for
domestic absorption. Nevertheless, the in-
creasing export transformation of produc-
tion ensures that real GDP declines only
modestly. A partial reduction in foreign aid
inflows reduces real value-added only
slightly. The effect on welfare in terms of
nominal absorption is also going to be
dampened by significant changes in price
incentives, but the negative impact is
nonetheless significant. Overall, the full
elimination of aid inflows is likely to yield
a decrease in welfare of around 10 percent.
The real GDP components confirm that
significant reallocation among the final de-
mand components would occur following a
complete elimination of foreign capital in-
flows (Table 7.3). Since net foreign capital
inflows add up to the trade balance deficit,
it follows that eliminating net foreign capi-
tal inflows is tantamount to eliminating the
trade balance deficit. The sequence of ex-
periments implies that exports and imports
contribute equally to the elimination of the
trade balance deficit. Since services have a
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Table 7.3  Real GDP components for aid dependence simulations
Base run Change from base run (percentage)
(100 billion
GDP component metical) Experiment 1 Experiment 2 Experiment 3 Experiment 4 Experiment 5
Exports 32.7 14.9 31.0 48.0 65.9 84.4
Imports 83.9 -6.4 -12.3 -17.9 -23.1 -28.1
Home consumption 32.6 -1.5 -2.7 -3.7 -4.5 -5.3
Marketed
consumption 106.8 -2.3 -4.0 -5.3 -6.2 -6.8
Recurrent
government 16.8 -3.7 -8.1 -13.2 -18.7 -24.5
Nongovernmental
organizations 5.5 -14.1 -31.0 -50.9 -73.8 -100.0
Investment 61.5 -11.0 -23.5 -37.1 -51.9 -67.4
Real GDP 172.1 -0.5 -1.3 -2.3 -3.6 -5.2
Source: Authors’ static CGE-model simulations.
52Alternative experiments with unemployment indicate that the macroeconomic impact of a full elimination of
capital inflows will only be moderately stronger. However, the alternative experiments also indicate that the ame-
liorating impact of initial changes in capital inflows is significantly moderated. Reductions in aid inflows in par-
ticular are likely to have a stronger real macroeconomic impact when unemployment appears.80 CHAPTER 7
large export share and a relatively high elas-
ticity of transformation, service exports ex-
pand considerably. Accordingly, the service
sector accounts for the main part of the ex-
pansion of exports. In contrast, the main
part of the decrease in imports is directly re-
lated to the demand effects of declining for-
eign capital inflows. It follows that around
two-thirds of the decline is accounted for by
declining imports of investment-related
transport and machinery equipment.
The macroclosure has important impli-
cations for the impact of changing capital
inflows on the composition of final de-
mand. The choice of a savings-driven in-
vestment closure in the current experiments
implies that the total elimination of net for-
eign capital inflows leads to a reduction in
real investment by more than two-thirds.
Moreover, real recurrent government ex-
penditure declines by 25 percent, in line
with the significant decline in absorption
expenditure. Since economic activity in
general and imports in particular remain at
reasonable nominal levels, it follows that
government domestic revenue remains rea-
sonably stable. Taken together, the develop-
ment of government revenue and recurrent
expenditure implies that the government
will be able to increase its own financing of
investment expenditures. This is particu-
larly important when foreign aid inflows
into the government investment budget are
eliminated. Nevertheless, the chosen
macroclosure implies that the government
will continue to run an overall budget
deficit. This is consistent with the notion
that both government and private invest-
ment are squeezed.
Since the significant expansion of ex-
ports ensures that aggregate real value-
added does not respond too strongly to de-
clining capital inflows, aggregate house-
hold income and consumption decline only
moderately. Moreover, import prices in-
crease significantly because of the strong
nominal exchange rate depreciation, imply-
ing that market prices increase faster than
producer prices. Combined with the fixed
budget shares of the household consump-
tion patterns, this explains in part why real
marketed consumption declines slightly
faster than real home-consumed produc-
tion. Another part of the explanation is that
the decline in rural household income (and
home consumption) is more moderate than
the decline in urban household income.
Overall, the experiments imply that the rel-
ative share of informal sector production in
household consumption is going to increase
as a response to decreasing capital inflows.
However, because of increased activity in
the tradable goods sectors, the informal sec-
tor is going to remain constant as a share of
total value-added. Finally, the externally fi-
nanced NGO sector vanishes with the dis-
appearance of capital inflows.
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Looking at the gradual elimination of
net foreign capital inflows, several regular-
ities in the impact on the composition of
final demand can be observed. All final de-
mand components are declining continu-
ously except exports, which increase
steadily. Among the domestic demand com-
ponents some differences in the rates of de-
cline can be observed. While the rate of de-
cline for government consumption and
overall investment has a tendency to in-
crease with the reductions in foreign capital
inflows, the rates of decline for the private
consumption components are decreasing.
The increasing rate of decline for overall in-
vestment is related to the declining rate of
depreciation of the exchange rate. The ex-
change rate depreciation insulates the do-
mestic currency revenues of foreign capital
53The 100 percent decline of real NGO demand in Experiment 5 is because all NGO revenues come from abroad.
When all capital inflows are eliminated, the NGO sector, by definition, disappears. Accordingly, the 100 percent
decline reflects the elimination of the NGO sector from the model in Experiment 5, not that a lower bound has
been struck.inflows somewhat, but the decreasing rate
of depreciation implies that the domestic
currency value of foreign currency inflows
is decreasing at an increasing rate. Since
foreign capital inflows constitute a signifi-
cant source of finance for investment ex-
penditures, this explains the increasing rate
of decline for real investment.
The falling rate of decline for real
household consumption reflects the de-
crease in nominal GDP.
54 While overall
household consumption decreases in line
with nominal GDP, the two individual com-
ponents of household consumption decline
at different rates. The marginal impact on
marketed consumption declines rapidly
from a high initial level, whereas the mar-
ginal effect on home consumption declines
more slowly from a smaller initial level.
This implies that the informal sector share
of household consumption is increasing at a
decreasing rate. In fact, the last 20 percent
reduction of capital inflows in experiment 5
has a stronger negative effect on home con-
sumption than on marketed consumption,
implying that the informal sector share of
household consumption decreases slightly.
The increasing rate of decline for govern-
ment consumption follows the pattern of
nominal absorption.
The above observations on the gradual
elimination of capital inflows have implica-
tions for the impact of reductions in aid in-
flows. A partial reduction in aid inflows
represented by experiment 1 leads to de-
clining imports and increasing exports.
While the absolute impact on real exports
of a full elimination of capital inflows is
larger than on real imports, the opposite is
true for a partial elimination of aid in-
flows—exports increase significantly in rel-
ative terms, but changes to real imports are
more important in absolute terms. Accord-
ingly, experiment 1 indicates that import
substitution and outright reductions in de-
mand for imported goods are going to be
more important than increased export trans-
formation in the adjustment to declining aid
inflows. Reduction in the demand for in-
vestment goods is going to be especially
important, but also reductions in demand
for imported services are going to be large.
Some small import substitution is going to
occur in agriculture and related sectors.
As indicated above, a reduction in capi-
tal inflows will have a particularly strong
effect on investment. Accordingly, a partial
reduction in aid inflows reduces real invest-
ment expenditures by 11 percent. This sig-
nificant reduction in investment affects not
only the level of imports but also the level
of domestic activity. Accordingly, the de-
cline in expenditures on construction re-
duces value-added in this sector by approx-
imately 0.9 percent of total economywide
GDP. The reduction in real value-added by
the construction sector is therefore larger
than the 0.5 percent overall decline in real
GDP. It follows that the impact on the con-
struction sector represents the main trans-
mission mechanism between reductions in
aid inflows and the domestic economy. It
can also be noted that the marginal impact
on real investment is increasing with the
level of reduction in aid inflows, and this
spills over into the impact on real GDP.
Hence, the full elimination of aid inflows
leads to a reduction in value-added by con-
struction amounting to 2.0 percent of total
real GDP, implying a 1.3 percent overall de-
cline in real GDP. It follows that continuing
reductions in aid dependence will entail 
increasingly negative repercussions on 
the domestic economy through the 
construction-investment channel.
54Changes in real household consumption reflect changes in nominal GDP, since the closure specifies the con-
sumer price index as numeraire.
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Reductions in aid inflows will also have
noticeable negative effects on rural and
urban household consumption.
55 The differ-
ent impacts on the two consumption items
are partly related to the different develop-
ments of producer and consumer prices and
partly to the fact that home consumption is
mainly associated with rural households.
Farmers actually increase value-added by
agricultural production marginally because
of slightly increasing agricultural import
substitution and export transformation.
Consequently, rural household income does
not decrease as much as urban household
income. It follows that home consumption
is somewhat insulated from decreases in
foreign aid inflows. In contrast, marketed
consumption by urban households is de-
creasing markedly, particularly because of
the loss of income from the construction
sector. This indicates that reductions in aid
inflows will hurt the formal urban sector
more than it will hurt the informal rural sec-
tor. A complete elimination of aid inflows
will, however, markedly reduce consump-
tion in both rural and urban areas.
Declining real government consump-
tion in relation to a partial reduction in aid
inflows is dictated by the model closure.
The 4.8 percent decline in nominal govern-
ment consumption is consistent with the
marked decline in nominal absorption.
Nevertheless, real government consump-
tion declines by only 3.7 percent, since the
declining aid inflows lead to declining do-
mestic prices in all service sectors. While
real imports decline by 6.4 percent, the par-
tial reduction in aid inflows leads to a much
smaller 0.7 percent reduction in nominal
import expenditures. This implies that the
main loss of government revenue is related
to other indirect taxes on goods, such as
consumption and circulation taxes. Impor-
tant revenue losses also follow from small,
direct tax components, including factor and
enterprise taxes. They suffer from declining
capital income. Overall, the 1.5 percent de-
crease in government revenues implies an
increase in the recurrent budget surplus.
However, the increasing recurrent budget
surplus is not large enough to finance the
significantly increasing deficit on the gov-
ernment investment budget. This is consis-
tent with the notion underlying the model
closure—that reduction in aid inflows is
going to result in “crowding-out” of private
investment.
The impact of the elimination of foreign
capital inflows on agricultural terms of
trade were evaluated at different points in
the price mechanism (Table 7.4). While rel-
ative agricultural export, producer, and
value-added prices increases, relative agri-
cultural import and consumer prices de-
crease. Overall, agricultural producers are
gaining in relative terms because of higher
relative prices on agricultural goods, while
rural consumers of agricultural goods are
gaining in relative terms from lower rela-
tive market prices. The increases in relative
agricultural producer prices are a result of
the markedly declining demand for con-
struction, while the demand for primary
agricultural goods is maintained. Moreover,
service sector producer and consumer
prices are competitively lowered. The de-
clining commercial-service price puts
downward pressure on agricultural and in-
dustry sector market prices. Since services
do not face any marketing costs, by defini-
tion, it follows that the downward pressure
on service sector market prices is transmit-
ted directly to service sector producer
prices.
55The interpretation of experiments 1 and 2 as proper reflections of reductions in aid inflows has to be qualified
somewhat in relation to the two household consumption items. Since the reductions in capital inflows include re-
ductions in remittances to households, this will overstate the negative impact as compared with pure reductions
in aid inflows. Nevertheless, the total effect of a full elimination of remittances amounts to less than 0.5 percent
of household consumption. The results can therefore be taken to properly reflect reductions in aid inflows in a
qualitative sense.The drastic decline in demand for con-
struction also lowers the demand for non-
agricultural labor and capital in this sector
markedly. This releases large productive re-
sources that are subsequently reallocated to
other productive sectors. Some of the re-
leased resources flow into primary agricul-
ture and agricultural processing. Demand
for primary agricultural goods is main-
tained because of increasing intermediate
input demands from agricultural processing
industries and some limited scope for im-
port substitution. The demand for agricul-
tural processing is in turn supported by in-
creasing incentives for export transforma-
tion.
56 Finally, it is important to note that de-
mand for agricultural goods is supported by
important feedback effects stemming from
the link between agricultural labor income
and the high agricultural budget shares that
characterize rural households. It follows
that the overall impact of an elimination of
foreign capital inflows on price incentives
is unequivocally positive for the rural agri-
cultural sector.
From the sequence of experiments, it
appears that the initial reductions in capital
inflows have strong effects on relative agri-
cultural prices. This observation underpins
the argument that changes in price incen-
tives are more important than quantitative
adjustments in relation to initial reductions
in capital inflows. All agricultural terms of
trade related to the production side respond
positively to reductions in aid receipts. The
impact on relative agricultural value-added
56 Export transformation provides little support to demand for primary agriculture because of low export shares. 
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Table 7.4  Price indices and agricultural terms of trade for aid dependence simulations
Change from base run (percentage)
Prices Base run Experiment 1 Experiment 2 Experiment 3 Experiment 4 Experiment 5
Import
Agricultural terms of trade 100 -0.3 -0.6 -0.8 -1.0 -1.1
Agricultural prices 100 3.9 7.5 10.6 13.3 15.6
Nonagricultural prices 100 4.3 8.1 11.5 14.5 16.9
Export
Agricultural terms of trade 100 2.8 5.0 6.8 8.1 9.1
Agricultural prices 100 9.8 18.5 26.1 32.6 37.9
Nonagricultural prices 100 6.8 12.8 18.2 22.7 26.4
Retail
Agricultural terms of trade 100 -0.4 -0.6 -0.7 -0.7 -0.4
Agricultural prices 100 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.3
Nonagricultural prices 100 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.7 0.7
Producer
Agricultural terms of trade 100 1.1 2.2 3.2 4.2 5.2
Agricultural prices 100 0.4 1.0 1.7 2.5 3.3
Nonagricultural prices 100 -0.7 -1.2 -1.5 -1.7 -1.8
Value-added
Agricultural terms of trade 100 2.7 5.1 7.1 8.7 10.1
Agricultural prices 100 0.4 0.9 1.6 2.5 3.4
Nonagricultural prices 100 -2.3 -4.0 -5.1 -5.8 -6.1
Exchange rate 100 6.1 11.6 16.4 20.5 23.9
Commercial service price 100 -2.9 -5.3 -7.3 -8.9 -10.1
Source: Authors’ static CGE-model simulations. prices is particularly strong in relation to a
partial or total elimination of aid inflows.
Accordingly, experiment 2 shows that rela-
tive agricultural value-added prices in-
crease by more than 5 percent when all aid
inflows are eliminated. The increasing agri-
cultural terms of trade follow from declin-
ing nonagricultural, as well as increasing
agricultural, value-added prices. The in-
creasing agricultural value-added prices are
driven mainly by the strong increases in do-
mestic agricultural export prices, which
again follow from significant reductions in
the price of marketing services and a
strongly depreciating exchange rate.
57 As
for agricultural terms of trade related to the
consumption side, it appears that all indices
decline. Overall, the impact of reductions in
aid inflows on price incentives appears un-
equivocally positive for the rural agricul-
tural sector.
Conclusions
The analyses of the experiments in this
chapter clearly indicate that reductions in
aid inflows have significant welfare impli-
cations. Apartial reduction or total elimina-
tion of foreign aid inflows would represent
a substantial reduction in overall foreign
capital inflows. Mozambique is facing large
problems in tapping into international capi-
tal markets, and access to foreign borrow-
ing is far from being sufficient to finance
the imports of essential physical productive
resources.
Declining aid inflows lead to a decline
in the trade balance deficit because of a lack
of alternative financing. The adjustment in-
cludes both reduced imports and increased
exports, underpinned by a significant depre-
ciation in the real exchange rate. The trade
balance adjustment mirrors the characteris-
tics of the initial Mozambican trade pattern,
as it includes a significant expansion of
service sector exports and a strong contrac-
tion of imports of investment-related trans-
port and machinery equipment. In addition,
some small import substitution is going to
occur in agriculture and related sectors.
While the expansion of exports is supply
driven and underpinned by changing pro-
ducer price incentives, the decrease in im-
ports of investment goods is mainly related
to the demand-side effects of declining aid
inflows. Consequently, the termination of
all aid inflows leads to a reduction in real
investment by almost 25 percent.
Crowding-out of private investment is
likely to occur when aid financing of gov-
ernment investment declines. Overall, the
expenditures on construction for investment
purposes will be the main transmission
channel between declining aid transfers and
the domestic economy. Continuing reduc-
tions in aid dependence will entail increas-
ingly negative repercussions on the domes-
tic economy through the construction-
investment channel. Moreover, the un-
avoidably negative future impact on the
capital stock is likely to add significantly to
the decline in future domestic economic 
activity.
The composition of the government
budget will also have to change when aid
inflows are reduced. While government re-
current expenditures are likely to decline
with the general level of absorption, domes-
tic revenues are likely to remain reasonably
stable, since nominal imports decline only
slightly. While the increasing surplus over
the recurrent budget leads to an important
increase in the government’s own financing
of investment expenditures, it is not large
enough to finance the significantly increas-
ing deficit from the government investment
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57 The lower marketing costs and exchange rate depreciation also benefit nonagricultural value-added prices.
However, the producer prices of the declining construction and service sector dominate the impact on nonagri-
cultural producer prices. Moreover, relatively large intermediate input-cost shares imply that the decline in pro-
ducer prices has a strong negative impact on value-added prices in the nonagricultural sector. Input price in-
creases induced by exchange rates also add to the decline in the nonagricultural value-added prices.budget. The government will continue to
run overall budget deficits, and some pri-
vate investment will be crowded out. 
The composition of household con-
sumption will change in favor of home-
consumed production because of relative
price changes and changes in the distribu-
tion of household income. Accordingly, the
overall household budget share of informal
sector production is going to increase, im-
plying that home consumption is somewhat
insulated from decreases in foreign aid in-
flows. In contrast, marketed consumption
by urban households is going to decrease
markedly because of a loss of income from
the construction sector. While the elimina-
tion of aid inflows will reduce consumption
for all households, it will hurt the formal
urban sector more than it will affect the in-
formal rural sector.
Reductions in aid inflows have strong
effects particularly on relative agricultural
producer prices. Changes in price incen-
tives alter the allocation of productive re-
sources and ensure that the macroeconomic
impact of reductions in aid inflows is some-
what ameliorated. Demand for primary
agricultural goods is maintained in the face
of reduced aid inflows because of increas-
ing intermediate input demands from agri-
cultural processing industries and some
limited scope for import substitution. It fol-
lows that relative agricultural export, pro-
ducer, and value-added prices increase,
while relative agricultural import and con-
sumer prices decrease. Overall, agricultural
producers are gaining in relative terms be-
cause of higher relative prices on agricul-
tural goods, while rural consumers of agri-
cultural goods gain in relative terms from
lower relative consumer prices. The overall
impact of an elimination of foreign aid in-
flows on price incentives is unequivocally
positive for the rural agricultural sector.
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The Agricultural Bias Revisited
T
he World Bank carried out a large-scale inquiry into the actual level of agricultural bias
associated with import-substituting policies in the late 1980s (Krueger, Schiff, and
Valdes 1988). The study made a decisive effort to call attention to the sectoral impact
of macroeconomic policies, but it assumed with little hesitation that agricultural products are
tradable and perfect substitutes in import and export. The core finding of Krueger, Schiff, and
Valdes, as well as others, was that trade and exchange rate policies supporting import substi-
tution have a strongly negative impact on relative price incentives aimed at agricultural pro-
ducers. The study also found that agricultural export taxes lower domestic export prices, while
nonagricultural import tariffs in import-competing sectors, such as fertilizer and pesticides, in-
crease the cost of agricultural production inputs significantly. Finally, the study found over-
valued exchange rates very damaging.
It is characteristic of the Krueger-inspired literature on agricultural bias that it focuses
strongly on distortions in the domestic-pricing mechanism. The trade policy interventions act
to change domestic prices of exports and imports, while the ultimate measure of agricultural
bias is based on price terms of trade for agricultural producers. No account is taken of quan-
tity adjustments in goods and factor markets or in the external account. This is critical. Quan-
tity adjustments can potentially affect relative agricultural prices strongly. The choice of a 
partial-equilibrium approach becomes even more questionable with the knowledge that im-
port-substituting trade policies may induce demand-side constraints on economic growth. Em-
phasizing the role of the agricultural sector as the primary driving force in economic devel-
opment is often justified by the potential for income feedback effects on the rest of the econ-
omy. It follows that analyses of the relative price impact of macroeconomic policy measures
must take these important mechanisms into account.
These points are pursued by Bautista et al. (2001), who compare the partial  and general-
equilibrium approaches and find severe deficiencies in the partial-equilibrium methodology.
They analyze the impact of agricultural export taxes and nonagricultural import tariffs, rely-
ing on a stylized Tanzanian CGE model. From this analysis it emerges that the level of agri-
cultural bias is significantly moderated in the context of their stylized economy. The exchange
rate effects, which were singled out as a very damaging source of agricultural bias in the 
partial-equilibrium literature, display a minor impact on relative agricultural prices.
This chapter reports a similar set of trade policy experiments for the case of Mozambique.
While the Mozambican CGE model set out in Chapter 6 is similar in structure to the Tanzan-
ian one, there are also important differences. The Mozambican model accounts for marketing
This chapter was written by Henning Tarp Jensen, and Finn Tarp.
86margin wedges between producer and retail
prices and associated home consumption of
own production. Moreover, in the present
context, the implications of the closure of
the CGE model are investigated in detail;
and, in contrast to Bautista et al. (2001), a
standard factor market closure is applied.
Nevertheless, the two models are suffi-
ciently similar in structure to make a com-
parison based on country-specific charac-
teristics.
Two kinds of trade policies were exper-
imented with, including a uniform 25 per-
cent tariff on nonagricultural imports and a
uniform 25 percent tax on agricultural ex-
ports (Table 8.1). Moreover, separate exper-
iments are implemented with fixed and
flexible exchange-rate regimes. Altogether,
the distinctions between nonagricultural
import tariffs and agricultural export taxes
versus fixed and flexible exchange-rate
regimes give rise to four different types of
experiments, which are analyzed under dif-
ferent macroclosures below.
In the partial-equilibrium literature, sig-
nificant attention was paid to the impor-
tance of overvalued exchange rates, but the
cause of the overvaluation was only identi-
fied in qualitative terms, not as an integral
element of the measurement of agricultural
bias. This approach is not possible in the
context of the CGE-model framework. The
exchange rate solution of a CGE model is
by definition an equilibrium solution, given
the distortions imposed on the model. Ac-
cordingly, the analysis of deviations of the
exchange rate from the fundamental equi-
librium exchange rate (FEER) level re-
quires the specification of FEER, and the
explicit formulation of the distortions that
lead to deviations from FEER.
In the current study, FEER is defined as
the exchange rate solution to a base run
where all indirect taxes directly entering
into the price mechanism have been re-
placed by nondistorting income taxes. The
agricultural export taxes and nonagricul-
tural import tariffs represent the distortions
that lead to deviations of the exchange rate
from the base-run FEER level. In the base
run, foreign capital inflows, which have
nonzero net values, are compensated for.
This is based on pragmatic grounds. Severe
aid-dependency is an important and stub-
born feature for Mozambique. This charac-
teristic should therefore be taken into ac-
count in the derivation of FEER because
donor support for Mozambique is likely to
continue.
The distinction between external clo-
sures for fixed and flexible exchange rates
(Table 8.1) is used to decompose the total
effect of price incentives from trade policy
interventions into direct price effects and
indirect exchange rate effects.
58 Since
FEER is defined as the exchange rate in the
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Table 8.1  Experiment descriptions for agricultural bias simulations
Simulation Description
Base run Tax distortions eliminated
Experiment 1 25 percent import tariffs on nonagriculture, with flexible exchange rate
Experiment 2 25 percent import tariffs on nonagriculture, with fixed exchange rate
Experiment 3 25 percent export taxes on agriculture, with flexible exchange rate
Experiment 4 25 percent export taxes on agriculture, with fixed exchange rate
Source: Authors’ static CGE-model simulations.
58This decomposition has no relation to the original direct and indirect effects as defined in the partial-equilib-
rium literature. In the current context, indirect effects reflect exchange-rate effects, while total effects reflect the
full impact of the policy intervention under study.base-run, undistorted economy, experi-
ments with a fixed exchange rate are going
to reflect FEER. In contrast, experiments
with a flexible exchange rate and exoge-
nously imposed net inflows of foreign cap-
ital are going to reflect the so-called official
exchange rate (OER). From the definitions
of FEER and OER, it follows that total ef-
fects of price incentives can be measured by
the distance between the base run and the
experiments with flexible exchange rates
(reflecting OER), while indirect effects of
exchange rates are measured by the dis-
tance between the experiments with fixed
and the flexible exchange rates (reflecting
FEER and OER, respectively).
59
The traditional partial-equilibrium liter-
ature focused narrowly on the impact on
agricultural price incentives through the
pricing mechanism without regard to poten-
tial feedback effects associated with quan-
tity adjustments. This approach is likely to
overstate relative price effects because
quantity adjustments lower the need for
price adjustments. The CGE model used
here explicitly allows for quantity adjust-
ment, except for some restrictions implied
by the model closure. The choice of factor
market closure for the current experiments
implies that agricultural and nonagricultural
labor supplies are fixed. Moreover, the
scope for changes in the sectoral composi-
tion of final demand is determined by the
combined choice of macroeconomic and
external closures.
It follows that price and quantity adjust-
ments in the experiments depend heavily on
the choice of macroclosure (Table 8.1).
Strong quantity adjustment in the foreign
capital account can occur under a fixed ex-
change rate regime, but exchange rate ad-
justment under a flexible exchange rate
regime can also alter the domestic currency
value of capital inflows significantly. These
adjustments can have considerable reper-
cussions on the domestic economy, depend-
ing on the macroclosure. The choice of
macroclosure is important for the proper
measurement of total and indirect exchange
rate effects. The approach in this chapter is
to make use of different macroclosures to
measure upper and lower bounds for the
total and indirect exchange rate effects. Ac-
cordingly, two kinds of macroclosure are
distinguished, one with savings-driven in-
vestment and one that is balanced, which
means that private investment remains
fixed in proportion to nominal absorption,
while a savings rate—in this case, the aver-
age household savings rate—is allowed to
vary to clear the domestic capital account.
60
A macroclosure with savings-driven in-
vestment implies that changes in foreign
capital inflows strongly affect investment
expenditures. Since investment goods orig-
inate almost exclusively in the nonagricul-
tural sector, a savings-driven investment
closure means that increasing or decreasing
capital inflows have maximum negative or
positive effect on relative agricultural
prices. In contrast, a balanced macroclosure
implies that changes in foreign capital in-
flows affect the different components of
final demand in a balanced way. It follows
that the balanced macroclosure maintains
the structure of nominal demand and 
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59The flexible exchange rate experiments are essential for the measurement of both total and indirect exchange
rate effects. It is therefore important to specify a proper exogenous level of foreign capital inflows. Trade policy
interventions are likely to affect both the exchange rate and the level of net capital inflows. Since reasonable es-
timates of changes to net capital inflows are not available, the initial (base run) level of capital inflows is im-
posed on all flexible exchange rate experiments. 
60Household savings rates are allowed to vary proportionately. This implies that urban households take most of
the adjustment, while the savings of poor rural households remain low.minimizes the relative price effects of
changing foreign capital inflows.
61
Agricultural export taxes lead to ex-
change rate depreciation in the experiments
using a flexible exchange rate. This implies
an increase in the domestic currency value
of foreign capital inflows. Since investment
goods originate in the nonagricultural sec-
tor, the savings-driven investment closure
leads to lower bounds for the total effects
on agricultural terms of trade, while the
balanced macroclosure leads to upper
bounds. In contrast, the stronger expansion
of capital inflows in the experiments with a
fixed exchange rate implies that the ex-
change rate effects reflect a relative de-
crease in capital inflows. The savings-
driven investment closure therefore leads to
upper bounds for the indirect exchange rate
effects on agricultural terms of trade, while
the balanced macroclosure leads to lower
bounds.
Nonagricultural import tariffs imply a
strong exchange rate appreciation in the ex-
periment with a flexible exchange rate. A
savings-driven investment closure therefore
leads to upper bounds for indirect exchange
rate effects on agricultural terms of trade,
while the balanced macroclosure leads to
lower bounds. In contrast, the stronger con-
traction of capital inflows in the experiment
with a fixed exchange rate means that a sav-
ings-driven investment closure leads to
lower bounds for indirect exchange rate ef-
fects on agricultural terms of trade, while
the balanced macroclosure leads to upper
bounds.
The choice of model closure is also im-
portant for the implied structure of the base-
run, undistorted economy. The base run is
based on an external closure with fixed for-
eign capital inflows and a flexible exchange
rate; and a macroclosure, with savings-
driven investment. The motivation for the
external closure is that capital inflows (in-
cluding aid) are presumed to remain rea-
sonably constant after the elimination of all
tax distortions in the price mechanism. The
savings-driven investment closure was cho-
sen because the increase in the domestic
currency value of foreign capital inflows is
expected to affect investment expenditures
in particular.
The evaluation of the total and indirect
exchange rate effects on relative price in-
centives will be based on average agricul-
tural terms of trade evaluated at different
points in the pricing mechanism. Value-
added prices are the most appropriate meas-
ures of relative price incentives for the allo-
cation of productive resources. However,
agricultural terms of trade evaluated at
other points in the pricing mechanism make
it possible to trace out the causes of the im-
pact on value-added prices and to evaluate
the effects on demand-side incentives af-
fecting consumer prices.
62
Simulations with a 
Savings-Driven Investment
Closure
Quantity Adjustments in the 
Foreign Trade Account
When a savings-driven investment closure
is applied, changes in foreign capital in-
flows play a critical role in economic 
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61Both of the macroclosures maintain recurrent government expenditures as well as government investment as
fixed proportions of nominal absorption. The two macroclosures arguably represent extreme cases when it comes
to the impact of foreign-capital inflows on the domestic economy. Changes in investment expenditures are likely
to be politically more feasible than changes in recurrent expenditures, but recurrent expenditures will also have
to change in response to strong changes in net capital inflows. Macroeconomic adjustment would in reality lie
somewhere between savings-driven investment and a balanced macroclosure. 
62The original price incentive measures in the partial-equilibrium literature were also based on agricultural terms
of trade measures.90 CHAPTER 8
adjustments, and effects on nonagricultural
investment expenditures are, as pointed out
above, particularly strong. It is therefore in-
structive to review in some detail the mech-
anisms underlying the quantity adjustments
in the foreign trade account before summa-
rizing the results of the policy simulations.
A uniform nonagricultural import tariff
of 25 percent leads, under a fixed exchange
rate regime, to a 33 percent decline in total
capital inflows. This effect is driven mainly
by tariff-induced increases in domestic im-
port prices, which lower import demand.
The decrease in capital inflows induces a
strong negative demand-side effect on in-
vestment. Investment is also hurt from the
supply side, since machinery and equip-
ment are not produced domestically.
In addition, decreasing import demand
lowers the commercial service price. This
moderates the decreasing import demand
but also underpins increased exports of
goods and services. Incentives for exports
of industry sector goods improve directly
from lower marketing costs. More impor-
tantly, domestic producer and consumer
prices for services are competitively low-
ered because of declining producer prices
for industry goods. The result is strongly in-
creasing exports from the service sector.
The channel for prices of commercial serv-
ices has little effect on the level of foreign
capital inflows but is very important for the
relative development of individual trade ag-
gregates. Lower marketing costs lead to in-
creased export earnings, which in turn fi-
nance a more moderate decline in imports
of essential intermediate inputs and invest-
ment goods.
Under a flexible exchange rate regime,
exchange rate appreciation acts to maintain
the foreign currency level of capital in-
flows. The appreciation curtails import
price increases for essential intermediate in-
puts and investment goods, limiting supply-
side effects. The appreciation also lowers
Table 8.2  Price indices and agricultural terms of trade for agricultural bias simulations
Change from base run (percentage)
Prices Base run Experiment 1 Experiment 2 Experiment 3 Experiment 4
Import
Agricultural terms of trade 100 -16.2 -17.0 -0.0 0.0
Agricultural prices 100 -8.3 -2.9 0.2 0.0
Nonagricultural prices 100 9.3 17.1 0.2 0.0
Export
Agricultural terms of trade 100 -0.8 4.1 -35.0 -35.2
Agricultural prices 100 -10.0 5.0 -34.8 -35.2
Nonagricultural prices 100 -9.2 0.9 0.4 -0.0
Retail
Agricultural terms of trade 100 -6.6 -6.9 -0.0 -0.0
Agricultural prices 100 -4.7 -4.8 0.0 0.0
Nonagricultural prices 100 1.9 2.4 0.0 0.0
Producer
Agricultural terms of trade 100 1.4 4.3 -1.1 -1.2
Agricultural prices 100 -2.1 -0.8 -1.1 -1.2
Nonagricultural prices 100 -3.5 -4.9 0.0 0.0
Value-added
Agricultural terms of trade 100 8.1 14.6 -1.2 -1.4
Agricultural prices 100 -2.5 -1.2 -1.3 -1.3
Nonagricultural prices 100 -9.8 -13.8 -0.1 0.0
Exchange rate 100 -9.0 0.0 0.3 0.0
Commercial service price 100 -5.9 -9.7 -0.2 0.0
Source: Authors’ static CGE-model simulations.the domestic currency value of foreign cap-
ital inflows. This induces a demand-side ef-
fect similar to the one in the experiment
with a fixed exchange rate. Since the ex-
change rate appreciates by 9 percent, the
domestic currency value of foreign capital
inflows drops by 9 percent (Table 8.2). This
stands in contrast to the 33 percent reduc-
tion in the experiment with a fixed ex-
change rate. It follows that the exchange
rate effects in the import tariff experiments
reflect a relative 24 percent increase in for-
eign capital inflows, while the total effects
reflect a 9 percent decrease.
While agricultural exports are small, the
relative importance of capital inflows is
also borne out by the experiments on agri-
cultural export taxes. The fixed exchange
rate experiment implies a 1.1 percent in-
crease in foreign capital inflows because of
decreasing export earnings. Moreover, the
0.3 percent exchange rate depreciation
(Table 8.2) leads to a 0.3 percent increase in
capital inflows in the experiment with a
flexible exchange rate. It follows that the
exchange rate effects in the export tax ex-
periments reflect a decrease of 0.8 percent
in foreign capital inflows, while the total ef-
fects reflect a 0.3 percent increase.
Finally, in the case of Mozambique, in-
vestment expenditures are allocated mainly
between two sectors—construction, and
machinery and equipment. While construc-
tion is only produced domestically, the ma-
chinery and equipment sector has an import
share exceeding 75 percent. Decreasing for-
eign financing of investment expenditures
on transport machinery and equipment is
automatically evened out by an almost sim-
ilar decrease in imports. In contrast, a de-
crease in foreign financing of construction
for investment purposes falls squarely on
the domestic economy. It follows that the
impact of changing capital inflows on the
domestic economy is determined mainly by
the impact on the construction sector
through the investment channel.
Macroeconomic Impact
The results of the four policy experiments
with savings-driven investment indicate
that nonagricultural import tariffs have
small negative effects on real GDP (Table
8.3). The negative impact is slightly
stronger in the experiment with a fixed ex-
change rate, where foreign capital inflows
decrease the most. Nevertheless, total and
indirect exchange rate effects on real GDP
are marginal. The impact on nominal GDP
is slightly negative under a fixed exchange
rate, while it is visibly positive in the exper-
iment with a flexible exchange rate. Over-
all, the positive total effects on nominal
GDP and the GDP deflator are dominated
by a positive, indirect exchange rate effect.
Since real and nominal GDPcapture the
impact on domestic income generation,
these measures are not affected directly by
changes in foreign capital inflows. In con-
trast, nominal absorption, which is a meas-
ure of welfare, is strongly affected by
changes in capital inflows. The welfare im-
plications of nonagricultural import tariffs
are therefore very different between the 
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Table 8.3  Macroeconomic indicators for agricultural bias simulations
Base run Change from base run (percentage)
(100 billion
Indicator metical Experiment 1 Experiment 2 Experiment 3 Experiment 4
Real GDP 172.1 -0.2 -0.5 -0.0 -0.0
Nominal GDP 172.1 2.9 -0.2 -0.2 -0.1
Nominal absorption 227.6 0.0 -8.1 -0.1 0.2
Source: Authors’ static CGE-model simulations. 92 CHAPTER 8
experiment with the fixed exchange rate
and that with a flexible exchange rate.
While absorption is virtually unchanged in
the experiment with a flexible rate (reflect-
ing that foreign capital inflows are kept at
their initial base-run level), it decreases
strongly in the experiment with a fixed rate.
Consequently, while the total effect of
nonagricultural tariffs and an overvalued
exchange rate is negligible, it is made up of
two large and oppositely signed direct and
indirect effects.
The strong positive welfare effect of the
exchange rate overvaluation is somewhat
counterintuitive. However, the results can
be given an interpretation whereby the ex-
change rate overvaluation lowers the cost of
essential imports of intermediate inputs and
investment goods. This induces domestic
and foreign entrepreneurs to increase direct
investment and borrowing from abroad.
Decreasing export earnings because of the
exchange rate overvaluation adds to the in-
creased need for foreign financing. It fol-
lows that the welfare increase, which ap-
pears as induced by the exchange rate over-
valuation, is in reality financed by increased
inflows of foreign savings, assumed to be
forthcoming to finance the foreign trade
gap.
Touching on the experiments involving
agricultural export taxes, 3 and 4 (Table
8.3), the macroeconomic indicators clearly
reflect the low agricultural trade shares that
characterize Mozambique. Real GDP does
not change in either of the two experiments,
and small changes in nominal GDPindicate
that relative prices move little. While the
total effect on absorption is marginally neg-
ative, it is made up of two slightly bigger
counteracting direct and indirect effects.
This pattern is similar to the import tariff
experiments. However, this time the direct
effect of the exchange rate is positive, while
the indirect impact is negative. Overall, the
indirect and total effects of agricultural ex-
port taxes and an undervalued exchange
rate on macroeconomic aggregates are neg-
ligible.
A breakdown of real GDP (Table 8.4)
indicates that the total effects of nonagricul-
tural import tariffs, measured by experi-
ment 1, lead to important reallocation
among GDPcomponents. Government con-
sumption benefits from the tax revenue
neutrality of the experiments. Moreover,
private consumption benefits from the
lower household tax burden, which more
than compensates for the tariff-induced in-
creases in nonagricultural consumer prices.
Overall, consumers of agricultural goods
and services benefit the most under a flexi-
ble exchange rate regime. Accordingly, pro-
ducer price declines in agriculture and serv-
ice sectors and a lower commercial service
price imply that agricultural goods, and es-
pecially services, become much cheaper.
Table 8.4  Real GDP components for agricultural bias simulations
Base run Change from base run (percentage)
(100 billion
GDP component metical) Experiment 1 Experiment 2 Experiment 3 Experiment 4
Exports 37.2 -9.2 15.9 -0.7 -1.5
Imports 92.6 -3.7 -13.2 -0.3 0.1
Home consumption 33.8 1.1 -1.1 0.1 0.1
Marketed consumption 105.9 3.8 0.1 -0.2 -0.1
Recurrent government 17.1 5.1 -1.3 -0.1 0.1
Nongovernmental organizations 6.0 -13.3 -3.1 0.3 -0.1
Investment 64.7 -7.3 -28.3 0.2 0.9
Real GDP 172.1 -0.2 -0.5 -0.0 -0.0
Source: Authors’ static CGE-model simulations.The total effects on GDP components
clearly show that investment is affected the
worst by nonagricultural import tariffs and
the associated overvalued exchange rate. As
noted above, investment is squeezed both
from the supply and demand sides. Since
capital transfers finance more than 70 per-
cent of total investment expenditures, the
effect on demand-side revenue from over-
valuation of the exchange rate completely
dominates the total effect on investment.
The strong negative total effect on exports
is also mainly due to the exchange rate
overvaluation, which lowers domestic ex-
port prices. Overall, total effects of nonagri-
cultural import tariffs on imports, exports,
and investment are strongly negative, while
total effects on private and government con-
sumption are positive.
The indirect exchange rate effects of
imposing high nonagricultural import tar-
iffs also imply strong changes among GDP
components. This is closely connected with
the fact that the indirect exchange rate ef-
fects reflect a 9 percent exchange rate ap-
preciation and a 24 percent increase in for-
eign capital inflows. Overall, indirect ex-
change rate effects on consumption, invest-
ment, and imports are strongly positive. The
relative increase in foreign capital inflows
induces an especially strong positive, indi-
rect effect on investment. In contrast, the in-
direct exchange rate effect on exports is
strongly negative because of the exchange
rate appreciation and the increased domes-
tic demand for production.
In the experiments involving agricul-
tural export taxes, 3 and 4, the total effects
on the composition of real GDP are again
small because of very low agricultural ex-
port shares. Exports drop because of de-
clines in domestic agricultural export prices
induced by export taxes, while imports drop
because of the exchange rate depreciation,
which increases domestic import prices.
Home consumption of own production in-
creases because of downward pressures on
agricultural producer prices. Finally, up-
ward pressure on nonagricultural market
prices implies that private and government
market-based consumption decline. Over-
all, the (small) total effects of agricultural
export taxes include lower consumption
and foreign trade, and increasing invest-
ment.
Agricultural export taxes also have
some visible indirect exchange rate effects
on the composition of GDP. These effects
reflect the 0.3 percent depreciation in ex-
change rates and a relative 0.8 percent de-
crease in foreign capital inflows. The de-
crease in capital inflows, combined with in-
creases in import prices of investment
goods induced by exchange rates, implies a
relatively strong negative, indirect ex-
change rate effect on investment. Further-
more, the exchange rate depreciation im-
proves the trade balance through increasing
exports and decreasing imports. In sum, the
indirect exchange rate effects of agricultural
export taxes are generally negative for con-
sumption, investment, and imports, and
positive for exports.
Agricultural Terms of Trade
The agricultural terms of trade were evalu-
ated at different points in the pricing chain
(Table 8.2). The total effect of nonagricul-
tural import tariffs is to lower the terms of
trade evaluated at domestic import prices
by 16.2 percent. The fall in the price of
commercial services improves domestic
prices for agricultural imports prices more
than for nonagricultural import. Accord-
ingly, the price channel for commercial
services moderates the negative total effect
on relative prices for agricultural import.
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The indirect exchange rate effect on relative
prices of agricultural imports is only mar-
ginally positive because the exchange rate
63Agricultural import prices would have decreased by 20 percent by definition, had marketing margins not been
present in the model.
THE AGRICULTURAL BIAS REVISITED 93appreciation and the decline in commercial
service prices affects agricultural and non-
agricultural import prices in a similar way.
This is so because marketing margin rates
for imported agricultural and nonagricul-
tural goods are similar.
The total effect of nonagricultural im-
port tariffs on relative agricultural export
prices is modest. The small total incentive
effect is due to almost equivalent rates of
decline in agricultural and nonagricultural
export prices. The negative impact on do-
mestic agricultural export prices is noted.
The 6.3 percent decline in the commercial
service price should increase relative agri-
cultural export prices. However, the large
share of marketing costs in the value of
agricultural exports also implies that agri-
cultural export prices are sensitive to ex-
change rate changes. It follows that the 9
percent exchange rate appreciation has a
particularly negative effect on agricultural
export prices. Overall, the total effect of
nonagricultural import tariffs is to lower
relative agricultural export prices by 0.8
percent.
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While the indirect exchange rate effects
are negative for agricultural and nonagri-
cultural export prices alike, agricultural
prices are affected the most because of the
mutually reinforcing effects of the ex-
change rate appreciation and the relative 5.1
percent increase in the commercial service
price. High agricultural margins for export
marketing imply that increased commercial
service costs worsen the agricultural terms
of trade. Moreover, the exchange rate ap-
preciation worsens the agricultural terms of
trade even further because of the implied
exchange rate sensitivity. Overall, the indi-
rect exchange rate effect on relative agricul-
tural export prices is a drop of 4.9 percent.
The total effect on agricultural terms of
trade evaluated at the prices for composite
goods is strongly negative. This is a result
of declining agricultural and increasing
nonagricultural price indices. The decline in
agricultural market prices follows from de-
clining producer prices and marketing
costs. Lower producer prices and marketing
costs also have a tendency to lower non-
agricultural market prices. However, tariff-
induced increases in nonagricultural import
prices dominate. Overall, the total effect of
nonagricultural import tariffs is to decrease
relative agricultural market prices by 6.6
percent.
The indirect exchange rate effect on rel-
ative agricultural market prices is small.
This effect reflects a 9 percent exchange
rate appreciation and 24 percent increase in
foreign capital inflows. On the one hand,
the appreciation leads to lower nonagricul-
tural market prices for imported goods be-
cause of relatively high nonagricultural im-
port shares. On the other hand, increased
foreign capital inflows lead to increased de-
mand and prices for nonagricultural invest-
ment goods (construction). Finally, the 5.1
percent increase in the commercial service
price increases agricultural market prices
relatively strongly. Overall, the indirect ex-
change rate effect of nonagricultural import
tariffs leads to a small 0.3 percent net in-
crease in relative agricultural market prices.
The total incentive effects of nonagri-
cultural import tariffs include increasing
relative agricultural producer prices. The
relative drop in nonagricultural producer
prices may seem counterintuitive, since
nonagricultural import tariffs are supposed
to protect nonagriculture. The reason for
this effect is partly to be found in the differ-
ences in marketing margin rates between
sectors. Import tariffs induce a drop in im-
port demand. This leads to a fall in the com-
mercial service price, which imparts a
downward pressure on agricultural and in-
dustry sector market prices. Since no mar-
keting margin is added to service sector 
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64Notice, however, that the high negative total effects on domestic export prices has a larger impact on nonagri-
cultural producer price incentives because of the larger nonagricultural export shares.activities, this leads to a competitive lower-
ing of service sector market and producer
prices. The producer price in the construc-
tion sector also declines because of declin-
ing foreign financing for investment pur-
poses. Overall, the nonagricultural import
tariffs lead to a total 1.4 percent increase in
relative agricultural producer prices in spite
of the protection afforded by the import tar-
iffs to the nonagricultural sector.
The indirect exchange rate effect of
nonagricultural import tariffs on relative
agricultural producer prices is moderately
negative. As mentioned previously, the ex-
change rate effect reflects an exchange rate
appreciation and a relative increase in for-
eign capital inflows. The exchange rate ap-
preciation works to lower the producer
prices on (nonagricultural) exports directly,
while the increase in foreign capital inflows
leads to increasing demand and producer
prices for construction. In addition, the rel-
ative increase in the commercial service
price leads to competitive increases in serv-
ice sector producer prices. The net result of
these disparate effects is that the indirect ex-
change rate effect of nonagricultural import
tariffs amounts to a 2.9 percent decrease in
relative agricultural producer prices.
The total effect of nonagricultural im-
port tariffs on relative agricultural value-
added prices is strongly positive. The posi-
tive total incentive effects for agricultural
producers cannot be explained by relative
changes in producer prices. They only
change slightly. Rudimentary production
technologies imply that agricultural value-
added prices decrease by a mere 2.5 percent
in accordance with producer prices. In con-
trast, nonagricultural value-added prices de-
crease by 9.8 percent in the more input-
intensive nonagricultural sectors. This is
much stronger than the 3.5 percent decline
in nonagricultural producer prices. Conse-
quently, nonagricultural value-added prices
particularly are negatively affected by
nonagricultural import tariffs through the
input cost channel.
The individual price indices indicate
that changes in producer prices and value-
added prices are correlated for both agricul-
ture and nonagriculture. However, interme-
diate input costs are clearly important for
the nonagricultural sector. This can be seen
from the fact that percentage changes differ
markedly between nonagricultural producer
prices and value-added prices. The effect of
large input costs has two dimensions. The
first is to introduce sensitivity to changes in
input prices. The second is to increase sen-
sitivity to changes in producer prices. Since
the average input cost share of nonagricul-
tural production is 50 percent, both dimen-
sions are important for nonagricultural
prices.
Overall, the total effect of nonagricul-
tural import tariffs on relative agricultural
value-added prices is 8.1 percent. It follows
that this positive total effect mainly stems
from the high sensitivity of nonagricultural
value-added prices to changes in producer
prices and from the tariff-induced increases
in consumer price, which increase nonagri-
cultural input prices. Since the agricultural
terms of trade evaluated at value-added
prices is the most appropriate measure of
relative incentives for agricultural produc-
ers, nonagricultural import tariffs and the
associated overvalued exchange rate imply
a bias against nonagriculture rather than a
bias against agriculture.
The indirect exchange rate effect of
nonagricultural import tariffs on relative
agricultural value-added prices is strongly
negative. Accordingly, the positive total ef-
fect follows from a strong positive effect on
direct prices, which reflects a 33 percent in-
crease in capital inflows. In contrast, the in-
direct exchange rate effect reflects a 9 per-
cent exchange rate overvaluation and a 24
percent increase in capital inflows. Overall,
the indirect exchange rate effect of nonagri-
cultural import tariffs works to lower rela-
tive agricultural value-added prices by 
6.5 percent. This cannot be explained alone
by the modest indirect exchange rate effect
on relative agricultural producer prices, 
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role. Hence, the positive indirect exchange
rate effect on relative agricultural value-
added prices results from the combination
of increasing relative agricultural producer
prices, a high sensitivity of nonagricultural
value-added prices to declining producer
prices and tariff-induced increases in non-
agricultural input prices.
The last two experiments, 3 and 4, are
used to analyze the impact of a uniform 25
percent agricultural export tax. The impact
on relative prices is generally small, since
agricultural export shares are low. The only
major impact of the 25 percent agricultural
export tax is to decrease relative agricul-
tural export prices by 35 percent. The rea-
son for this seeming inconsistency is that
agricultural marketing margin rates are rel-
atively high. High margins imply that do-
mestic export prices are especially sensitive
to changes in the domestic currency value
of world market prices.
65 Since agricultural
export taxes subtract from the domestic cur-
rency value of the world market prices for
exports, domestic agricultural export prices
react strongly to export taxes.
In general, agricultural export taxes
have only marginal effects on nonagricul-
tural prices. The declining agricultural
terms of trade evaluated at producer and
value-added prices reflect the strongly de-
clining producer prices for exports. The
mild impact is a result of the low agricul-
tural export shares. In conclusion, the total
incentive effects of agricultural export taxes
are moderately adverse toward agricultural
production in general but very adverse to-
ward production of agricultural export
goods in particular. The indirect exchange
rate effects on agricultural terms of trade
following from the 0.3 percent undervalua-
tion of the exchange rate are very small.
Overall, the agricultural export taxes lead to
a positive indirect incentive effect on rela-
tive agricultural value-added prices in the
order of 0.2 percent.
Simulations with a Balanced
Macroclosure
Quantity Adjustments in the 
Foreign Trade Account
This section presents trade policy analyses
of export taxes and import tariffs in the con-
text of a balanced macroclosure where the
private investment share of absorption is
fixed. Government consumption and in-
vestment are also fixed in proportion to
nominal absorption, so constant shares are
close to being maintained in absorption.
66
Maintaining private investment as a con-
stant share of absorption requires allowing
a savings rate—in this case the average
household savings rate—to vary and thus
maintain equilibrium between savings and
investment.
In general, changes in the foreign capi-
tal inflows do not depend much on the
choice of macroclosure. This is so because
the changes in the commercial service price
and the exchange rate are similar irrespec-
tive of the choice of macroclosure.
Under a fixed exchange rate regime,
nonagricultural import tariffs lead to a 29
percent drop in foreign capital inflows, as
compared with 33 percent under a savings-
driven investment closure. The mechanism
remains the same as before, namely tariff-
induced increases in domestic import prices
drive nonagricultural imports of investment
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65Marketing costs make up for the difference between domestic agricultural prices and the world market price in
domestic currency. If marketing margins were not accounted for, a uniform 25 percent agricultural export tax
would lead to a 25 percent decrease in domestic agricultural export prices, by definition.
66Were it not for the revenue-driven NGO demand component, which is relatively small, fixed government con-
sumption and total investment shares of absorption would imply a constant private consumption share of ab-
sorption as well.goods and services down. Moreover, the
non-agricultural import tariff experiment
with a flexible exchange leads to a 9 percent
decline in the domestic currency value of
capital inflows regardless of the choice of
macroclosure. In the following, total effects
accordingly reflect a 9 percent decline in
capital inflows, while the indirect effects re-
flect a 20 percent increase.
The total effects of agricultural export
taxes reflect a 0.3 percent increase in capi-
tal inflows regardless of the choice of
macroclosure. Moreover, the current indi-
rect effects reflect a 0.9 percent decrease in
capital inflows as compared with a 0.8 per-
cent decrease with savings-driven invest-
ment. In general, it can be concluded that
the policy impacts on foreign capital in-
flows do not depend on the choice of
macroclosure. The experiments with a bal-
anced macroclosure are therefore compara-
ble to the experiments with a savings-
driven investment closure in relation to
their impacts on capital inflows.
Macroeconomic Impact
Both nonagricultural import tariffs and agri-
cultural export taxes have effects on aggre-
gate real GDP similar to the experiments
with a savings-driven investment closure
(Table 8.5). While there are real small neg-
ative real effects of imposing nonagricul-
tural import tariffs, agricultural export taxes
show no visible effects on real GDP. The
impact on nominal macroeconomic indica-
tors is also very similar to the previous ex-
periments with savings-driven investment.
Overall, the positive total effects of non-
agricultural tariffs on nominal GDP and the
GDP deflator are dominated by positive in-
direct exchange rate effects.
The marginal total effect of nonagricul-
tural import tariffs on nominal absorption is
again made up of strong direct and indirect
effects. Furthermore, the positive indirect
effect of exchange rates still follows from
the 20 percent increase in capital inflows.
The impact of agricultural export taxes re-
mains small. Again, a 0.9 percent decrease
in capital inflows leads to a negative indi-
rect exchange rate effect on nominal ab-
sorption. Overall, the effects of export taxes
and import tariffs on macroeconomic indi-
cators do not change much with the change
to a balanced macroclosure.
In line with the previous set of experi-
ments, small changes in real GDP cover
significant changes in the composition of
final demand (Table 8.6). Total effects of
nonagricultural import tariffs do not change
much with the change to a balanced macro-
closure, except for a more moderate decline
in real investment and a smaller expansion
of private marketed consumption. Accord-
ingly, the conclusion remains that private
and government consumption expands at
the expense of real investment.
The fact that the composition of real
GDP still changes may seem like a paradox
given that the balanced macroclosure main-
tains the structure of domestic nominal de-
mand. However, changing relative prices
affect the composition of real final demand.
Tariff-induced increases in nonagricultural
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Table 8.5  Macroeconomic indicators for agricultural bias simulations
Base run Change from base run (percentage)
(100 billion
Indicator metical) Experiment 1 Experiment 2 Experiment 3 Experiment 4
Real GDP 172.1 -0.2 -0.4 -0.0 -0.0
Nominal GDP 172.1 2.7 -0.7 -0.2 -0.1
Nominal absorption 227.6 -0.1 -7.6 -0.1 0.2
Source: Authors’ static CGE-model simulations.import prices lead to increasing prices for
nonagricultural investment goods. In con-
trast, service prices are competitively low-
ered. Overall, the total effects of nonagri-
cultural import tariffs still involve decreas-
ing trade and investment, and increasing
consumption.
The indirect exchange rate effects of
nonagricultural import tariffs are also af-
fected strongly by the change to a balanced
macroclosure. Since the indirect exchange
rate effects reflect a 20 percent increase in
capital inflows, the change to a balanced
macroclosure moderates the relative expan-
sion of nonagricultural investment demand
in favor of a stronger expansion of more
agriculturally oriented consumption de-
mand.
The negative indirect exchange rate ef-
fect on exports is also moderated with a bal-
anced macroclosure. Accordingly, the more
moderate 3.8 percent increase in marketing
costs lowers competitive price increases in
the service sector. Nevertheless, exports
still decline by around 20 percent because
of declines in domestic export prices in-
duced by changes in the exchange rate and
a general increase in domestic absorption
resulting from increased capital inflows.
Overall, indirect exchange rate effects
of nonagricultural import tariffs continue to
involve increasing real consumption, in-
vestment, and imports; and decreasing ex-
ports. However, the choice of a balanced
macroclosure implies a stronger increase in
consumption, a more moderate increase in
investment, and a more moderate decrease
in exports. The contemporary expansion of
real consumption and investment continue
to reflect a relative 20 percent increase in
foreign capital inflows for financing 
purposes.
The change to a balanced macroclosure
also affects the impact of agricultural export
taxes on the composition of final demand.
While total and indirect exchange rate ef-
fects are small, the change in tradeoff be-
tween private consumption and investment
demand remains visible. The total effect on
investment turns positive, while the impact
on private consumption becomes negative.
Overall, the total effect of agricultural ex-
port taxes continues to include a reduction
in trade, while total effects on investment
and consumption are marginal.
The most visible impact of the balanced
macroclosure in relation to the agricultural
export tax experiments is on the indirect ex-
change rate effects. Accordingly, the nega-
tive indirect effect on investment is clearly
moderated at the expense of a negative in-
direct effect on private consumption. Over-
all, the indirect exchange rate effects of
agricultural export taxes include decreasing
consumption, investment and imports, and
increasing exports.
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Table 8.6  Real GDP components for agricultural bias simulations
Base run Change from base run (percentage)
(100 billion
GDP component metical) Experiment 1 Experiment 2 Experiment 3 Experiment 4
Exports 37.2 -9.9 11.1 -0.7 -1.4
Imports 92.6 -4.0 -13.0 -0.2 0.1
Home consumption 33.8 0.8 -1.8 0.1 0.2
Marketed consumption 105.9 0.9 -8.1 0.0 0.3
Recurrent government 17.1 4.8 -1.6 -0.1 0.1
Nongovernmental organizations 6.0 -13.4 -4.2 0.3 -0.0
Investment 64.7 -2.3 -11.1 -0.1 0.2
Real GDP 172.1 -0.2 -0.4 -0.0 -0.0
Source: Authors’ static CGE-model simulations.Agricultural Terms of Trade
The impact of nonagricultural import tariffs
on relative agricultural import prices is not
affected in any important way by the choice
of macroclosure (Table 8.7). Average mar-
keting margin rates are similar for agricul-
tural and nonagricultural imports. It follows
that slightly varying changes in the com-
mercial service price and the exchange rate
leave the agricultural terms of trade virtu-
ally unaffected by the choice of macroclo-
sure (Tables 8.1 and 8.7). Overall, the non-
agricultural import tariffs lead to a strong
negative total effect of –16.2 percent on
relative agricultural import prices, while the
overvalued exchange rate leads to a small
positive indirect exchange rate effect of 0.7
percent.
Agricultural export prices are somewhat
more sensitive to the choice of macroclo-
sure, since agricultural marketing margin
rates are relatively high. The total effects of
nonagricultural import tariffs reflect a 6.3
percent decline in the commercial service
price, compared with a 5.9 percent decline
with savings-driven investment. It follows
that the total effect of nonagricultural im-
port tariffs on relative export prices remains
around –1.0 percent, regardless of the
choice of macroclosure.
In contrast, indirect exchange rate ef-
fects reflect an increase of 3.8 percent in the
commercial service price compared with a
5.1 percent increase with savings-driven in-
vestment. The more moderate increase in
marketing costs benefits relative agricul-
tural export prices. It follows that the
change to a balanced macroclosure moder-
ates the negative indirect effect on agricul-
tural export prices. Nevertheless, the ex-
change rate appreciation and the relative in-
crease in the commercial service price still
imply that nonagricultural import tariffs
lead to a strong negative indirect exchange
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Table 8.7  Price indices and agricultural terms of trade for agricultural bias simulations
Change from base run (percentage)
Prices Base run Experiment 1 Experiment 2 Experiment 3 Experiment 4
Import
Agricultural terms of trade 100 -16.2 -16.9 0.0 0.0
Agricultural prices 100 -8.1 -2.5 0.2 0.0
Nonagricultural prices 100 9.6 17.4 0.2 0.0
Export
Agricultural terms of trade 100 -1.0 3.3 -35.0 -35.1
Agricultural prices 100 -9.9 4.0 -34.8 -35.1
Nonagricultural prices 100 -9.0 0.7 0.3 0.0
Retail
Agricultural terms of trade 100 -7.5 -10.0 0.0 0.1
Agricultural prices 100 -5.4 -7.1 0.1 0.1
Nonagricultural prices 100 2.2 3.2 0.0 0.0
Producer
Agricultural terms of trade 100 -0.8 -3.2 -1.0 -0.9
Agricultural prices 100 -4.0 -7.1 -1.0 -0.9
Nonagricultural prices 100 -3.2 -4.0 0.0 0.0
Value-added
Agricultural terms of trade 100 5.3 4.8 -1.1 -1.0
Agricultural prices 100 -4.7 -8.3 -1.2 -1.0
Nonagricultural prices 100 -9.5 -12.5 -0.1 0.0
Exchange rate 100 -8.8 0.0 0.3 0.0
Commercial service price 100 -6.3 -11.4 -0.1 0
Source: Authors’ static CGE-model simulations.rate effect of –4.3 percent on relative agri-
cultural export prices.
Nonagricultural import tariffs decrease
relative prices for agricultural goods by 7.5
and 10.0 percent, respectively, in the exper-
iments with flexible and fixed exchange
rates. Accordingly, a balanced macroclo-
sure implies a stronger negative total effect,
composed of a stronger negative direct ef-
fect and a stronger positive indirect ex-
change rate effect. The individual price in-
dices indicate that the change to a balanced
macroclosure has a negative impact on agri-
cultural prices (Tables 8.2 and 8.7). These
agricultural price effects are the most im-
portant effects of a change to a balanced
macroclosure.
Overall, the strong negative total effect
of nonagricultural import tariffs on relative
agricultural composite prices still follows
from the combination of increase in non-
agricultural market prices and decreases in
agricultural market prices. Consequently,
the import tariffs increase domestic non-
agricultural (import) prices, while decreases
in producer prices and marketing costs de-
crease agricultural market prices.
Nonagricultural import tariffs decrease
relative agricultural producer prices by 0.8
percent in the experiment with flexible ex-
change rates and by 3.2 percent in the ex-
periment with fixed exchange rates. As a re-
sult, the change to a balanced macroclosure
leads to a negative total effect and a positive
indirect exchange rate effect. The individ-
ual price indices indicate that a balanced
macroclosure affects nonagricultural pro-
ducer prices positively and agricultural pro-
ducer prices negatively (Tables 8.2 and
8.7). The reason is that adjustment to de-
clining capital inflows are shifted from
nonagricultural investment goods to agri-
cultural consumer goods.
Overall, the negative total effect of
nonagricultural import tariffs on relative
agricultural producer prices continues to be
the net outcome of simultaneous declines in
agricultural and service sector producer
prices. Producer prices in industry and man-
ufacturing sectors generally decline less
than in other sectors because of tariff pro-
tection and lower marketing costs. The pos-
itive indirect exchange rate effect reflects a
strong positive impact on agricultural pro-
ducer prices. While the relative demand in-
crease for agricultural consumption goods
directly affects the domestic economy, in-
creasing demand for nonagricultural invest-
ment goods leaks out partly through im-
ports. Accordingly, the 20 percent increase
in capital inflows increases agricultural pro-
ducer prices more strongly than nonagricul-
tural producer prices.
Nonagricultural import tariffs increase
relative agricultural value-added prices by
5.3 percent and 4.8 percent, respectively, in
the experiments with flexible and fixed ex-
change rates. The positive total effect is
moderated by the change to a balanced
macroclosure, while the indirect exchange
rate effect has turned marginally positive.
The balanced macroclosure affects agricul-
tural value-added prices positively (the
major impact) and nonagricultural value-
added prices negatively. This was also the
case for producer prices. This might suggest
that the change to a balanced macroclosure
affects relative agricultural value-added
prices through its impact on agricultural
producer prices. However, the effect of the
change to a balanced macroclosure on
nonagricultural producer prices is also im-
portant, since the input cost channel magni-
fies the effect of producer prices changes on
value-added prices.
Overall, nonagricultural import tariffs
have a total effect of 5.3 percent on relative
agricultural value-added prices. The total
effect on relative producer prices is small. It
follows that the positive total effect mainly
stems from the input cost channel including
the very sensitive nature of nonagricultural
value-added prices to changes in producer
prices, and the tariff-induced price in-
creases for nonagricultural inputs. Nonagri-
cultural import tariffs also lead to a positive
indirect exchange rate effect of 0.5 percent
on relative value-added prices. The small
100 CHAPTER 8positive indirect effect results because agri-
cultural and nonagricultural value-added
prices increase in parallel between the fixed
and flexible exchange rate experiments.
The reason is that the structure of domestic
final demand is maintained almost constant.
This minimizes the relative price impact of
the relative 20 percent increase in capital in-
flows.
The change to a balanced macroclosure
has very little importance for the results in
the experiments with agricultural export
taxes. Total and indirect exchange rate ef-
fects remain small because of the very low
agricultural export shares in the model.
Consequently, the conclusion remains that
agricultural export taxes reduce agricultural
producer incentives slightly, while price in-
centives for production of agricultural ex-
port crops are reduced strongly. 
Conclusions
During the 1980s the benefits of free trade
and deregulated markets were increasingly
emphasized, and partial-equilibrium studies
in the late 1980s concluded that import-
substituting trade and exchange rate poli-
cies have strong negative effects on agricul-
tural production incentives. The generality
of these conclusions are, however, seriously
questioned when the analysis is performed
inside a general-equilibrium framework.
Our experiments suggest that quantity ad-
justment in the foreign trade account is im-
portant to consider when analyzing the agri-
cultural bias in a general-equilibrium
framework. The specific characteristics of
the model are important for the results ob-
tained. High agricultural marketing margins
imply that agricultural price incentives im-
prove when declining demand for market-
ing services, driven by declining trade, low-
ers the price of marketing services. More-
over, increases in industry input costs, be-
cause of import tariffs or exchange rate de-
preciation, tend to benefit relative agricul-
tural price incentives. Overall, the bias
against agriculture following from agricul-
tural export taxes is minor, while nonagri-
cultural import tariffs actually increase agri-
cultural production incentives strongly.
The impact of import-substituting poli-
cies on relative agricultural value-added
prices suggests that historical policies may
not have imparted an agricultural bias in
Mozambique, as previously believed. Con-
sequently, the increasing agricultural share
of value-added up through the early 1990s,
identified in Chapter 4, appears to have
come about not so much because of struc-
tural adjustment induced improvements to
agricultural price incentives, but rather be-
cause the sector was recovering from the
war in the 1980s and early 1990s, and the
drought in 1992. However, it is important to
be aware of the limitations of the results
presented in this chapter. Accordingly, the
fact that agricultural export taxes have 
little effect on relative agricultural price in-
centives rests squarely on the fact that agri-
cultural export shares are small in the
model. These results cannot be used to
argue that export taxes on, for example, raw
cashews can make up a vital source of gov-
ernment revenue. This would require that
agricultural export shares, a key structural
characteristic of the model, increased 
substantially.
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Marketing Margins and Agricultural 
Technology
F
ollowing the peace agreement in 1992 and the first free general elections in 1994, dis-
placed people returned to rural agricultural areas in massive numbers. This played an
important role in the recovery of aggregate agricultural production, as discussed in
Chapter 4. Nevertheless, production technologies employed by most farmers remain rudi-
mentary and the quality of inputs is poor. Therefore significant possibilities exist for shifting
to better production technologies through using improved seed varieties and other improved
inputs, and through better farming practices (Bay 1998). Moreover, a key problem limiting the
impact of market reforms and the potential benefits of better agricultural technology is that
many farmers do not have access to markets. The lack of markets is widespread, and transac-
tions costs are very high. Some progress has been made regarding the extension of primary
and secondary road networks, and this has been accompanied by some integration of trading
activities between different parts of the country. The overall goal of bringing the different re-
gions into a single, integrated domestic economy that links rural production areas with urban
consumption centers through the establishment of countrywide transport, storage, and com-
munication facilities is, however, far from achieved.
Against this background, this chapter presents a quantitative assessment of the potential
benefits from increases in the productivity of the agricultural sector and improvements to mar-
keting networks. The analysis is based on the CGE model set out in Chapter 6. The 1995 SAM
shows that marketing margins for some sectors were as high as three times the producer price
in 1995, and they are especially large for primary agricultural production. These marketing
costs represent wedges between producer and purchaser prices, and partly explain why more
than half of agricultural production remains unmarketed. Since the vast majority of the popu-
lation relies on agricultural production for their livelihood, potential exists for very large in-
come gains through improved market integration in rural areas. Synergy between a poverty-
reducing strategy of increasing agricultural productivity and parallel improvements in the
marketing infrastructure can be expected.
Simulations
Marketing margins in the model, discussed here, are based on the distinction between factory
and farmgate prices on the one hand and purchaser prices on the other, reflecting storage and
This chapter was written by Channing Arndt, Henning Tarp Jensen, Sherman Robinson, and Finn Tarp.
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67 The marketing margins
were introduced into the CGE model
through commercial service coefficients.
This treatment amounts to assuming that
each production good from a given produc-
tion sector requires a fixed amount of mar-
keting services to reach the market. In
essence, they are input-output coefficients
relating the demand for commerce services
required to move goods from producer to
market. A single production activity pro-
vides the marketing services associated
with imported, exported, and domestically
marketed commodities.
The model formulation incorporates
home consumption and marketed consump-
tion through a linear expenditure system
(LES). In this formulation, the marginal
budget shares of marketed and nonmar-
keted goods are fixed and each commodity
has an associated minimum consumption
level below which physical consumption
cannot fall. Home-consumed goods are, as
already noted, valued at producer prices,
while marketed goods are valued at pur-
chaser prices, including consumption taxes
and marketing margins. Labor supplies are
fixed in the agricultural and nonagricultural
sectors.
68 As a result, wage rates are al-
lowed to diverge between agricultural and
non-agricultural labor.
In the model, implementation of agri-
cultural technology improvements, through
Hicks-neutral productivity increases, is
straightforward and in line with our focus
on the productivity-enhancing importance
of introducing better-quality inputs, such as
improved seed, in combination with better
farming practices. Reductions in marketing
margins are modeled through scaling down
the commercial service coefficients further
discussed below.
69 In the analysis, invest-
ment expenditures associated with im-
proved technology and marketing infra-
structure are ignored. This treatment
amounts to assuming that these investments
are undertaken before the current simula-
tions, and the analysis makes no attempt to
quantify the costs of realizing the policy ini-
tiatives studied here. The focus is instead on
benefits.
The simulations include a uniform 30
percent improvement in productivity across
agricultural sectors and a 15 percent reduc-
tion in the commercial service coefficients
for imported, exported, and domestically
produced and marketed commodities
(Table 9.1). Achieving agricultural produc-
tivity growth on the order of 30 percent in
Mozambique is probably feasible over a
reasonably short time span because of the
rudimentary nature of current agricultural
production practices. Reductions in market-
ing margins on the order of 15 percent are
also feasible, given the scope for improving
the marketing system after the devastation
caused by the war. While a 15 percent gain
may come relatively cheaply, large invest-
ments in marketing infrastructure will
likely be needed to achieve significant fur-
ther declines in marketing costs. In short,
the costs of achieving these gains are not
explicitly included in the model. However,
the costs of attaining these gains are likely
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67The price gap may reflect some degree of imperfect competition. In the SAM and the model, they are assumed
to reflect real costs.
68Simulations with a specification of constant elasticity of transformation between agricultural and nonagricul-
tural labor supplies lead to the same conclusions.
69The current experiments analyze the effects of reductions in the demand for marketing services following from
investment in marketing infrastructure. The experiments do not take account of potential efficiency gains in the
production of commercial services associated with improvements to the marketing infrastructure. The demand
effect is assumed to dominate, at least initially, in the Mozambican context. Better infrastructure will make it pos-
sible to transport, for example, 1 ton of maize faster and with less input of work-hours and fuel, but the trucks
carrying the cargo remain the same. In any case, efficiency gains in the provision of marketing services would
yield similar qualitative results, reinforcing the conclusions derived from the analysis in this chapter.to be relatively low. For the attainment of
further gains, a more detailed consideration
of cost would be desirable.
The productivity increase of 30 percent
for all agricultural products (experiment 1)
yields an aggregate welfare improvement of
6.8 percent (the change in absorption de-
flated by the aggregate CPI (Table 9.2). The
productivity increase raises output and low-
ers relative prices significantly in the agri-
cultural sector. The price decline moderates
the increase in aggregate rural income and
transmits much of the gain to the urban sec-
tor. Since agriculture has very high trade
margins, the greater output generates a sig-
nificant increase in demand for commerce
services, driving up their price. The result is
that the gap between supplier and market
prices for exports and imports rises. Exports
decrease more than imports in real terms,
and a mild depreciation of the real ex-
change rate (3.3 percent) restores equilib-
rium in the trade balance.
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Table 9.1  Experiment descriptions for marketing margin and agricultural technology
simulations
Experiment Description
Base run Base social accounting matrix (SAM) data set for 1995
Experiment 1 Increase in productivity by 30 percent for all agricultural products
Experiment 2 Reduction of marketing margins for all goods by 15 percent
Experiment 3 Scenarios 1 and 2 combined
Source: Authors’ static CGE-model experiment design.
Table 9.2  Macroeconomic indicators and prices for marketing margin and agricultural
technology simulations
Base run Change from base run (percentage)
(100 billion
Indicator metical) Experiment 1 Experiment 2 Experiment 3
Real GDP 172.1 6.8 5.0 12.2
Absorption 223.3 6.8 4.9 12.9
Price indices
Value-added 100 1.4 5.3 7.3
Export producer 100 4.8 5.3 10.3
Import purchaser 100 6.2 0.2 6.4
Cost of living indices
Rural 100 -5.9 2.8 -3.1
Urban 100 3.7 -0.8 3.0
Real exchange rate index 100 3.3 -0.1 2.8
Agricultural terms of trade
Producer 100 -24.9 7.4 -17.8
Value-added 100 -29.4 7.1 -22.4
Export 100 -1.8 6.7 5.1
Import 100 0.2 -0.6 -0.5
Price of commerce 1 9.8 2.2 12.7
Source: Authors’ static CGE-model simulations.
70The real exchange rate is defined as the ratio between an index composed of domestic exports and imports
prices, and an index composed of prices of domestically marketed and nonmarketed goods.The 15 percent reduction in marketing
margins (experiment 2) leads to a 4.9 per-
cent increase in welfare. This is a large wel-
fare gain.
71 The decrease in marketing mar-
gins narrows the spread between producer
and purchaser prices, raising the former and
lowering the latter. Both producers and con-
sumers gain, and the gains are spread
evenly across the economy, as further dis-
cussed below. The impact on trade is the
converse of experiment 1: exports gain
slightly more than imports, and the real ex-
change rate appreciates slightly (0.1 per-
cent), to restore equilibrium.
Results from combining the first two
experiments (experiment 3) support the hy-
pothesis that prior improvements in market-
ing infrastructure allow the economy to
reap greater benefits from improvements in
agricultural productivity. The increase in
welfare in experiment 3 is about 10 percent
greater than the sum of the effects of exper-
iments 1 and 2 run separately. The reduc-
tion in marketing margins diminishes the
decrease in agricultural producer prices that
would otherwise follow from the significant
expansion of supply as agricultural produc-
tivity rises. Improvements to the marketing
network ensure that increased production
following agricultural productivity im-
provements benefits both farmers and con-
sumers more, as the gap between producer
and purchaser prices is narrowed.
The relative changes in the cost-of-
living indices for rural and urban house-
holds differ across the simulation scenar-
ios.
72 Gains in agricultural productivity (ex-
periment 1) lower agricultural prices signif-
icantly, and since rural households allocate
a larger share of their budget to agricultural
goods, their cost-of-living index falls rela-
tive to that of urban households. In contrast,
lower marketing margins (experiment 2) in-
crease producer prices in agriculture and in-
crease the relative cost of living for rural
households with significant home con-
sumption. The effects on cost of living with
the combined scenario (experiment 3) are
very close to the sum of the two separate
experiments.
Increased agricultural productivity,
which increases output, worsens the agri-
cultural terms of trade (Table 9.2). De-
creased marketing costs improve the agri-
cultural terms of trade by increasing the
producer price of agriculture more than that
of nonagriculture. In the combined scenario
(experiment 3), however, the agricultural
productivity effect is stronger and the terms
of trade move significantly against agricul-
ture. From a policy perspective, the com-
bined scenario is attractive because the ad-
verse terms-of-trade effect of increasing
agricultural productivity is significantly
ameliorated.
The welfare impact of the experiments
in terms of changes in household consump-
tion is measured by equivalent variation
from the base (Table 9.3).
73 Given that av-
erage household savings rates are assumed
fixed in the model, these measures provide
a good indicator of the distributional impact
of the scenarios between rural and urban
households. Rural households are the main
gainers from increased agricultural produc-
tivity. The significant increases in agricul-
tural production are accompanied by sub-
stantial decreases in producer prices, so
rural household income increases only
slightly. Yet, rural households benefit 
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71Both static gains from trade liberalization, for example, rarely exceed 1 percent.
72The numeraire is the cost-of-living index, including urban and rural household consumption. Changes in the
individual rural and urban indices are therefore relative to an average. Thus, when the cost of living of urban
households drops rural people must experience an opposite effect.
73Equivalent variation measures the lump-sum transfer that would make the household indifferent between the
scenario and the base case plus the transfer.106 CHAPTER 9
significantly on the consumption side, since
they allocate a relatively large share of their
budgets to agricultural goods.
Urban and rural households gain
roughly the same percent increase from
lowering trade margins (experiment 2). As
noted above, narrowing the gap between
producer and purchaser prices spreads the
gains across the economy. Again, the results
for experiment 3 indicate a synergy be-
tween the two effects—the gain in welfare
for both urban and rural households from
experiment 3 is greater than the sum of the
gains from the two separate simulation sce-
narios.
Interactions between agricultural pro-
ductivity increases and marketing margin
reductions are significant for most of the
final demand components of real GDP
(Table 9.4)—the results from experiment 3
generally do not equal the sum of the other
two experiments. For example, increased
agricultural productivity (experiment 1)
leads to significant import substitution in
grains, which has a high import share
8;
hence aggregate exports decline because
less export earnings are required to achieve
the fixed trade balance. Lowering trade
margins, on the other hand, narrows the gap
between border prices and domestic market
prices for both imports and exports, and
leads to increases in both. The trade-
creating effect, which dominates in the
combined scenario, indicates a significant
Table 9.3  Equivalent variation on consumption for marketing margin and agricultural
technology simulations
Percentage of base consumption
Households Base run Experiment 1 Experiment 2 Experiment 3
Urban 0 5.2 4.7 10.5
Rural 0 12.3 4.6 18.2
Total 0 8.5 4.6 14.1
Source: Authors’ static CGE-model simulations.
Table 9.4  Components of real GDP for marketing margin and agricultural technology
simulations
Base run Change from base run (percentage)
(100 billion
GDP components metical) Experiment 1 Experiment 2 Experiment 3
Exports 32.7 -2.2 9.4 8.0
Imports 83.9 -0.8 3.7 3.1
Home consumption 32.6 24.3 -0.8 22.5
Marketed consumption 106.8 4.4 6.4 11.8
Recurrent government 16.8 -0.7 2.7 2.4
Nongovernmental organizations 5.5 -2.5 1.5 -1.5
Investment 61.5 -1.1 2.4 1.2
Real GDP 172.1 6.8 5.0 12.2
Source: Authors’ static CGE-model simulations.
74This effect is likely to diminish as Mozambique becomes more self-sufficient in producing food following eco-
nomic recovery, but recent events demonstrate how difficult this is.interaction between increasing the supply
of traded goods and lowering the costs of
moving these goods to and from interna-
tional markets.
75
Agricultural productivity increases have
a major effect on the level of home-
consumed production. Increased agricul-
tural production decreases producer prices,
which makes home consumption of agricul-
tural goods more attractive. Moreover, the
increase in the price of marketing services
amplifies the gap between producer and
purchaser prices, which further favors
home consumption. Lowering marketing
margins ameliorates the effect of the widen-
ing price gap—experiment 2 lowers home
consumption—and provides incentives for
a further switch toward marketed consump-
tion in the combined experiment. However,
the agricultural production effect on the
consumption patterns still dominates in this
case.
In terms of the effects of the scenarios
on returns to labor and capital, the increase
in agricultural productivity leads to almost
no change in the agricultural wage—it rises
by 0.1 percent (Table 9.5). The decline in
producer prices almost exactly offsets the
effect of increased productivity as far as
agricultural labor is concerned. In experi-
ment 1, some of the gains are transmitted
through lower prices to the nonagricultural
sectors. The wage of nonagricultural labor
and the capital rental rate both rise signifi-
cantly, but the significant increase in de-
mand for capital-intensive commercial
services increases capital returns relative to
wages.
Lower trade margins (experiment 2) in-
crease all factor returns but favor agricul-
tural labor, since the agricultural sectors
have the highest trade margins. The com-
bined scenario is notable in that it spreads
the gains more evenly across the three fac-
tors, with all factors gaining more than the
sum of the effects of the two separate sce-
narios. The synergy between increasing
agricultural productivity and lowering trade
margins in parallel yields returns to all fac-
tors that exceed the sum of the separate sce-
narios, with little change to the overall
functional distribution of income. From a
policy perspective, the results of these in-
teractions are very desirable, since much
political conflict is rooted in changes in the
distribution of income among factors of
production.
Conclusions
The results presented in chapter indicate
that increasing agricultural productivity is
an important priority for Mozambique, with
large potential gains. However, increasing
agricultural output in an environment of
very high marketing costs leads to a 
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75Trade creation of course depends greatly on the ability of Mozambican exporters to penetrate export markets,
highlighting that this is an important area for policy concern.
Table 9.5  Factor price indices for marketing margin and agricultural technology 
simulations
Change from base run (percentage)
Factor prices Base run Experiment 1 Experiment 2 Experiment 3
Labor 1.0 0.1 11.4 15.0
Nonagricultural labor 1.0 8.9 4.9 14.4
Capital 1.0 10.6 2.0 13.4
Source: Authors’ static CGE-model simulations.108 CHAPTER 9
significant fall in prices. These price de-
clines transmit most of the gains in factor
income to the nonagricultural sectors and
factors of production. Rural households do,
however, gain from greater availability of
food and lower producer prices, which to-
gether lower the cost of home-consumed
goods.
Lowering marketing costs decreases the
gap between producer and purchaser prices
in all markets. The gains are large even for
relatively small reductions in the margins.
Furthermore, these gains are spread across
the economy, but agriculture gains rela-
tively more because its marketing margins
are higher. The scenario creates trade; both
aggregate exports and imports grow, be-
cause the lower marketing margins increase
the returns to producers supplying to export
markets and lower the domestic market
price to purchasers of imports. The con-
sumption of marketed goods rises signifi-
cantly, while home-consumption declines
slightly.
The combined scenario reveals signifi-
cant synergy between increasing agricul-
tural productivity and lowering marketing
costs in parallel. The welfare gains from the
combined scenario are larger than the sum
of the gains from the two separate scenar-
ios. Lowering marketing costs somewhat
ameliorates the worsening in the agricul-
tural terms of trade caused by the increase
in supply due to the increase in agricultural
productivity. Both rural and urban house-
holds gain significantly as returns to all fac-
tors increase—agricultural and nonagricul-
tural wages, and capital rentals. Compared
with the separate scenarios, the combined
scenario yields little change in the 
distribution of income across factors of 
production—the functional distribution.
This result makes the combined scenario
appealing from a policy perspective. It
should cause a relatively low level of 
political strain, while providing relatively
large increases to the welfare of poor rural
households.
Because of the multiplicity of precondi-
tions for a broadly based development
process and the limited availability of gov-
ernment resources in Mozambique, there is
a clear need for prioritizing among different
policy initiatives. So far, government prior-
ities have been directed toward increasing
the efficiency of governance, and improv-
ing incentive structures and the quality of
price signals in the economy. Following the
introduction of democratic rule and the re-
cent recovery of the economy to more nor-
mal levels, priorities seem to have shifted in
favor of improvements in the educational
and health systems as well as extensions to
the primary road network. This study shows
that there are good reasons for also direct-
ing resources toward improved agricultural
productivity, especially in small-scale farm-
ing; and continuing to reduce marketing
costs through improved infrastructure, in-
cluding particularly investment in the sec-
ondary and tertiary road network. There are
significant synergy effects between im-
proved agricultural productivity and re-
duced marketing costs, and the synergy be-
tween the two raise the welfare of poor rural
households while preserving the politically
sensitive functional distribution of income.CHAPTER 10
Agricultural Technology, Risk, and Gender
T
he CGE model (described in Chapter 6) was employed to analyze the interactions be-
tween agricultural technology improvement, risk, and gender roles in agricultural pro-
duction with a particular focus on cassava.
76 These interactions are important. For ex-
ample, analysis of data from the 1996–97 marketing year (a good production year) revealed
that 64 percent of the rural population had insufficient calories available to meet the caloric
requirements of household members (MPF/EMU/IFPRI 1998).
As usual, moving from a microeconomic, household approach to a macroeconomic, 
general-equilibrium approach has numerous pitfalls. Some detail is necessarily suppressed.
However, the authors of this report would like to point out, from the outset, that the results and
conclusions from the analysis presented here are driven primarily by a few features relating to
gender roles and the characteristics of the agricultural sector. First, rural women are busy peo-
ple.
77 Second, gender roles in household activities exist. Women bear almost all the burden of
domestic tasks, including the daily provision of meals, and are responsible for ensuring food
security at the household level (Naeraa-Nicolajsen 1998). Third, agriculture is the critical in-
come source for the large majority of rural households. Fourth, cassava is a very important
crop in value terms and has distinct risk-reducing attributes. Critically, for gender-related is-
sues, available data indicate that women provide the large majority of labor input into cassava
production.
In addition to the model characteristics already discussed in detail in Chapter 6, this chap-
ter distinguishes between male and female labor, and introduces risk aversion. These model
dimensions are briefly described below.
Male and Female Agricultural Labor
Agricultural labor is divided into male and female categories. The percentages of labor allo-
cated to each in this study (Table 10.1) reflect the available data on gender roles in agricultural
production summarized in the previous section, interviews with knowledgeable individuals in
Mozambique, and the authors’ own judgment. As emphasized above, cassava production is 
This chapter was written by Channing Arndt and Finn Tarp.
76World Development devoted a special issue to gender and macroeconomics in which calls were made to intro-
duce gender into CGE models (see Cagatay, Elson, and Grown 1995).
77The World Bank’s Mozambique Agricultural Sector Memorandum (1997) asserts that rural women work, on
average, 14-16 hours per day, although it is not clear where these figures were obtained. For further background
see Arndt and Tarp (2000).
109female dominated. The division of labor
implies that 63 percent of agricultural labor
is undertaken by women (Table 10.1). This
agrees reasonably well with the 60 percent
figure calculated by Pehrsson (1993). Even
though time-allocation studies show
roughly that women and men spend equal
time working in agricultural production,
these are reasonable figures, since there are
more working-age women than working-
age men in rural areas. Because of the war
and male migration for off-farm work,
slightly more than one rural household in
five is headed by a female, with this pro-
portion being higher in the south and lower
in the north (Datt et al. 1999). In addition,
primarily because of the war, females repre-
sented 53 percent of the population in 1997
as opposed to 51 percent in 1981, the year
just prior to the onset of hostilities (NIS
1999). The effects of the war on the gender
structure of the population are certain to be
strongest in the working-age cohort.
Risk Aversion
Low incomes, rudimentary technology,
heavy dependence on agriculture, and a
variable climate generate a strong need for
risk-reduction strategies among rural
households. Gender inequality may also
make women in rural households more risk
averse than men.
78 In more recent house-
hold models, men and women are therefore
treated as separate agents with different,
often competing, interests and, potentially,
an unequal power structure. Under these
conditions, women may not be sure to have
access to an adequate share of family cash
income. Different attitudes to risk are likely,
especially when women are responsible for
food security at the household level.
As mentioned above, cassava is drought
tolerant, resistant to disease, relatively flex-
ible with respect to timing of labor inputs,
and easy to store. Because of these attrac-
tive risk-reducing properties and the control
that women exert over cassava, it is as-
sumed, in some of the simulations in the
next section, that cassava plays an explicit
role in risk reduction. Specifically, it is as-
sumed that a safety-first strategy is pursued.
Under this strategy, households aim to pro-
duce a certain (exogenous) amount of cas-
sava for risk-reduction purposes only. Once
the resources necessary to produce the min-
imum amount of cassava have been allo-
cated, the household allocates resources to
other agricultural and nonagricultural activ-
ities according to relative prices.
79
The risk-aversion strategy of safety first
is implemented by adding an endogenous
variable, RISKj, that serves as a risk pre-
mium. The variable RISKj enters the factor




78Gender asymmetries have been shown to be important for intrahousehold resource allocation (Haddad, Hod-
dinott, and Alderman 1997), and Hoddinott and Haddad (1995) find that as women’s share of cash income in-
creases, the household budget share of food tends to increase and the household budget share on alcohol and to-
bacco tends to decline.
79This approach differs from an expected utility-maximization approach.
80These two equations are referred to as A12 and A25 in Appendix A and in Chapter 6.
Table 10.1  Female labor share by 
agricultural activity for agricultural 




Other basic food crops 70
Raw cashews 60
Raw cotton 50
Other export crops 20
Livestock 10
Forestry 50
Source: Authors’ assessments based on interviews
with experts on Mozambican agriculture,
and Naeraa-Nicolajsen (1998).(3)
(4)
where FDSCif represents use of factor f in
activity j; QAj is output of activity j; PVj the
value-added price of activity j; αjf is the
cost share of factor f in production of the
value-added aggregate for activity j; WFf is
the price (wage or rental rate) of factor f;
YFCTRf is total income for factor f; and
WFDISTfja scaling factor that allows factor
returns to differ by sector (when capital is
fixed in one sector, for example).
As shown in equation (3), a value
greater than one for the variable RISKj im-
plies that more factors are allocated to the
production of activity j than pure profit-
maximization would dictate. Activity j
might be cassava, whose risk-reducing
properties cause farmers to allocate extra
resources to cassava production. This risk-
based allocation of resources to activity j
comes at a cost in terms of factor income. In
the factor income equation (4), returns to
factors allocated to the activity jare reduced
by the risk premium factor represented by
the variable RISKj. In the risk scenarios, the
risk premium on cassava production is
complementary to cassava production. That
is, as long as the value for the variable
RISKcassava is greater than 1, cassava produc-
tion (QAcassava) is fixed at base levels, while
the risk premium is endogenous. If, as in
some of the experiments, the value for
RISKcassava is driven to 1 (for example, the
risk premium is eliminated), cassava pro-




Besides male and female agricultural labor,
a third category of labor, nonagricultural
labor, is also included. The simulation re-
sults presented below are based on a formu-
lation with separate labor pools fixed in
agriculture or nonagriculture.
81 As men-
tioned above, remaining elements of the
model are standard. Capital (excepting that
associated with mining and fishing activi-
ties) is mobile across sectors. Production
technology is Cobb-Douglas in value-
added.
82 This value-added aggregate com-
bines with intermediate products in a Leon-
tief fashion. The model contains a rural and
an urban household. The model is closed by
fixing the value of foreign currency inflows
and allowing the exchange rate to adjust en-
dogenously. This closure is the most logical
because of the importance of aid flows.
Important omissions. While capturing
many salient features of the Mozambican
economy, the model used here also misses
much. Perhaps most importantly, produc-
tion within the household and other intra-
household issues of resource allocation are
ignored. For example, traditional process-
ing of cassava is time-consuming, is done
within the household, and is undertaken al-
most exclusively by women. Since formal
studies of time allocation to cassava pro-
cessing have not been undertaken in
Mozambique, a precise estimate of time al-
location to cassava processing is not avail-
able. However, time-allocation studies have
been undertaken in other African countries.
For example, Adekanye (1985) finds signif-
icant time allocated by rural women in
Nigeria to the processing of cassava into
gari, a local staple. Improved treatment of
issues of gender and resource allocation, as
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81A version of the model permits migration between the male agricultural labor and the nonagricultural labor
pools. Simulations with this specification lead to similar conclusions.
82This implies an elasticity of substitution of 1 between male and female labor in agricultural production.well as production activities within the
household, are therefore critical topics for
future research and data generation.
Simulations
To address the issues raised in this chapter,
four CGE scenarios were conducted:
1. A 30 percent Hicks-neutral increase in
agricultural productivity in all 
agricultural commodities except 
cassava
2. A 30 percent Hicks-neutral increase in
agricultural productivity in all 
agricultural commodities;
3. A 15 percent decline in marketing 
margins for all commodities; and
4. Experiments 2 and 3 combined.
Each of these experiments was con-
ducted under the alternative assumption of
the presence or absence of risk-reducing be-
havior in cassava production. Thus, results
from a total of eight simulations are pre-
sented.
The simulations were designed to re-
flect plausible shocks to the economy over
the medium term. Agricultural technology
is highly rudimentary. At the same time,
agricultural potential is high. Given the di-
vergence between performance and poten-
tial, a 30 percent technology increase is rea-
sonable to conservative. In the family sector
(which dominates agricultural production),
the most promising new technologies come
in the form of improved seed and better
farming practices, especially higher plant-
ing densities. In addition, agricultural
chemical use is practically zero at the mo-
ment. Use of agricultural chemicals offers
promise for increased production in high-
potential agriculture regions served by op-
erational marketing networks (Bay 1998).
A Hicks-neutral technological improve-
ment is a reasonable representation of the
first two improvements, which are the more
likely advances to come about in the near
term.
Regarding marketing margins, the 15
percent shock introduced in the simulations
reflects the effects of the war, which ended
only in 1992. Substantial efforts have been
undertaken to improve infrastructure and
provide market information. These invest-
ments, combined with a general growth in
the sophistication of marketing sector par-
ticipants, should lead to approximately a 15
percent increase in the efficiency of the
marketing system relative to the level ob-
served in 1995.
In analyzing these eight scenarios, as-
pects not related to gender were considered
first, followed by gender-specific results.
The impact of the alternative scenarios on
cassava production, price, and the risk pre-
mium was studied under various scenarios
featuring risk (Table 10.2). In the no-risk
scenarios, the risk variable has a value of 1,
reflecting the no-risk premium. In the risk
scenarios, the risk variable is endogenous,
with a starting value of 1.3, which reflects a
premium of 0.3.
83 In these scenarios, the
premium will vary depending upon the
shock. If the shock increases the opportu-
nity cost of attaining the safety-first level of
cassava production, the risk premium will
increase. If, on the other hand, the shock re-
duces the opportunity cost of attaining the
safety-first level of cassava production, the
risk variable will decrease toward its lower-
bound value of 1, reflecting a risk premium
of zero. Once the risk variable attains a
value of one, cassava production is permit-
ted to increase above the safety-first level.
84
Not surprisingly, production and price
movements differ considerably for cassava
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83There are no data on the appropriate value for the risk premium. This level allows for elimination of the risk
premium, and consequent increases in cassava production, in some scenarios. 
84The PATH solver scheme automatically handles these complementary slackness conditions (Dirkse and Ferris
1995).between the risk and no-risk scenarios. For
example, in experiment 1, where productiv-
ity increases for all crops excepting cas-
sava, the no-risk scenario predicts a small
increase in cassava production. This comes
about to satisfy increased cassava demand
due to higher income. Cassava is not im-
ported or exported, so domestic supply
equals domestic demand in equilibrium. In
contrast, in the risk scenario, production of
cassava remains at the minimum safety-first
level, while the risk premium declines. In
the risk scenario for experiment 2 (produc-
tivity increases for all agricultural activi-
ties), the risk premium disappears and cas-
sava production increases 9.4 percent over
the safety-first level. By comparison, cas-
sava production increases by 25.2 percent
in the no-risk scenario. Because of the
muted production response, cassava price
movements in the risk scenario are far less
pronounced as well.
When marketing margins are reduced
(experiment 3), cassava production is pro-
jected to decline very slightly in the no-risk
scenario.
85 This occurs even though market-
ing margins on cassava production are very
high relative to other crops. The small share
of cassava marketed in total production
supplies the explanation. Only about 8 per-
cent of cassava production is marketed.
When marketing margins are reduced, de-
mand for marketed cassava increases. How-
ever, this increase is more than compen-
sated for by a decline in home consumption
of cassava. The resulting decline in cassava
production frees resources, which in the
present model are allocated to production of
crops that are more market-oriented. The
results from experiment 4, the combined
experiment, are roughly additions of the
two preceding experiments.
Some additional comments on technical
change in cassava merit mention. Cassava
is widely regarded as a neglected crop in
agricultural research (Cock 1985; CIAT
1999). One reason for this neglect is the low
share of production of cassava that is mar-
keted. For Mozambique, the logic of ne-
glecting cassava research because of a low
marketed share is dubious. Caloric intake
for most of the rural population is insuffi-
cient. As a result, increases in home con-
sumption of cassava (a 27 percent increase
is predicted in the no-risk scenario) are a
good thing. However, since cassava is a
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Table 10.2  Cassava production, price, and risk premium for agricultural technology, risk, and gender 
simulations
Change from base run (percentage)
Scenario Base run Experiment 1 Experiment 2 Experiment 3 Experiment 4
No risk
Production
a 10.3 3.5 25.2 -0.7 23.4
Price 1.0 2.2 -20.3 10.3 -9.9
Risk premium 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Risk
Production
a 10.3 0.0 9.4 0.0 77.0
Price 1.0 7.4 -4.0 9.2 8.9
Risk premium
b 1.3 -29.7 -100.0 5.9 -100.0
Source: Authors’ static CGE-model simulations.
aThe unit for cassava production is the value of production in 100 billion 1995 metical.
bCalculated using the formula (new – base)/(base – 1).
85This translates into a slight increase in the risk premium in the risk scenario (Table 10.2).risk-reducing crop, an improvement in cas-
sava technology is also likely to reduce the
risk premium or insurance cost associated
with cassava production. As shown in the
risk scenario, the level of cassava produc-
tion remains relatively constant after tech-
nological change in cassava. It is the risk
premium that declines. With the technolog-
ical improvement, the resources necessary
to meet the safety-first requirement are re-
duced. For example, considering experi-
ment 2, the increase in grain production is
51 percent in the risk scenario compared
with 44 percent in the no-risk scenario. The
differential reflects resources allocated to
grain production rather than to cassava pro-
duction. The effect is similar, though less
pronounced, for most other agricultural ac-
tivities.
At this point, it is also worth consider-
ing the omission of female labor time allo-
cated to cassava processing. In the more re-
alistic risk scenario this omission is not crit-
ical. If cassava production levels change
relatively little, total time allocation to cas-
sava processing remains unaffected. Over-
all, results are likely to be very similar. In
the no-risk scenario, on the other hand, ex-
plicit treatment of cassava processing
would quite likely influence some of the re-
sults. In particular, the increase in cassava
production induced by technical advance
would almost surely be attenuated, as the
demands on female labor time for process-
ing would preclude a large expansion of
cassava production. The net effect on fe-
male labor time allocated to cassava and
cassava processing combined is an empiri-
cal question.
In CGE models only relative prices mat-
ter. To establish a reference point, one
price—known as the numeraire—is fixed.
The CPI was chosen as the model nu-
meraire. As a result, nominal absorption (or
absorption as read directly from model out-
put) is effectively deflated by the CPI and is
an appropriate welfare indicator. In a
macroeconomic perspective, the difference
in welfare between the risk and no-risk sce-
narios is very small (Table 10.3). However,
two items do emerge. First, because of the
importance of cassava as a crop, technology
gains in cassava production provide sub-
stantial gains to the economy. Welfare in-
creases by an additional 1.5 percent from
experiment 1 to experiment 2. Second, si-
multaneous improvements in agricultural
technology and marketing efficiency inter-
act. The welfare gains in experiment 4 ex-
ceed the sum of welfare gains from experi-
ments 2 and 3 by 1.2 percent and 1.1 per-
cent in the no-risk and risk scenarios, re-
spectively. In other words, these synergy ef-
fects account for about 9 percent of the total
welfare gain in experiment 4 under both the
no-risk and risk scenarios.
The measure for agricultural terms of
trade is simply a ratio of price indices for
the agricultural and nonagricultural sectors
(Table 10.4). An increase in this measure 
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Table 10.3  Microeconomic indicators for agricultural technology, risk, and gender simulations
Base run Change from base run (percentage)
(100 billion
Scenario metical
a) Experiment 1 Experiment 2 Experiment 3 Experiment 4
No risk
Real GDP 172.1 5.1 6.8 5.0 12.2
Nominal absorption 223.3 5.3 6.8 4.9 12.9
Risk
Real GDP 172.1 5.2 6.7 5 12.2
Nominal absorption 223.3 5.2 6.7 4.9 12.7
Source: Authors’ static CGE-model simulations.
aThe exchange rate was 8,890 metical per U.S. dollar in 1995.indicates that agricultural prices are rising
relative to nonagricultural prices. A variety
of price indices (for example, consumer,
producer, and export) may be used. In this
case, the relative price of value-added in the
agricultural and nonagricultural sectors. As
is standard following an agricultural pro-
ductivity shock, agricultural terms of trade
decline, indicating transmission of some of
the benefits of the productivity increase to
the rest of the economy through lower agri-
cultural prices. Other measures of terms of
trade show roughly similar declines. For the
productivity shocks, the declines in terms of
trade with value-added are smaller in the
risk scenarios. This is primarily because of
the firmness of cassava prices in the risk
scenario compared with the no-risk sce-
nario (Table 10.2).
Household welfare, for urban and rural
households, was measured by equivalent
variation
86 (Table 10.5). A total welfare
measure was also used. Despite the decline
in terms of trade, rural households benefit
substantially from improvements in agricul-
tural technology. Gains from improvements
in marketing efficiency are shared roughly
equally between the urban and the rural
household. As with nominal absorption, in-
teraction effects between improvements in
agricultural technology and increases in ef-
ficiency in the marketing system lead to
greater than additive benefits to both rural
and urban households in the combined ex-
periment (experiment 4).
While total welfare gains are very simi-
lar between the risk and no-risk scenarios,
the distribution of benefits between rural
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Table 10.4  Agricultural terms of trade in valued-added terms for agricultural technology, risk, and gender 
simulations
Change from base run (percentage)
Scenario Base run Experiment 1 Experiment 2 Experiment 3 Experiment 4
No risk 100.0 -21.9 -29.4 7.1 -22.4
Risk 100.0 -21.4 -27.9 7.0 -20.5
Source: Authors’ static CGE-model simulations.
Table 10.5  Equivalent variation on consumption for agricultural technology, risk, and gender simulations
Percentage base consumption
Scenario Base run Experiment 1 Experiment 2 Experiment 3 Experiment 4
No risk
Urban 0.0 4.7 5.2 4.6 10.4
Rural 0.0 8.7 12.3 4.6 18.2
Total 0.0 6.6 8.5 4.6 14.1
Risk
Urban 0.0 4.9 5.8 4.6 11.1
Rural 0.0 8.5 11.5 4.7 17.4
Total 0.0 6.6 8.5 4.6 14.1
Source: Authors’ static CGE-model simulations.
86Formally, equivalent variation shows the amount of money, at base prices and income levels, that would have
to be given to (or taken from) the household to achieve the utility level attained by the household in the experi-
ment. Here, this measure is a percent of base income (Table 10.5).and urban households is somewhat differ-
ent. Specifically, rural households gain less
from agricultural technology improvement
when risk is introduced into the model. The
intuition behind this shift in gain between
rural and urban households is as follows:
Equivalent variation measures consumption
of goods. In the no-risk scenario, resource
allocation is unfettered by risk considera-
tions. An increase in cassava production
technology increases cassava production.
Since only 8 percent of this production is
marketed in the base case, most of the in-
crease in cassava production is home con-
sumed. More than 90 percent of this home
consumption occurs in rural households.
87
The increase in cassava consumption in-
creases welfare, particularly rural house-
hold welfare. In the risk case, the increase
in cassava technology affects the risk pre-
mium rather than cassava production. In-
stead of increasing cassava production, re-
sources are allocated to other crops, all of
which tend to have a higher marketed share
of production. While the share of marketed
production is by no means fixed, it is a very
important determinant of first-order im-
pacts of the technology or marketing effi-
ciency shock. In the risk scenario, the in-
crease in production of crops other than cas-
sava tends to push more goods into the mar-
keting channels where urban consumers can
access them. As a result, urban welfare
tends to be higher and rural welfare lower in
the risk scenario compared with the no-risk
scenario.
Factor returns (Table 10.6) represent a
final welfare indicator.
88 The rural house-
hold in the CGE model represents an aver-
age rural household. This household owns
some nonagricultural labor (family mem-
bers working in the city or in rural industry)
and some capital. However, a large number
of rural households own only male and fe-
male agricultural labor. For these typically
very poor households, returns to labor are
probably a better welfare indicator than the
equivalent variation measures presented
(Table 10.5).
In the analysis on experiments 1 and 2,
a first noteworthy impact of the technology
shocks is the effect on the return to capital,
which increases dramatically. Part of the
explanation lies in the choice of the CPI as
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87Urban households in Mozambique often maintain a field in the countryside where they produce goods for home
consumption.
88Robinson and Thierfelder (1999) point out that factor returns are not always valid as a welfare indicator. How-
ever, for this case of technology shocks and marketing margin improvements, they are a valid indicator.
Table 10.6  Factor price indices for agricultural technology, risk, and gender simulations
Change from base run (percentage)
Scenario Base run Experiment 1 Experiment 2 Experiment 3 Experiment 4
No risk
Male agricultural labor 1.0 -0.1 -0.3 12.3 16.2
Female agricultural labor 1.0 2.3 0.3 10.9 14.2
Nonagricultural labor 1.0 6.6 8.9 4.9 14.4
Capital 1.0 8.1 10.6 2.0 13.4
Risk
Male agricultural labor 1.0 -0.2 -0.3 12.2 16.4
Female agricultural labor 1.0 2.8 1.9 10.8 16.2
Nonagricultural labor 1.0 6.5 8.6 4.9 14.0
Capital 1.0 8.0 10.5 2.0 13.2
Source: Authors’ static CGE-model simulations.numeraire. Since food is such a large part of
the household consumption basket, declines
in the food price raise the price of nonagri-
cultural goods, such as capital and nonagri-
cultural labor, relative to the CPI. Market-
ing margins represent the second major
push factor on returns to capital. The com-
merce sector, which supplies marketing
services, is a large sector representing about
22 percent of total value-added in the 1995
SAM. It is also capital intensive with capi-
tal accounting for 68 percent of factor cost.
Since agriculture and processed food ac-
count for almost all of the sales of the com-
merce sector, technological change in agri-
culture substantially increases demand for
marketing services from the commerce sec-
tor. This increase in demand is reinforced
by a consumer preference structure that al-
locates greater shares of marginal income to
marketed commodities. Expansion of the
commerce sector (output increases by 5
percent, and price by 9.8 percent), in exper-
iment 2 has a strong impact on the return to
capital.
The second important impact in experi-
ments 1 and 2 concerns the returns to male
and female agricultural labor. Wage rates to
male agricultural labor decline slightly,
while female agricultural labor rates rise.
This is an effect of crop composition. By
construction, male agricultural labor tends
to be more highly involved in production of
goods with a relatively high marketed
share. The share-weighted average propor-
tion of production marketed is 40 percent
for males and 29 percent for females.
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Given the increase in the price of marketing
services provided by the commerce sector,
the relatively heavy involvement of males
in marketed production tends to reduce
male wages. In other words, male wages
decline slightly to accommodate the in-
crease in the price of marketing services.
Since female labor is more concentrated in
activities with relatively low marketed
shares of production, the effect of increases
in the price of marketing services is less
strong and female wages tend to rise.
The impacts on female wages between
the risk and no-risk scenarios in experi-
ments 1 and 2 differ significantly. The rela-
tive firmness of cassava prices, because of
the presence of the risk premium, makes the
difference. As pointed out above, in the risk
scenario, the risk-reducing properties of
cassava cause greater allocation of re-
sources to cassava than ordinary profit
maximization would dictate. As shown in
equation (4), this “overallocation” of re-
sources comes at the cost of reduced returns
to factors allocated to cassava production as
represented by the risk premium. Female
labor represents by far the largest share of
factor cost in cassava production (nearly 80
percent, since the contribution of capital in
cassava production is negligible), and the
value of cassava production is large. Thus,
the risk premium substantially dampens fe-
male wage rates in particular.
90 As the risk
premium declines in response to the tech-
nology shocks (Table 10.2), returns to fe-
male labor allocated to cassava production
increase. This has the effect of supporting
the overall female wage.
Finally, it is worth noting that the inter-
action effects between improvements in
agricultural technology and increases in
marketing efficiency, captured in experi-
ment 4, are strong for agricultural wages,
particularly male agricultural wages. In the
risk scenario, the interaction effects add an
additional 4.5 percent to the additive per-
centage wage increases from experiments 2
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89Marketing margins are slightly higher on average for goods produced by females. This would tend to increase
the role of margins for females relative to males. However, this slight difference in average margins is not enough
to offset the effects of the male tendency to produce for the market and the female tendency to produce for home
consumption.
90Cassava accounts for 30 percent returns in the factor of female agricultural labor.and 3 for male labor, and 3.5 percent for fe-
male labor. In other words, interaction ef-
fects account for 27 and 22 percent of the
agricultural labor wage gains in experiment
4 for males and females, respectively. Inter-
action effects are not nearly as pronounced
for the other factors of production. These
large interaction effects in agricultural labor
wage rates (male and female) are due to the
relatively greater importance of marketing
margins in the sectors of primary agricul-
ture and primary agriculture processing.
The larger interaction effects for male labor
compared with female labor are a result of
the relative concentration of male labor in
agricultural activities where the marketed
share of output is relatively high.
Conclusions
The results lead to the following conclu-
sions. First, general agricultural technology
improvements induce important welfare
gains for the economy in general and for
rural households in particular. Second, re-
gardless of whether risk is a factor in cas-
sava production, technological improve-
ments in cassava production have strong
welfare effects. Third, if—as is likely—risk
reduction is a factor in cassava production,
impacts of technological improvement in
cassava are likely to be particularly positive
for rural women. With improved cassava
technology, women have the opportunity to
allocate time to other activities, including
crops that are more market-oriented. In ad-
dition, the factor returns penalty to risk re-
duction, which weighs particularly heavily
on female agricultural labor because of its
high level of involvement in cassava pro-
duction, declines. As a result of this decline
in the risk premium, female wage rates tend
to improve with improved technology in
cassava. Women would also have the possi-
bility of reallocating time formerly devoted
to cassava production to, for example, do-
mestic tasks or leisure. This possibility is
not, however, captured in the model. In this
case, female wage gains for agricultural
labor would tend to be even stronger fol-
lowing technological change in cassava be-
cause of an effective decline in the supply
of female agricultural labor. Fourth, recent
research points strongly to increased house-
hold welfare stemming from increased fe-
male cash income and time allocation to do-
mestic tasks (Haddad 1999). It can also be
recalled that Elson (1989) argues that
recognition of the crucial role of women
cultivators in food production should lead
to a greater focus on increasing their pro-
ductivity in growing staple foods, such as
cassava. The analyses in this report support
this. Consequently, technical change in cas-
sava appears to be a particularly strong
lever for increasing rural household wel-
fare. Finally, technological change in agri-
culture and improvements in marketing sys-
tems interact, with significant additional
benefits accruing to both male and female
occupants of rural households. These inter-
action effects are significant in both the risk
and the no-risk scenarios.
The research presented in this chapter
represents an attempt to incorporate gender
issues into CGE models. Much remains to
be done in responding adequately to this
challenge. With reference to Mozambique,
firming our understanding of the function-
ing of the agricultural sector, through con-
tinued data collection and analysis, is a
clear priority. This would permit, for exam-
ple, a richer specification of gender and risk
issues. More information is also desirable to
understand more fully the importance of
productive activities at the household level,
such as food processing. In addition, further
household and regional disaggregation
would, for example, permit the model to
capture regional variation in gender roles in
agricultural production. Finally, with refer-
ence to more general gender-related model-
ing issues, it would be highly relevant and
challenging to examine intrahousehold pro-
duction activities and resource allocation
within a CGE model.
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Food Aid
Q
uestions regarding the impact of food aid are typically posed and analyzed in a 
partial-equilibrium context. This is appropriate because it is clear that the exact im-
plementation of food aid programs can strongly influence outcomes. Nevertheless, it
is also clear that food aid programs are often large enough to generate important general-
equilibrium effects. The analytics of food aid in general equilibrium have, for example, been
traced out by Bhagwati (1985). However, despite vastly increased capacity to conduct applied
or CGE analysis in recent years, relatively little CGE analysis has been conducted on food aid
issues. The CGE analyses conducted to date have generally focused on assessment of food aid
needs (Riaz 1992; Sadoulet and de Janry 1992). Using a broader lens, this chapter seeks to
contribute to the debate regarding monetization of food aid. Specifically, the general-
equilibrium effects of alternative distribution schemes for food aid following a drought are ex-
amined. The results indicate that different distribution schemes (for example, who takes pos-
session of the food for either direct consumption or resale) have very distinct general-equilib-
rium effects.
In Mozambique, the economic and social impacts of drought can be very large and food
aid can play a significant role in palliating the negative effects of drought. To give an extreme
example, because of the combined effects of war and drought, the Mozambican population es-
sentially subsisted on food aid in 1992 (Tschirley, Donovan, and Weber 1996). Since that time,
the return of peace and good rains have, as alluded to in Chapter 4, helped to dramatically in-
crease agricultural production and reduce food imports. Food aid volumes have declined com-
mensurately with the increases in production and decreases in imports of food (Figure 11.1).
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Yet, natural calamities are bound to strike again, and following a widespread and reasonably
severe shock, food imports will reappear on a large scale. It is also reasonable to expect that a
substantial share of these imports will arrive in the form of food aid. Investigating alternative
schemes for food aid can therefore potentially help policymakers.
The CGE framework underlying the policy simulations in this chapter is described in
Chapter 6. Food aid enters the model through the equilibrium conditions of the composite
commodity market. It simply increases the composite commodity supply. While the machin-
ery of the model would allow for increased supply of any commodity in the model through
food aid, food aid in Mozambique has almost invariably arrived in the form of grains. Food
aid is thus modeled as an increase in the supply of grains.
This chapter was written by Channing Arndt and Finn Tarp.
91Mozambique remains a structural importer of wheat and rice. These imports represent about 15 percent of total
domestic supply of cereals (SADC/FSU 1999).
119Under this formulation, food aid repre-
sents an increase in the supply of goods
without any associated real resource costs
of production or delivery. As such, the
model takes the perspective of the recipient
who simply receives an increased supply of
food (in the form of grain). This formula-
tion is attractive in that it is simple and con-
forms to the basic vision of the purpose of
food aid. A potential disadvantage of the
formulation is that marketing margins are
avoided. As emphasized above, receipt and
distribution of goods, such as grains, entails
real resource costs. The model does not
capture any real resource costs associated
with receipt and distribution of food aid.
While imperfect, this approach is prob-
ably the best available option. Real resource
costs associated with receipt and distribu-
tion of food aid are not known. They are
likely to be considerably below the domes-
tic real resource marketing cost for locally
produced or privately imported products for
two reasons. First, food aid distributors tap
international credit markets and do not have
commercial motivations. As a result, the
costs of working capital and risk considera-
tions, both of which are mentioned above as
major contributors to the marketing mar-
gins, do not apply. Second, distribution in-
frastructure, such as trucks, often arrives
with the food aid allowing (all too 
frequently according to critics) food aid
providers to sidestep local marketing serv-
ices (Colding and Pinstrup-Andersen,
2000).
92 These considerations, combined
with the advantages of simplicity, make the
current formulation attractive.
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92Note that it is not being argued here that it is cheaper or better, from the donor perspective, to sidestep local
credit and distribution channels. It is merely stated that it is done. An extreme example is the airlifting of grain
to drought-stricken regions. From the donor perspective, this operation is very expensive. From the recipient per-














Figure 11.1  Maize production and imports for food aid simulations
Source: SADC/FSU (1999).Once the food aid enters the system,
careful consideration is given to who takes
ownership. The food aid is valued at market
prices. If, for example, the government
takes ownership of the food aid, it can sell
the food aid and use the resulting revenue in
any manner it chooses.
93 If, on the other
hand, the food aid is distributed directly to
households, it can either be consumed di-
rectly or sold to purchase other goods.
The model is closed in the standard
way. As stated before, two types of labor,
agricultural and nonagricultural, are present
in the model. However, because of the
short-run nature of the simulations in this
chapter, capital is fixed in each sector, and
agricultural labor is fixed by agricultural ac-
tivity. For agricultural activities, this
amounts to assuming that a production plan
is decided upon before the onset of drought.
Once the drought begins, agents in the agri-
cultural sector, particularly the smallholders
who dominate production, have very little
opportunity to react.
Simulations
Three simulations were used for the portion
of the study described in this chapter (Table
11.1). Experiment 1 simulates a drought in
the absence of any food aid for drought re-
lief. Experiment 2 combines drought with
food aid. Food aid volumes amount to
nearly 60 percent of the volume of grain 
imports observed in experiment 1, or 85
percent of the volume of grain imports 
observed in 1995, the base year for the
SAM. The food aid imports are monetized
at market prices, and the revenue is deliv-
ered to government. Government is as-
sumed to spend the food aid revenue on re-
current and investment expenditure in ac-
cordance with observed spending shares.
Experiment 3 is the same as experiment 2,
except that the food aid is delivered directly
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93Donors may of course decide to play a role here, but it is assumed here that this does not change in any way
the use of the revenue. This seems reasonable in view of past experience.
Table 11.2  Declines in technology used








Basic food crops 0.75
Livestock 0.85
Forestry 1.00
Sources: Authors’ assessments from interviews
with experts on Mozambican agriculture;
existing time-series data on production as
analyzed by Bacou (2000); and technol-
ogy parameters estimated by Arndt,
Robinson, and Tarp (2002) from their sim-
ulations for agriculture in 1992 (a severe
drought year).
Note: Delines in technology make up a
weighted-average, agricultural-productiv-
ity decline of 20 percent.
Table 11.1  Experiment descriptions for food aid simulations
Simulation Description
Base run 1995 data
Experiment 1 Drought with no food aid
Experiment 2 Drought with monetized food aid and revenue to government
Experiment 3 Drought with food distributed directly to households as aid
Source: SADC/FSU (1999).to rural and urban households according to
population shares.
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In Mozambique, agricultural production
is essentially the process of converting
labor into agricultural goods. The vast 
majority of production is based on small-
holders using rudimentary technology.
Input use is essentially confined to seed,
capital use involves rudimentary tools only,
and land is generally abundant.
95 In this en-
vironment, drought can be adequately sim-
ulated by shocking agricultural technology
in a Hicks-neutral fashion. Since labor and
capital are fixed by agricultural activity, the
technology declines translate directly into
production declines (Table 11.2).
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As reflected in the macroeconomic ef-
fects of the shocks (Table 11.3), the drought
results in a decline in GDP and absorption,
as expected. Since the CPI is the numeraire,
absorption can be used as a measure of ag-
gregate welfare. The agricultural share in
GDP of about 25 percent and the decline in
agricultural productivity of about 
20 percent imply a GDP decline of about 
5 percent. This lack of spillover of 
drought-induced decline of GDP into non-
agricultural sectors is consistent with the
work of Benson and Clay (1998), who
find—in a cross country analysis focused
on Africa—that the GDP effects of drought
in countries with relatively low levels of de-
velopment, such as Mozambique, tend to be
confined to the agricultural sector because
of relatively weak links between primary
agriculture and nonagricultural sectors in
the input-output matrix. As a result, the
drought-induced decline in agriculture is
relatively isolated and the impacts on over-
all GDP are roughly equivalent to the im-
pacts on agricultural GDP multiplied by the
share of agriculture in total GDP.
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As expected, the addition of food aid
does not change GDP substantially. (The
small change observed is due to changes in
output composition.) However, food aid
does increase welfare as measured by nom-
inal absorption deflated by the CPI. On the
basis of this measure alone, monetized food
aid (experiment 2) is preferred, as it results
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94The simulations assume a 70 percent rural and 30 percent urban population split in accordance with the 1997
population census.
95There is evidence of land scarcity in some areas (Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries/Michigan State Uni-
versity 1992).
96The cotton sector receives some special treatment. Data from national accounts indicate that raw cotton is nei-
ther exported nor imported. The textile industry relies entirely on domestically produced cotton. As a result, de-
mand for domestically produced cotton is extremely inelastic and changes in production result in substantial
price movements. Perhaps because of this issue, textile firms have been granted monopsony power in purchas-
ing raw cotton in predetermined “action zones.” These monopsonies are regulated (and partially owned) by the
government. Prices for raw cotton are contracted in advance of the growing season. To reflect this environment,
it is assumed that the producer price of cotton is fixed (relative to the CPI), and that textile firms maintain a stock
of raw cotton to smooth out variability in production.
97The definition of GDP plays a role here. Processing of agricultural products within the home for home con-
sumption does not form a part of GDP, and these are important rural nonfarm activities. However, because of the
definition of GDP, the inevitable effects of drought on home processing for home consumption are not included. 
Table 11.3  GDP and welfare for food aid simulations
Base run Change from base run (percentage)
(100 billion
Indicator metical) Experiment 1 Experiment 2 Experiment 3
Real GDP 172.1 -5.0 -4.9 -4.9
Absorption 223.3 -5.9 -3.7 -4.6
Source: Authors’ static CGE-model simulations.in the smallest drought-induced decline in
absorption and welfare. However, invest-
ment and government spending are signifi-
cant components of absorption, and the
focus in drought years is on household con-
sumption.
By the measure of equivalent variation
on consumption for urban and rural house-
holds for the three experiments (Table
11.4), the ranking is reversed. Household
welfare, as measured by equivalent varia-
tion on consumption, is substantially higher
when food aid is distributed directly to
households (experiment 3) as opposed to
being monetized by government (experi-
ment 2). The differential effects of alterna-
tive food aid distribution schemes on the
components of total absorption drive this
result on aggregate household welfare.
When food aid is distributed to households,
the first-order incidence of the food aid ac-
crues directly to households and the house-
hold share of total absorption expands with
concomitant impacts on household 
welfare.
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To explain the differences in welfare re-
sults between households (as well as the
differences in the impacts on aggregate ab-
sorption across experiments), grain import
volumes and relative price effects must be
examined (Table 11.5). The resulting data
show that food aid primarily substitutes for
commercial imports. The total supply of
grain available (domestic production, plus
imports, plus food aid) varies, but not dra-
matically, across the experiments.
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98Ordinarily, researchers strive to prevent shifts in the composition of absorption from contaminating welfare
analysis. However, in this short-run analysis of the implications of drought and food aid, these compositional
shifts are in focus.
Table 11.4  Equivalent variation on consumption for food aid simulations
Percentage of base consumption
Households Base run Experiment 1 Experiment 2 Experiment 3
Urban 0.0 -4.3 -3.4 -2.6
Rural 0.0 -9.8 -9.2 -5.7
Total 0.0 -6.9 -6.1 -4.1
Source: Authors’ static CGE-model simulations.
Table 11.5  Grain and food aid imports for food aid simulations
Measure Base run Experiment 1 Experiment 2 Experiment 3
Volume of grain food aid  0.0 0.0 3.5 3.5
Volume of grain imports 4.1 6.0 2.5 2.8
Source: Authors’ static CGE-model simulations.
Note:  One unit in the measure by volume is defined as the amount of grain imports that could be purchased
with 100 billion metical at 1995 prices.
Table 11.6  Agricultural terms of trade for food aid simulations
Change from base run (percentage)
Indicator Base run Experiment 1 Experiment 2 Experiment 3
Agricultural terms of trade in 
value-added terms 100.0 31.6 26.5 35.6Following a drought in experiment 1,
agricultural terms of trade increase dramat-
ically reflecting the contraction of agricul-
tural production (Table 11.6). Large budget
shares for food, especially home consump-
tion, imply that rural household welfare de-
creases despite the improved terms of trade
in the sale of their agricultural production.
Urban household welfare declines primarily
because of higher prices for agricultural
products.
When food aid in the form of grains ap-
pears, as in experiment 2, the effect is to di-
minish the increase in agricultural terms of
trade relative to experiment 1. The producer
price of grains—which rises by 28 percent
in experiment 1, but only by 16 percent in
experiment 2—is the main reason for the
more modest increase in the agricultural
terms of trade. Prices of other agricultural
products rise very slightly between experi-
ments 1 and 2. Because of these price shifts,
the benefits of food aid tend to accrue to
urban households (Table 11.4). In sharp
contrast, when food aid is distributed di-
rectly to households, agricultural terms of
trade tend to increase relative to the drought
scenario. The difference in impact on agri-
cultural terms of trade between experiments
2 and 3 is very substantial.
The differential impact on agricultural
terms of trade between experiments 2 and 3
arises from the very different marginal
budget shares between households and gov-
ernment. Urban and rural households spend
respectively 64 and 88 percent of an addi-
tional unit of income directed to consump-
tion (for example, an increment to supernu-
merary income) on primary agricultural
commodities and processed foods. On the
other hand, only 5 percent of government
spending on commodities is directed to-
ward primary agricultural commodities and
processed foods. By assumption, marginal
and average government budget shares are
equated in the model formulation. Conse-
quently, the first-order impact of monetized
food aid with the revenue given to govern-
ment is an increase in spending on nonagri-
cultural goods. The opposite occurs when
food aid is given directly to households.
The income increases resulting from food
aid are directed overwhelmingly toward
agricultural goods. These differential
spending patterns affect the desired compo-
sition of total absorption and strongly influ-
ence relative prices.
The effects of these differentials in
spending patterns can also be seen in the
figures on grain import volumes (Table
11.5). In the absence of food aid, drought
drives up commercial grain import volumes
by nearly 50 percent relative to the base.
When food aid is delivered and monetized,
with the proceeds accruing to govern-
ment—as in experiment 2—the income and
welfare impacts on the primary demanders
of grain, households (particularly rural
households), are relatively small. As a re-
sult, grain demand is essentially constant
and food aid mainly serves to displace
commercial imports. The total volume of
grain imports remains essentially the same
(commercial imports plus food aid).
99When
the food aid is delivered to households as in
experiment 3, household income or welfare
expands and demand for grain expands
along with it. Total imports of grain, includ-
ing food aid, in experiment 3 are 5 percent
greater than in experiment 1.
100The increase
comes through the income expansion
through food aid transfer; such income 
expansion stimulates household demand.
The results on impacts on factor prices
(Table 11.7) follow logically from the 
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99Since food aid enters as composite commodity and imports must combine with domestic production to form
the composite commodity, technically, different products are being added together here. This would be similar to
adding together white and yellow maize, which gives a good idea of total maize availability. Nevertheless, de-
spite the relatively high Armington elasticity, this product differentiation between imported and domestic grains
drives the relative price shifts observed for grains between experiments 1 and 2.
100Imports of other food commodities also increase.FOOD AID 125
preceding discussion. Drought in experi-
ment 1 reduces returns to all factors relative
to the CPI. Because of the improvements in
agricultural terms of trade, agricultural
labor experiences the mildest decline in fac-
tor price relative to other factors. When
food aid is monetized and the proceeds
spent by government in experiment 2, the
drought-induced improvement in agricul-
tural terms of trade is moderated. As a re-
sult, returns to agricultural labor decline
and returns to nonagricultural labor and
capital increase relative to experiment 1.
When food aid is delivered directly to
households in experiment 3, the improve-
ments in agricultural terms of trade, relative
to experiments 1 and 2, result in increases
in returns to agricultural labor and de-
creases in returns to non-agricultural labor
and capital relative to both preceding exper-
iments. In fact, in experiment 3, agricultural
labor wages decline very little relative to
the base situation with no drought.
Conclusions
Drought clearly affects total welfare nega-
tively, as measured by absorption (Table
11.3). Moreover, total welfare declines less
as compared with the drought scenario
when food aid is supplied, and this conclu-
sion is independent of the distribution
scheme opted for. Total welfare, as meas-
ured by total absorption, is least affected by
drought when food aid is channeled through
the government. Nevertheless, alternative
distribution schemes have very distinct im-
pacts on household welfare (as measured by
equivalent variation) and prices, notably the
relative price of agricultural goods. Com-
pared with monetization of food aid by
government (experiment 1), direct distribu-
tion to households (experiment 2)—done
by population shares in the experiments—
strongly benefits (poorer) rural households.
Moreover, when food is distributed directly
to households (experiment 3), impacts on
agricultural terms of trade are positive com-
pared with a scenario of no food aid, which
is exactly the opposite of the terms of trade
effect related to monetization.
When households take ownership of the
food aid, they (rather than government) ex-
perience the first-order impact of the re-
source transfer. Moreover, since rural
households direct the large majority of any
increment to income to the purchase of
agricultural goods, the increase in house-
hold income generated by the food aid ex-
pands the demand for agricultural goods.
Alternatively viewed, when households de-
rive income from food aid, the desired com-
ponents of nominal absorption shift toward
agricultural products. As a result, agricul-
tural terms of trade improve (even relative
to the scenario of drought without food aid,
in experiment 1), which further benefits
rural households. These results indicate
that, when improving the welfare of
drought-stricken rural households is the pri-
mary goal of food aid, direct distribution of
food aid is preferred. This conclusion
would be less convincing, however, if the
government were able to use food aid rev-
enue in a manner strictly targeted at rural
households that are drought-stricken.
Table 11.7  Factor price indices for food aid simulations
Change from base run (percentage)
Factor Base run Experiment 1 Experiment 2 Experiment 3
Agricultural labor 1.0 -2.5 -4.2 -0.2
Nonagricultural labor 1.0 -7.3 -4.9 -7.9
Capital 1.0 -9.2 -8.3 -9.8
Source: Authors’ static CGE-model simulations.CHAPTER 12
Scenario Building: The Merged Model
T
he macroeconomic simulations in this chapter are based on a macroeconomic model
that takes on most of the features from the operational projection model formulated by
Brixen and Tarp (1996). As such, it reflects basic behavioral features of the World
Bank’s Revised Minimum Standard Model (RMSM) and the IMF’s financial programming
approach to modeling. The basic premise for the set up of the macroeconomic projections was
that postwar recovery was complete so the 1997 economic performance could be seen as nor-
mal given the level of development in Mozambique at that time. Accordingly, the parameter
values used in this chapter are in large measure based on calibrated parameter values for
1997.
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Another important underlying assumption is that the environment of political stability
would be maintained and that natural disasters would not occur. The last major drought was
recorded in 1992, while the prediction of a significant drought in 1998, in connection with the
strong El Ninõ weather phenomenon of that year, did not materialize. The drought of 1992 re-
sulted in negative overall growth for the economy, and it is clear that the appearance of an-
other major disaster during the simulation period would have affected the results significantly.
The simulations therefore include two scenarios distinguished by the inclusion of an economic
shock following a natural disaster. 
Model Framework and Base-Year Data
The seminal theoretical contribution to the merged-model literature is that of Khan, Montiel,
and Haque (1990). This work does not, however, focus on aspects of implementation for pol-
icy formulation and simulations. The merged model was developed as a practical tool by
Brixen and Tarp (1996), who focus on the consistency between the underlying IMF and World
Bank frameworks. In the same vein, the modified version of the operational merged model
used here should be seen as a practical tool for analysis and simulations. It is primarily meant
as a guide to policymakers on matters of consistency.
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This chapter was written by Henning Tarp Jensen, and Finn Tarp.
101Note that the simulations in this chapter were undertaken pre-1999; hence projections were made on, then, fu-
ture developments to 2001–02. Data were not available at the time of writing to compare the projections with ac-
tual developments.
102Shortcomings of the model, such as the absence of distributional considerations and the smoothness of the clo-
sure mechanism, are outlined by Tarp (1993) and pursued in Chapter 13.
126The specification of this study’s modi-
fied merged model reflects the two “parent”
approaches closely. This is apparent from
Appendix B, where the full set of equations
is given. Nevertheless, this meant that some
compromises had to be made in the specifi-
cation of interaction between the submod-
els. The simple RMSM model presented by
Addison (1989) does not account explicitly
for the government sector. Accordingly, this
model does not need to account explicitly
for the flow of value-added into household
budgets. The simple financial programming
framework presented by the IMF (1987)
does include a government sector. How-
ever, the focus of the financial program-
ming framework on the financial sector im-
plies that the borrowing requirement of the
government sector is exogenously imposed.
To model the government sector sepa-
rately in line with the financial program-
ming model, Brixen and Tarp (1996) di-
vided consumption and investment aggre-
gates in the RMSM model into private and
government parts. Tax revenue was taken
into account in the budget constraint for the
private sector, and a simple linear function
for private consumption was introduced.
On the financial (financial programming)
side of the model, the balance of payments
accounted for net capital inflows in the
form of factor and interest payments as well
as net factor income. However, the private
sector part of these net capital inflows was
not included in the private sector budget on
the real (RMSM) side of the model. This
excluded private income from abroad in the
form of remittances and factor payments
from private disposable income. In contrast,
so-called terms-of-trade gains following
price changes in the world market were in-
cluded in the private sector budget.
The inclusion of terms-of-trade gains
into private disposable income does not fol-
low immediately from the simple RMSM
model. Terms-of-trade gains form part of
gross domestic savings in the RMSM
model. As such it only affects the resource
gap defined as a trade balance adjusted for
terms of trade. Aggregate consumption and
investment are left unchanged. The original
merged model retains the latter characteris-
tic. Since terms-of-trade gains are included
in private disposable income, such gains do,
however, affect the relative distribution of
consumption and investment between the
private and government sectors. This fur-
ther affects private and government budg-
ets, and ultimately influences the politically
sensitive level of government domestic
credit.
The terms-of-trade gains were origi-
nally introduced into the simple RMSM
model, since this model is otherwise formu-
lated without reference to prices. Accord-
ingly, the formulation represents an attempt
to allow for the possibility that relative
changes in world market prices can affect
available foreign resources. A country that
is import constrained because of a lack of
foreign currency can benefit from higher
relative world market prices for exports
through increased access to foreign cur-
rency. This enables imports of essential in-
vestment goods, which can underpin in-
creased GDPgrowth. It follows that the for-
mulation for terms-of-trade gains is only
useful in so far as prices are not modeled
and the country is import constrained be-
cause of a lack of foreign resources.
Yet, the merged model does specify
prices, including import and export prices,
as well as absorption and GDP deflators. It
follows that the resource gap forms an inte-
gral part of the balance-of-payments section
of the model, implying that the terms-of-
trade gains should be eliminated from the
model. Consequently, the modified version
of the merged model in Appendix B defines
private disposable income as the sum of
nominal value-added (including the nomi-
nal value of the trade balance), net govern-
ment transfers, and income from abroad.
The original merged model defined absorp-
tion prices as a weighted average of the
GDP deflator and import prices. However,
SCENARIO BUILDING: THE MERGED MODEL 127the formulation with fixed shares implies
that the nominal values of imports, GDP,
and absorption, in general, are not going to
be consistent. Accordingly, the modified
model includes a new specification for 
absorption prices whereby nominal values
of macroeconomic aggregates remain 
consistent.
In sum, the model equations in Appen-
dix B are divided into four parts—real sec-
tor, government accounts, balance of pay-
ments, and prices and monetary sector—
and they have been extended to match the
dimensions of a reduced version of the
MACSAM presented in Chapter 5. The
NGO sector has been included as a separate
sector, which consumes on the basis of rev-
enues received from abroad. Longer-
term domestic debt is not explicitly 
accounted for in the current model, but is
included into the money stock, which 
continues to be governed by a quantity
equation specification.
The revisions to the original merged
model referred to above are primarily made
to capture the workings of the economy in a
more appropriate way. Nevertheless, the re-
visions also make it possible to relate the
merged-model specification to the SAM
framework. Relating the real side of the
merged model to the SAM framework is
convenient, because it lays the groundwork
for the construction of a financial sub-
SAM. The explicit specification of a con-
sistency framework encompassing both the
real and financial sectors of the merged
model facilitates the collection and integra-
tion of base-year data. Moreover, the simu-
lations can rely partly on the 1995 SAM
data set for the real side of the Mozambican
economy.
103
Nevertheless, because the modeling ex-
ercise includes yearly simulations covering
the period 1998–2002, it was necessary to
rely on 1997 data as the principal base year.
In any case, base-year data were generated
for the full three-year period of 1995–97.
The construction of 1995–96 base-year data
was considered desirable because it enabled
a check on the consistency of model param-
eter values.
104 Calibrating model parameters
to each of the 1995–97 base years provided
an idea of how model parameters have
evolved over time. Given the available
SAM data set only includes real economy
data for 1995, it was necessary to obtain the
remaining base-year data, including real
economy data for 1996–97 and financial
economy data for 1995–97, from other
sources; several were used including na-
tional income and expenditure accounts,
balance of payments statistics, government
finance statistics, and monetary surveys.
105
The simulations, described in the next
section, take into account two large, (at the
time planned) projects in Mozambique—
the Cahorra Bassa power plant and the
Mozal aluminum smelter. In the model,
these projects are envisioned to work like
enclaves in the economy. As a result some
labor income and royalties flow to domestic
agents. It is also assumed, however, that all
intermediate inputs are imported, that all
output is exported, and that profits are fully
repatriated by foreign owners. With the
large projects assumed to function as en-
claves, it is possible to run simulations with
and without them. Accordingly, separate
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103The combined SAM framework for the real and financial sector of the merged model proves much more im-
portant in relation to the creation of a dynamic CGE model in the Chapter 13. Accordingly, the financial sub-
SAM provides a complete roadmap on how to incorporate the financial sector of the merged model into the
framework of a dynamic CGE model based on the static CGE model presented in Chapter 6.
104Apart from providing a check on parameter values in the merged model, the inclusion of 1995 as a base year
is essential for the dynamic CGE modeling exercise presented in Chapter 13 of this volume. Accordingly, the
1995 SAM data set provides structural details that are not available from other data sources.
105Details on the construction of the 1995-97 base-year data set within the combined SAM framework are in
Jensen (1999). Data differ slightly because of the inclusion of updated numbers.variables are included for projected im-
ports, exports, and investment by the large
projects (ENCM, ENCX, and ENCIV). Ad-
ditional value-added flowing from the large
projects toward domestic economic agents
(MADD) is assumed to be spent between
consumption and investment according to
the fixed marginal propensities to consume
and invest. The assumption that all output is
exported implies that the large projects have
a positive impact on foreign currency in-
flows. Nevertheless, the increased access to
foreign currency is assumed to be spent on
increased imports, leaving the level of for-
eign currency reserves unaffected by the
large projects. Finally, the expenditures by
large projects on investment goods and im-
ported production inputs are financed by
foreign capital inflows (NTRENC), while
profits are fully repatriated (NFPENC).
Finally, the closure of the simulation
model includes the exogenous specification
of growth paths for several variables, in-
cluding real GDP and most price indices.
The specific growth paths of the exogenous
variables are fully described in relation to
the individual scenarios. However, instead
of specifying the development of the gov-
ernment net foreign debt exogenously, a
technical relationship is introduced that re-
lates the foreign debt of the government to
the level of foreign currency exports. This
technical relationship is based on consider-
ations that were made before the HIPC ini-
tiative negotiations in late 1999. At that
time, the expectation was that that initiative
would reduce the government net foreign
debt to around 200 percent of foreign cur-
rency export earnings. This translates into a
ratio of 2.0 in terms of the technical rela-
tionship.
The calibration of the model parameters
to the 1995–97 base-year data implies that
parameter values change over time (Table
12.1). The nine parameters in the current
version of the merged model number one
less than the parameters included in the
original merged model. The difference in
the number of parameters is a result of a
change made to the price equation, where
the fixed weighting parameter has been re-
placed by endogenously determined ab-
sorption shares. The private propensity to
save (B) is derived from the ratio of private
nominal consumption to disposable in-
come. The increasing private propensity to
save over the years reflects the relatively
strong growth in GDPduring 1995–97. The
parameter relating changes in foreign ex-
change reserves to changes in imports (D)
varied significantly over the base-year pe-
riod. It follows that foreign exchange re-
serves increased markedly, while the bill in
foreign currency of imports actually de-
creased somewhat.
The parameter relating government net
foreign debt to exports (G) remained rela-
tively high over the base-year period. The
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Table 12.1  Parameter values for the merged model, 1995–97
Value
Parameter Symbol 1995 1996 1997
Private propensity to save B 0.10 0.12 0.17
Ratio of ∆R to ∆M D 1.21 -4.82 -10.51
Ratio of NFDG to XPI*X G 13.90 11.95 12.40
Marginal effect of GDP on IV κ0 0 0.29 0.18 0.09
Incremental capital-output ratio κ1 1 2.00 2.00 2.00
Constant in import function α0 0 -0.72 -0.93 -1.15
GDP elasticity of imports α1 1 1.00 1.00 1.00
RER elasticity of imports α2 2 -1.00 -1.00 -1.00
Velocity V 3.66 3.57 2.41
Source: Author’ merged model.130 CHAPTER 12
decline in the ratio between 1995 and 1996
is a result of a relatively strong, concurrent
increase in foreign currency exports. The
private foreign debt increased moderately
in percentage terms throughout the base-
year period. The investment function has
two parameters (κ0 and κ1). It is therefore
necessary to assume a value for one of the
parameters—in this case the incremental
capital-output ratio (κ1)—while the other
parameter (κ0) is residually determined. As-
suming that the incremental capital–output
remained at a constant level, it follows that
the marginal effect of GDP on total invest-
ment declined strongly. The relatively
strong growth in recent years was accompa-
nied by declining or unchanged real invest-
ment expenditures, implying that produc-
tion efficiency increased markedly.
Since the import function includes three
parameters, it was decided to assume values
for the GDP and real exchange rate elastic-
ities of the imports (α1 and α2), and to let
the constant of the import function (α0) be
residually determined. The declining value
of α0 reflects the import compression that
characterizes the base-year period. Finally,
the velocity of money circulation (V), de-
rived as the ratio between nominal GDPand
the money stock, declined markedly be-
tween 1996 and 1997. Accordingly, a
strongly increasing money stock led to a de-
cline in the velocity, even in the face of
strongly increasing nominal GDP. The
strong decrease in velocity between 1996
and 1997 suggests that the privatization of
state-owned banks and the simultaneous
stabilization of domestic prices had a quick





The optimistic scenario relies on constant
parameter values over the full simulation
period, 1998–2002 (Table 12.2). Moreover,
parameter values are equivalent to 1997
calibrated values with three exceptions.
First, the ratio between accumulation of for-
eign exchange reserves and increase in im-
ports was assumed to remain constant at
5/12. The calibrated coefficients for the 
Table 12.2  Parameter values for the optimistic scenario in the merged-model simula-
tions, 1998–2002
Year
Parameter Symbol 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Private propensity to save B 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17
Ratio of ∆R to ∆M D 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.42
Ratio of NFDG to XPI*X G 10.99 5.86 2.00 2.00 2.00
Marginal effect of GDP on IV κ0 0 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13
Incremental capital-output ratio κ1 1 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00
Constant in import function α0 0 -1.15 -1.15 -1.15 -1.15 -1.15
GDP elasticity of imports α1 1 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
RER elasticity of imports α2 2 -1.00 -1.00 -1.00 -1.00 -1.00
Velocity V 2.41 2.41 2.41 2.41 2.41
Source: Author’ merged model.
106The level of the velocity parameter is very low for a developing country. Two explanations are possible: The
money stock includes some longer term loans that ought to have been excluded, or nominal GDP is underesti-
mated. In the view of the authors, the latter explanation is the most likely. While longer-term loans are very un-
common in Mozambique, nominal GDP was revised upward in late 1999.period 1995–97 were very much influenced
by temporary possibilities for import substi-
tution and significant reserve accumulation
following monetary stabilization. They
were therefore not reasonable for use in
simulations. Instead, the chosen parameter
value reflected the government objective
that foreign exchange reserves should cover
five months of import expenditures in the
medium to longer term.
Second, variations in the technical coef-
ficient relating the foreign debt of the gov-
ernment to export earnings are based on in-
formation on the (then) expected future
path of government net foreign debt with-
out the HIPC initiative (IMF 1998), and the
expectation that the initiative would lower
the government net foreign debt to 200 per-
cent of export earnings around mid-1999.
Third, the parameter that measures the mar-
ginal impact of GDP on investment in the
investment function (κ0) was changed. Un-
changed real investment and increasing
growth over the base-year period set the
background for the apparent increase in
production efficiency. At an unchanged
capital–output ratio of 2.0, this implied that
the depreciation rate declined from 14.3
percent in 1995 to a mere 4.4 percent in
1997. Such a sharp drop in the depreciation
rate is clearly unreasonable and reflects that
the capital–output ratio improved some-
what as well.
The improvement in production effi-
ciency was the net result of the privatization
and restructuring of public enterprises, 
recovery-induced improvements of capac-
ity utilization in private companies, and
good weather conditions favoring agricul-
ture and related sectors. These conditions
relate to the recovery and structural adjust-
ment years, but they cannot be expected to
have a similar effect on the relationship be-
tween investment and growth over the sim-
ulation period. Accordingly, κ0 was as-
sumed to remain fixed at the average of the
1996–97 calibrated values for the duration
of the simulation period. This implies a
constant 6.7 percent depreciation rate of
capital over the simulation period at a con-
stant capital-output ratio of 2.0.
Finally, both the private savings rate and
the velocity of money circulation were
fixed at their 1997 level.
107 The same goes
for the scale parameter in the import func-
tion. Substantial import substitution in key
parts of the economy, including agriculture
and agricultural processing, was not ex-
pected to continue.
Closure of the model. The closure of the
model implies that growth paths must be
specified exogenously for real exports and
GDP. The exogenously imposed growth
paths for sectoral GDPand exports, exclud-
ing large projects, implied that export
growth rates remain 3 to 4 percent higher
than GDP growth rates. Accordingly, GDP
growth rates averaged 9.3 to 9.5 percent an-
nually, while export growth rates averaged
12.2 to 13.8 percent. The inclusion of large
projects as enclaves necessitated the inclu-
sion of estimates of enclave investment ex-
penditures and import demand, remunera-
tions to domestic laborers employed by
large projects, and the associated repatria-
tion of profits by foreign owners. Since the
current modeling exercise concentrates on
the increasing electricity production by the
Cahorra Bassa dam and the phasing-in of
the Mozal aluminum smelter, estimates of
income and expenditures were readily ob-
tained from the Government of Mozam-
bique (1998). These estimates implied that
the Mozal aluminum project would have a
significant effect on aggregate imports and
exports, as well as on aggregate investment
expenditures during the construction period
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107As discussed above, the velocity is potentially underestimated. This implies that further noninflationary ex-
pansion of the money stock may be possible. However, such a scenario was not considered appropriate on the
basis of currently available data.132 CHAPTER 12
1998–2000. The effect on aggregate GDP
would be more moderate.
The three different exogenous prices
and the exchange rate were set to increase
so as to leave the external terms-of-trade
virtually unchanged. Accordingly, while the
GDP deflator and the world market import
and export prices were set to increase by 5
and 3 percent annually, respectively, the ex-
change rate was set to depreciate by 2 per-
cent annually. Government tax revenue was
assumed to grow in line with nominal GDP,
but government transfers (to households)
were only assumed to increase in line with
the GDP deflator. Furthermore, net foreign
transfers to the government (that is, aid in-
flows) were set to increase modestly at 3
percent annually, implying that government
investment expenditures could be allowed
to expand at 6 percent annually. Aid inflows
into the NGO budget were presumed to re-
main constant in terms of U.S. dollars, as
were net factor payments from abroad.
Simulations for the goods market. De-
spite the respectable growth that character-
ized the recovery process, low income lev-
els persisted thereafter, particularly in rural
areas, and many structural problems remain
to be addressed effectively. Accordingly,
poverty remains widespread and food secu-
rity issues remain important in determining
the structure of agricultural production.
Furthermore, in the late 1990s, the govern-
ment budget was squeezed to a bare mini-
mum to attain balance and comply with the
conditions of donor countries. It follows, as
discussed elsewhere in this report, that
Mozambique needs a broad-based growth
plan to raise the income for the majority of
the population, who live in rural areas. This
process must, at the same time, increase
government income through goods taxes—
the only feasible means of raising revenue.
In any case, the basic premise for the simu-
lations is that the successful stabilization of
the 1990s paved the way for the economy to
move toward a sustainable growth path. For
this reason, reasonably fast growth was ex-
pected over the simulation horizon (Table
12.3).
The sectoral GDP data indicate that real
GDP growth was high in the agricultural
sector up until 1997 (Table 12.4). The 
high growth rates reflect both the end to
Table 12.3  Growth in the material balance for the merged-model simulations, 1995–2002
Growth rate (percentage)
Variable Symbol 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Consumption C -4.0 3.6 8.8 9.4 8.8 8.2 8.1 8.3
Private consumption CP 24.7 4.3 6.8 9.0 8.8 8.9 9.1 9.2
Government consumption CG -51.1 -4.2 34.2 15.5 11.6 5.4 3.5 3.8
Nongovernmental organization 
Consumption CN -75.3 10.9 -11.1 -2.9 -2.9 -2.9 -3.0 -3.0
Investment IV 21.0 -10.2 11.7 7.6 7.9 10.0 10.4 10.0
Private investment IVP 73.1 -12.1 2.7 9.3 9.9 13.9 14.4 13.4
Government investment IVG -10.5 -8.0 21.8 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0
Exports X 20.8 19.4 -2.0 12.2 12.7 13.2 13.7 13.8
Imports M 3.0 -7.6 -3.3 9.3 9.1 9.2 9.4 9.5
GDP GDP 4.3 7.1 12.5 9.4 9.2 9.3 9.4 9.5
Consumption, including large projects CTOT -4.0 3.6 8.8 10.5 9.0 8.0 7.7 8.3
Investment, including large projects IVTOT 21.0 -10.2 11.7 55.0 14.5 0.0 -20.3 9.9
Exports, including large projects XTOT 20.8 19.4 -2.0 23.5 14.4 22.4 53.3 7.5
Imports, including large projects MTOT 3.0 -7.6 -3.3 54.4 15.1 2.8 -5.6 7.3
GDP, including large projects GDPTOT 4.3 7.1 12.5 11.8 9.7 9.6 11.8 9.0
Source: Authors’ merged-model simulations.hostilities and recovery from the devastat-
ing effects of the 1992 drought. Further
possibilities for recovery-induced growth
were nevertheless limited, because such
high growth rates could not be expected to
continue. Accordingly, the GDPgrowth rate
for the agricultural sector was assumed to
decline gradually during the simulation pe-
riod. In contrast, the industry sector was as-
sumed to experience high growth over the
simulation period. As previously discussed,
this sector was particularly depressed dur-
ing the war because of lack of intermediate
input supplies and devastated distribution
networks, and hence was privatized and re-
structured.
The service sector is naturally a large
contributor to GDP. In the model, this is as-
sumed to continue as the integration of the
economy proceeds, and as Mozambique es-
tablishes stronger trade relationships with
the surrounding region. Altogether the agri-
culture and service sector shares of GDP
were projected to fall to 27 and 45 percent,
respectively, in 2002, while the industry
sector share was projected to increase to 28
percent.
Overall, annual GDP growth was pro-
jected to remain reasonably constant, at
around 9.3 to 9.5 percent, over the simula-
tion horizon. Taking the income earnings
flowing from the large projects of Cahorra
Bassa and Mozal into account GDP growth
rates were projected to increase by 1 per-
cent to 4 percent over the simulation period.
Domestic income flowing from the large
projects was based on estimates of income
generation from employment of domestic
labor and expenditure outlays on domesti-
cally produced goods for investment pur-
poses. Nevertheless, it was assumed that the
majority of large project earnings would be
repatriated by foreign capital owners. This
is reflected in the similarity of the con-
sumption growth rates with and without
large projects (Table 12.3).
A lack of penetration of export markets
appeared to have been a key reason for the
mixed export experience in the mid-1990s.
Yet, the small agricultural exports increased
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Table 12.4  Growth in sectoral GDP for the merged-model simulations, 1995–2002
Growth rate (percentage)
Variable Symbol 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Agriculture GDP AGDP 22.0 12.3 8.6 8.0 7.0 6.0 5.0 5.0
Industry GDP IGDP 13.3 10.8 22.9 11.0 11.0 12.0 13.0 13.0
Service GDP SGDP -6.3 2.5 8.1 9.0 9.0 9.0 9.0 9.0
GDP GDP 4.3 7.1 12.5 9.4 9.2 9.3 9.4 9.5
Source: Authors’ merged-model simulations.
Table 12.5  Growth in sectoral exports for the merged-model simulations, 1995–2002
Growth rate (percentage)
Variable Symbol 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Agriculture exports AX 56.2 -7.7 150.9 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0
Industry exports IX 9.4 31.9 -10.3 14.0 15.0 16.0 17.0 17.0
Service exports SX 29.1 11.7 -5.8 11.0 11.0 11.0 11.0 11.0
Exports X 20.8 19.4 -2.0 12.2 12.7 13.2 13.7 13.8
Source: Authors’ static CGE-model simulations.strongly in 1997, implying that the agricul-
tural share of total exports rose to an esti-
mated 10 percent (Table 12.5). This was in
large measure because of progress in ex-
porting maize out of the northern provinces.
This spurt in agricultural exports seemed
unlikely to continue but, given the low ini-
tial level, reasonable growth rates in agri-
cultural exports were anticipated. Growth
rates for industrial exports also varied con-
siderably over the base-year period, but
they eventually stabilized making supplies
of production inputs more regularly forth-
coming and the prospects for a fast expan-
sion of industrial production and exports
encouraging.
Finally, service sector exports account
for a major share of total export earnings in
the model. Tensions with neighboring 
countries significantly reduced the histori-
cally important exports of transit services
during the 1980s and early 1990s. The end
to sabotage against the rail lines supplying
the land-locked countries of the Mozambi-
can hinterland, and the renewed opening-up
to transit shipments of goods bound for
South Africa were projected to be the major
factors behind export earnings rebounding
in this sector. Moreover, ongoing invest-
ment projects were projected to develop the
transport corridors that run alongside the
major east–west rail lines, and hence the
service sector was projected to be dynamic.
Specifically, sectoral growth paths indi-
cated that the agricultural and service sector
share of total exports would reduce to 8 and
43 percent, respectively, in 2002, while the
industry sector share would increase to 49
percent.
The high export growth rates also im-
plied that the export–GDP ratio would in-
crease for each of the individual sectors as
well as on the aggregate level. The 
material-balance data  clearly indicated that
the export performance of Mozambique
would be significantly affected by the in-
clusion of the large projects (enclaves)
(Table 12.3). Accordingly enclave export
earnings were expected to amount to no less
than 35 percent of total export earnings in
2002.
Despite the remarkable real increase in
1997, the material balance data indicated
that the recurrent budget would remain very
small, with expenditures contributing no
more than 10.2 percent of GDP. The opti-
mistic scenario reflects that expansion of
government expenditures on health and ed-
ucation, as well as those aimed at reversing
the severe wage compression for civil ser-
vants, was a realistic possibility over the pe-
riod 1998–2000. However, a subsequent
expansion of private disposable income
limits the ability of the economy to accom-
modate continuing expansion in later years.
Growth rates for private consumption
vary somewhat over the simulation horizon,
since estimates obtained from the IMF
(1998) indicated that interest payments
were expected to increase relatively
strongly until 2000, implying that effective
interest rates and the debt-servicing ratio
would increase strongly as well. Second,
government taxes were assumed to grow in
line with nominal GDP, while transfers of
government income would only increase
with the domestic price level. This would
lead to a continuous increase in the net tax
burden on the private sector. Overall, these
factors suggested that private disposable in-
come and consumption would only start to
increase more strongly after the increasing
foreign interest payments leveled off after
2000.
Following a significant drop in overall
investment in 1996, increased government
investment expenditures, in particular, were
responsible for the significant rebound of
investment in 1997. In spite of the de-
pressed state of the country, continued high
government investment expenditures to
some extent depended on continued back-
ing from the donor community. It must also
be kept in mind that problems surround the
classification of investment expenditures in
the government budget. The government
share of investment is likely to be over-
stated, while the private share is 
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Table 12.6  Current account of the balance of payments for the merged-model simulations, 1995–2002
Share of GDP (percentage)
Variable Symbol 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Resource balance RESBAL -29.9 -20.6 -15.9 -15.5 -15.0 -14.4 -13.7 -13.0
Export X 18.8 18.8 15.6 16.0 16.5 17.1 17.8 18.5
Import M 48.7 39.4 31.6 31.6 31.6 31.6 31.6 31.6
Net factor service income NETFSY -5.6 -4.4 -1.2 -1.7 -1.7 -2.2 -2.1 -2.1
Net factor payments NFP 2.0 1.9 1.5 1.3 1.2 1.0 0.9 0.8
Private foreign interest payments INFP 5.6 4.5 1.0 0.5 0.7 1.4 1.3 1.3
Government foreign interest 
payments INFG 2.0 1.8 1.7 2.5 2.2 1.9 1.7 1.6
Net transfers NTR 15.4 12.1 12.7 11.6 74.7 66.6 8.7 7.9
Private net transfers NTRP 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Government net transfers NTRG 12.2 8.8 10.1 9.3 72.7 64.8 7.1 6.5
Nongovernmental organization net 
transfers NTRNGO 3.2 3.3 2.6 2.3 2.0 1.8 1.6 1.4
Current account balance CURBAL -20.1 -12.8 -4.5 -5.6 58.0 50.0 -7.2 -7.2
Resource balance, including enclaves RESBALENC -29.9 -20.6 -15.9 -26.4 -27.8 -22.9 -8.7 -8.6
Net factor service income, including 
enclaves NETFSYENC -5.6 -4.4 -1.2 -2.8 -3.1 -4.0 -6.4 -5.9
Net transfers, including enclaves NTRENC 15.4 12.1 12.7 23.6 87.3 75.4 8.3 7.6
Current account balance, including 
enclaves CURBALENC -20.1 -12.8 -4.5 -5.5 56.5 48.5 -6.8 -6.9
Source: Authors’ merged-model simulations.
108Total investment numbers are based on United Nations standards of national accounting (NIS 1998). The total
investment level is therefore reliable. Private investment must therefore be underestimated, since it is residually
derived as the difference between total and government figures.
understated.
108 To correct for these inaccu-
racies, a relatively modest growth path was
assumed for government investment.
The constant 6 percent annual growth
rate in real government investment was
supported by an assumed 3 percent annual
increase in foreign currency aid transfers,
which were included in government net for-
eign transfers (Table 12.6). Since the do-
mestic inflation rate is higher than the rate
of exchange rate depreciation (Table 12.7),
the slow growth of aid inflows induced a
moderate pressure to transfer resources
from the recurrent to the investment side of
the government budget. Nevertheless, since
very high investment growth would be nec-
essary to underpin high GDP growth rates,
gaining moderate government investment
growth would mean that private investment
would have to grow in the range of
9.3–14.4 percent. These high growth rates
are in contrast to actual private investment
performance but seemed plausible given the
stabilization of the economy and the
reestablishment of a reasonable domestic
savings rate. Overall, the investment share
of the government budget was set to de-
crease to 52 percent by the end of period
under study, while the private sector shareof total investment was expected to increase
to 56 percent.
Different paths in consumption and in-
vestment growth in the model imply fluctu-
ations in the consumption–investment ratio,
but the ratio was projected to decrease only
slightly across the simulation period, from
3.0 in 1998 to 2.8 in 2002. The simulations
therefore imply that the composition of ab-
sorption would remain relatively un-
changed. Including the enclaves did not
change this outcome. The consumption
share of absorption was projected to drop
only temporarily during 1999–2000 be-
cause of the huge Mozal investment expen-
ditures. Following the discontinuation of
this expense, the overall consumption and
investment pattern was projected to revert
to normal.
The assumed discontinuation of the im-
port compression leading up to 1997 im-
plied that the deficit of U.S. dollars on the
resource balance, exclusive of large project
resource flows, would worsen gradually
over the simulation period. When including
the enclave projects, the significant invest-
ment-related imports of the Mozal project
were projected to worsen the resource bal-
ance considerably during 1998–2000. How-
ever, this should be seen in connection with
the significant inflow of foreign financing,
showing up in net foreign transfers, in addi-
tion to the enclaves (NTRENC, Table 12.6).
In contrast, huge Mozal exports were pro-
jected to lower the trade balance deficit sig-
nificantly during 2001–02. Yet, the im-
proved trade balance would apparently only
be positive because the outflow of profits as
dividends to foreign investors—included as
a negative item in net factor service income
(NETFSYENC)—implied that the current
account of the balance of payments (CUR-
BALENC) was not much affected.
Simulations for prices. On the basis of
the significant price stabilization that oc-
curred in the later part of the base-year pe-
riod (Table 12.7), it was assumed that the
different price indices would increase in a
smooth and modest fashion over the simu-
lation period. The official domestic infla-
tion target was 5 percent for the years
1998–2000; consequently this was used as
the basis for the optimistic scenario. As-
suming that monetary control would be
maintained and that no major external
shocks would affect inflation, domestic in-
flation was projected to remain at 5 percent
throughout the full simulation period of
1998–2002, which seemed reasonable.
Moreover, world market prices for both im-
ports and exports were assumed to develop
smoothly at a constant 3 percent annual
growth rate. Finally, the nominal exchange
rate was set to depreciate by 2 percent an-
nually over the simulation period. As a first
approximation, the real exchange rate was
assumed to remain stable at around the
1997 level.
Simulations for the balance of pay-
ments. The current account of the balance
of payments indicated that the gradual 
improvement in the ratio of trade balance 
to GDP would be driven mainly by in-
creases in real exports, while the functional
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Table 12.7  Price inflation for the merged-model simulations, 1995–2002
Growth rate (percentage)
Variable Symbol 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Absorption price P 51.0 40.3 7.4 5.1 5.1 5.1 5.1 5.1
GDP deflator PD 51.9 40.9 8.8 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0
Export price XPI 21.0 0.7 1.4 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0
Import price MPI 5.0 5.3 -0.9 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0
Exchange rate E 50.2 25.3 2.3 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
Source: Authors’ merged-model simulations.specification of import demand would re-
sult in a fixed nominal import share of GDP
(Table 12.6).
109 The simulations also imply
that the gradual improvement of the trade
balance would not be transmitted to the cur-
rent account because of an increase in the
flow deficit of factor service income
(NETFSY), induced by interest payments,
and a relative decline in unrequited net
transfers (NTR).
Net factor service payments were pro-
jected to decline as a share of GDP, based
on the expectation that unchanged working
opportunities in the South African mining
industry would depress such payments, and
because private debt servicing was assumed
to increase. A turnaround in government
foreign interest payments based on the as-
sumption that Mozambique would be
awarded significant debt reduction under
the HIPC initiative would only pull slightly
in the opposite direction.
110
Net foreign transfers to the government
sector varied significantly over the simula-
tion period because the assumed debt re-
duction in relation to the HIPC initiative
was implemented as a net foreign trans-
fer.
111 Aside from the initiative, reliance on
foreign aid through net transfers from
abroad was set to decrease to 7.9 percent of
GDP in 2002, in accordance with a key ob-
jective of the Mozambican government.
112
The means for achieving this goal was the
relatively fast growth of exports, which
would reduce the importance of the trade
balance deficit and lower the relative need
for foreign financing through aid transfers.
However, improvement in the trade balance
would not be sufficient to sustain the as-
sumed decrease in aid dependence, as evi-
denced by the increase in the current ac-
count deficit. The GDP deflator, export
price, import price, and exchange rate data
(Table 12.7) show that the large projects af-
fect individual components of the current
account strongly but leave the overall cur-
rent account virtually unchanged.
Simulations for the capital account
(Table 12.8) indicate that the declining cur-
rent account deficit during the stabilization
period created room for the large increase in
foreign exchange reserves, amounting to
slightly more than 90 percent of the value of
imports in 1997. Such a level of reserves is
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109Import demand is determined by a linear functional relationship between the logarithm of imports and the log-
arithms of GDP and the terms of trade. The specific choice of parameter values then implies that the import-GDP
ratio is fixed.
110The government interest payments were projected to fall only slightly during 1999–2001 because of implicit
assumptions about increasing debt servicing, as reflected in the developments of the effective interest rates. 
111The foreign transfers that go toward financing the debt reduction were divided between 1999 and 2000. This
was intended to capture the expected debt reduction in mid-1999.
112This is because of the assumption that U.S. dollar net transfers to government would increase by a mere 3 per-
cent annually, while U.S. dollar net transfers to NGOs would remain unchanged.
Table 12.8  Capital account of the balance of payments for the merged-model simulations, 1995–2002
Share of GDP (percentage)
Variable Symbol 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Current account balance CURBAL -20.1 -12.8 -4.5 -5.6 58.0 50.0 -7.2 -7.2
Change in private net foreign debt DNFDP 19.4 12.8 13.0 2.8 3.1 3.6 3.4 3.3
Change in government net foreign debt DNFDG 5.2 5.3 5.9 4.3 -59.6 -52.2 5.2 5.4
Change in foreign exchange reserves DR 4.4 5.3 14.4 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5
Source: Authors’ merged-model simulations.higher than the government objective of
maintaining reserves equivalent to five
months of imports on a continuous basis.
Annual changes in reserves were therefore
projected to amount to 5/12 of the annual
change in the U.S. dollar value of imports
over the simulation horizon.
113
The government was also assumed to be
able to obtain foreign loans amounting to
200 percent of the increase in exports earn-
ings (excluding exports of large projects).
The significant debt reduction related to the
HIPC initiative around mid-1999, which
was expected to lower the level of the
Mozambican debt stock to 200 percent of
the level of exports excluding large proj-
ects, was also expected to affect govern-
ment net borrowing figures strongly in
1999–2000. The expected developments of
the international reserves and government
borrowing would enable a reasonably stable
evolution of private borrowing. Accord-
ingly, private foreign borrowing was ex-
pected to peak at 3.6 percent of GDP in
2000, after which it was projected to de-
crease slightly.
Simulations for the government and fi-
nancial accounts. The total government
budget was assumed to decrease as a share
of GDP over the simulation horizon be-
cause of modest growth in foreign aid trans-
fers (Table 12.9). Increases in foreign aid
transfers were likely to remain modest be-
cause of general donor reluctance to in-
creasing grants, as well as the stated gov-
ernment objective of reducing aid depend-
ency in the medium to long term. The im-
plied decrease in government income rela-
tive to GDP was not expected to be coun-
tered by the developments in domestically
collected revenue. Ongoing tax reform, in-
cluding the replacement of circulation taxes
with a value-added tax system, as well as
ongoing judiciary and administrative re-
form efforts were unlikely to result in any
major breakthrough in medium-term rev-
enue collection. Domestic revenue was
therefore projected to grow at rates similar
to nominal GDP, excluding large projects.
Altogether, available government resources
were expected to decline compared with
GDP.
The real side of the government budget
simulations indicated that reasonable
growth in government investment and other
components of the material balance would
put strict limits on the possible expansion of
government consumption. Nevertheless,
government consumption was projected to
maintain its share of GDP across the full
simulation period because of the reduced
importance of interest payments resulting
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Table 12.9  Government budget for the merged-model simulations, 1995–2002
Share of GDP (percentage)
Variable Symbol 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Government tax revenue TG 13.1 13.4 14.4 14.4 14.4 14.4 14.4 14.4
Government net foreign transfers E*NTRG 12.2 8.8 10.1 9.3 72.7 64.8 7.1 6.5
Government consumption P*CG 9.7 8.7 10.2 10.8 11.0 10.6 10.1 9.6
Government investment P*IVG 16.6 14.2 15.2 14.7 14.3 13.9 13.5 13.1
Government transfers GT 0.8 1.1 1.4 1.2 1.1 1.0 1.0 0.9
Government foreign interest payments E*INFG 2.0 1.8 1.7 2.5 2.2 1.9 1.7 1.6
Government borrowing requirement BRG 3.8 3.6 3.9 5.6 -58.4 -51.8 4.7 4.1
Source: Authors’ merged-model simulations.
113The change in reserves makes up a constant share of GDP over the simulation period because of the combina-
tion of a constant incremental reserve-import ratio and the import demand specification, which maintains a con-
stant nominal import-GDP ratio.from the expected debt reduction inside the
HIPC initiative. Overall, the developments
of the different parts of the government
budget implied that the government share
of GDP would be reduced to 24 percent in
2002.
Overall, the relatively moderate growth
in investment expenditures implied that the
government borrowing requirement would
increase only slightly, to 4.1 percent of
GDP in 2002. Data on the financing of the
required government borrowings indicated
that foreign borrowing would remain 
important (Table 12.10). Assuming that the
government would have had access to for-
eign loans amounting to 200 percent of the
increase in exports earnings, the govern-
ment would have to rely only marginally on
domestic sources of finance during
1998–2000, and would be able to support
the domestic capital market in 2002. Alto-
gether, nominal domestic credit to the gov-
ernment was expected to remain virtually
unchanged between 1997 and 2002, thus
making allowances for the large concurrent
expansion of private sector demand for do-
mestic credit.
The banking sector’s balance sheet, in-
cluding the central bank, shows that the
money supply was set to grow at the same
pace as nominal GDP(Table 12.11). Never-
theless, domestic credit to the economy was
projected to expand strongly, implying that
government restraint would allow the pri-
vate sector to expand domestic borrowing
quickly.
Pessimistic Scenario
The parameter values for the pessimistic
scenario (Table 12.12) are similar to those
for the optimistic scenario (Table 12.2) for
the years 1998–99. However, the pes-
simistic scenario incorporated a natural dis-
aster in 2000, temporarily affecting struc-
tural characteristics. In general, such a dis-
aster was expected to lower the aggregate
propensity to save, to increase the deprecia-
tion rate of capital and the capital–output
ratio, and to increase the ratio between
nominal imports and GDP. It follows that
the pessimistic scenario is based on the as-
sumption that a natural disaster would en-
compass the destruction of economic infra-
structure. This would increase the need for
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Table 12.10  Government finance for the merged-model simulations, 1995–2002
Share of GDP (percentage)
Variable Symbol 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Change in government domestic credit DDCG -1.4 -1.7 -2.0 1.2 1.2 0.4 -0.5 -1.3
Change in government net foreign debt E*DNFDG 5.2 5.3 5.9 4.3 -59.6 -52.2 5.2 5.4
Government borrowing requirement BRG 3.8 3.6 3.9 5.6 -58.4 -51.8 4.7 4.1
Source: Authors’ merged-model simulations.
Table 12.11  Money supply for the merged-model simulations, 1995–2002
Share of GDP (percentage)
Variable Symbol 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Private domestic credit DCP 14.7 13.7 17.0 17.0 17.0 17.8 19.5 21.8
Government domestic credit DCG -1.9 -2.9 -4.4 -2.6 -1.0 -0.5 -1.0 -2.1
Foreign exchange reserves E*R 14.4 17.3 28.8 27.0 25.5 24.1 22.9 21.8
Money supply MS 27.3 28.0 41.5 41.5 41.5 41.5 41.5 41.5
Source: Authors’ static CGE-model simulations.donor support to undertake investment proj-
ects for reconstruction purposes. Such re-
construction would be essential if the econ-
omy were to return quickly to the strong
positive growth path that had characterized
prior years. Overall, the pessimistic sce-
nario is optimistic in the sense that it as-
sumes that funds for reconstruction would
be forthcoming.
The private savings rate was assumed to
decline by approximately 25 percent. Sav-
ings rates were not envisioned to decline
further because a natural disaster would pri-
marily affect rural areas, where savings are
low. Moreover, given that rural farmers are
helped to re-establish themselves, savings
rates should revert to more normal levels
relatively quickly. The destruction of infra-
structure was assumed to imply a 12 per-
cent increase in the capital–output ratio, as
well as an increase in the depreciation rate
of capital to 12 percent. This indicates that
the marginal effect of GDP on investment
increases strongly, while the incremental
capital–output ratio (κ1) is virtually zero.
Nevertheless, a quick return of a more nor-
mal depreciation rate and capital–output
ratio implied that the investment function
parameters would be close to initial levels
in 2002.
114 The increase in the ratio between
nominal imports and GDP is implemented
through a lowering of the negative constant
in the import function. The underlying need
for emergency assistance was assumed to
be limited to a couple of years, implying
that the import level would return to normal
in 2002.
Natural disaster also affects the finan-
cial side of the economy. While donor sup-
port was expected to be forthcoming, it was
also assumed to remain short of what would
be needed for relief and reconstruction pur-
poses. It was therefore likely that additional
borrowing over and above 200 percent of
additional export earnings would be forth-
coming. Assumed increases in foreign bor-
rowing imply that the debt–export ratio
would reach 250 percent in 2002.
115 In
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Table 12.12  Parameter values for the pessimistic scenario in the merged-model 
simulations, 1998–2002
Value
Parameter Symbol 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Private propensity to save B 0.17 0.17 0.13 0.14 0.15
Ratio of ∆R to ∆M D 0.42 0.42 0.00 0.00 0.00
Ratio of NFDG to XPI*X G 11.00 5.88 2.25 2.40 2.50
Marginal effect of GDP on IV κ0 0 0.14 0.14 0.26 0.19 0.14
Incremental capital-output ratio κ1 1 2.00 2.00 -0.05 1.27 1.54
Constant in import function α0 0 -1.15 -1.15 -0.85 -1.00 -1.15
GDP elasticity of imports α1 1 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
RER elasticity of imports α2 2 -1.00 -1.00 -1.00 -1.00 -1.00
Velocity V 2.41 2.41 2.53 2.65 2.77
Source: Authors’ merged-model simulations.
114The depreciation rate of capital would be reduced to 9 percent in 2001 and to 7 percent in 2002, while the 
capital-output ratio would be reduced to 2.12 in 2001 and to 2.06 in 2002. The functional relationship between
the depreciation rate of capital and the capital-output ratio, on the one hand, and the investment function param-
eters, on the other, is outlined in Jensen (1999).
115Additional borrowing will possibly be on beneficial terms, implying that the effective interest rate should be
reduced in later years. However, this is not included in the current scenario.addition, the stock of foreign exchange re-
serves was assumed to remain unchanged
from 2000, implying that the private sector
would be allowed additional access to do-
mestic credit.
116 This is necessary because
the velocity of money circulation was ex-
pected to start increasing by 5 percent per
year from 2000. The increasing velocity
follows from a gradual acceleration in the
inflation rate, following reduced access to
essential goods and the possible need to in-
crease government revenue through the in-
flation tax. Overall, the pessimistic scenario
includes the assessment that most real ef-
fects of a simulated natural disaster in 2000
could be overcome by 2002.
Closure of the model. In accordance
with the optimistic scenario, government
revenue was assumed to increase in line
with nominal GDP, and government trans-
fers to households were expected to in-
crease with the GDP deflator. Net foreign
transfers to the government (excluding
transfers related to the HIPC initiative)
were set to increase by 50 percent in 2000
and to remain at that level through 2001.
This level of aid transfer was then reduced
by 25 percent given donations for emer-
gency and reconstruction purposes were as-
sumed to be phased out in 2002. While aid
inflows into the NGO sector were projected
to increase strongly—by 50 percent—in
2000 as part of the relief operations, the in-
creased inflows were assumed to be phased
out by consecutive 20 percent declines dur-
ing 2001–02.
Acceleration in the inflation rate is also,
as mentioned above, included in the pes-
simistic scenario. A non-accommodating
exchange rate, projected to reach 11 percent
in 2002, implies a terms-of-trade loss with
negative repercussions on the purchasing
power of export earnings and foreign aid in-
flows.
117 The real appreciations do benefit
the private household sector, where imports
become cheaper. The positive effects on
real imports, are, however, dwarfed by the
heavy inflows of relief supplies and invest-
ment goods.
Exports were assumed to rebound after
a minor decline despite recurring terms-of-
trade losses. While exports were projected
to suffer a minor setback of around 2 per-
cent in 2000, growth was projected to re-
bound 2002, with a real growth rate of
around 14 percent. GDP growth was pro-
jected to suffer a much more serious initial
decline of around 10 percent in 2000. The
simulated natural disaster was expected to
lower agricultural GDP by a third and in-
dustry GDP by 9 percent but to leave GDP
in the service sector unchanged. Neverthe-
less, GDPgrowth rates were projected to re-
bound and reach 14 and 12 percent, respec-
tively, in the following two years.
118 The
large projects were not expected to be af-
fected by the natural disaster. The impact of
the enclaves on the domestic economy,
therefore, was expected to remain un-
changed compared with the optimistic sce-
nario.
Simulations for the goods market. The
simulations for the real side of the economy
in Table 12.13 show that simulations for the
years 1998–99 are similar to the optimistic
simulations. However, after the natural 
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116The level of foreign currency reserves is relatively high compared with government objectives. Accordingly,
reserves could possibly be lowered to help in financing emergency and reconstruction expenditures. However,
the current scenario shows that fixed foreign exchange reserves also reduce the reserve-import ratio strongly. Ini-
tial reductions should be followed by subsequent increases, implying that the reserve stock can be used for tem-
porary financing purposes only.
117The terms-of-trade loss can conceivably come about because the real exchange rate may be overvalued, as al-
ready argued in Chapter 4. The GDPdeflator was assumed to increase by 10 percent and 15 percent, respectively
during 2000 and 2001, while the exchange rate was assumed to depreciate by 5 and 8 percent, respectively.
118For comparative purposes, it can be noted that the impact on GDP is more severe than the impact of the
drought in 1992, while the rebound is of the same relative order of magnitude.disaster in 2000, final demand—including
consumption, investment, and exports—
would drop precipitously, while imports
would increase strongly because of the in-
flow of relief supplies. The decline in the
marginal propensity to save moderates the
decline in private consumption at the ex-
pense of private investment, which de-
creases by around 12 percent. The govern-
ment was also assumed to change priorities
away from investment toward consump-
tion. Government investment was projected
to decline by 6 percent while increases in
both inflows and foreign borrowing indi-
cate that government consumption should
expand considerably—by 30 percent. This
implies, together with a 45 percent expan-
sion in real NGO expenditures, that overall
consumption would expand slightly.
The real expansion of total consumption
may seem counterintuitive. However, the
assumption that the natural disaster affects
only parts of Mozambique implies that
strong regional differences would likely
arise. Consumption would most likely con-
tinue to expand in unaffected regions, while
government and NGO consumption would
have to replace private consumption in 
affected areas. The natural disaster would
generally lower investment and private in-
vestment in particular. Declining economic
activity combined with households using
savings in affected areas and a shift in gov-
ernment priorities imply that economywide
savings and investment would deteriorate
markedly.
Following the initial impact of the relief
operations, NGO expenditures were pro-
jected to return to normal levels in 2002.
Moreover, a strong expansion of govern-
ment investment in 2001 would re-establish
economic infrastructure and lead to a re-
duction in the relatively high capital–output
ratio. Subsequently, government invest-
ment would return to normal levels in 2002.
Private investment would quickly return to
high growth rates, although at a lower level
than in the optimistic scenario. The lower
private investment seems incompatible with
the strong rebound in GDP. However, this
period can be interpreted as a grace period
where high government investment in infra-
structure enables the private sector to take
advantage of spare production capacity.
Both relief supplies and the reconstruction
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Table 12.13  Growth in material balance for the merged-model simulations, 1995–2002
Growth rate (percentage)
Variable Symbol 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Consumption C -4.0 3.6 8.8 9.4 8.7 0.8 6.4 10.2
Private CP 24.7 4.3 6.8 9.0 8.9 -4.7 12.5 10.1
Government CG -51.1 -4.2 34.2 15.6 9.5 30.2 -17.5 17.7
Nongovernmental organization  CN -75.3 10.9 -11.1 -2.9 -2.9 45.1 -24.8 -25.9
Investment IV 21.0 -10.2 11.7 7.5 9.0 -8.9 21.9 -0.3
Private IVP 73.1 -12.1 2.7 9.2 12.2 -11.7 10.4 11.8
Government IVG -10.5 -8.0 21.8 6.0 6.0 -6.0 33.0 -10.0
Exports X 20.8 19.4 -2.0 12.2 12.7 -1.9 9.8 13.6
Imports M 3.0 -7.6 -3.3 9.3 9.3 22.9 1.6 0.9
GDP GDP 4.3 7.1 12.5 9.4 9.3 -10.5 14.1 11.6
Consumption, including large projects CTOT -4.0 3.6 8.8 10.5 8.9 0.8 5.9 10.1
Investment, including large projects IVTOT 21.0 -10.2 11.7 54.9 15.3 -12.5 -16.3 -0.3
Exports, including large projects XTOT 20.8 19.4 -2.0 23.5 14.4 9.0 55.1 6.7
Imports, including large projects MTOT 3.0 -7.6 -3.3 54.4 15.2 12.0 -10.1 0.3
GDP, including large projects GDPTOT 4.3 7.1 12.5 11.8 9.8 -9.7 16.5 10.6
Source: Authors’ merged-model simulations.of destroyed infrastructure were expected to
be supported by increased imports.
Growth was expected to be driven by
the rebound in agriculture in 2001, while it
would be balanced at more normal levels in
2002. The seemingly strong rebound pro-
jected for 2001 was not expected to push
agricultural GDP above 1998 levels (Table
12.14). Even this kind of rebound would
depend strongly on the actions of NGOs
and the government. Because of low agri-
cultural export shares, total exports (Table
12.5) were expected to experience only a
moderate decline in 2000, before returning
to normal levels in 2002. It follows that
total export growth would also return to
normal in 2002. The impact of large proj-
ects is the same as for the optimistic sce-
nario, reflecting the assumption that the dis-
aster would not affect the enclave projects.
Simulations for prices. The data on
prices (Table 12.16) indicate that the GDP
deflator and the exchange rate would start
to diverge from the optimistic scenario in
2000. Accordingly, the disaster would have
sparked an inflationary process because of
increased demand pressure and the possible
need to collect domestic revenues through
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Table 12.14  Growth in sectoral GDP for the merged-model simulations, 1995–2002
Growth rate (percentage)
Variable Symbol 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Agriculture GDP AGDP 16.9 10.9 7.0 8.0 7.0 -35.0 40.0 15.0
Industry GDP IGDP 10.0 12.7 22.2 12.0 13.0 0.0 8.7 13.0
Service GDP SGDP -4.4 2.3 11.9 9.0 9.0 0.0 6.0 9.0
GDP GDP 4.3 7.1 12.5 9.4 9.3 -10.5 14.1 11.6
Source: Authors’ merged-model simulations. 
Table 12.15  Growth in sectoral exports for the merged-model simulations, 1995–2002
Growth rate (percentage)
Variable Symbol 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Agriculture exports AX 56.2 -7.7 150.9 10.0 10.0 -20.0 20.0 15.0
Industry exports IX 9.4 31.9 -10.3 14.0 15.0 0.0 10.7 16.0
Service exports SX 29.1 11.7 -5.8 11.0 11.0 0.0 7.3 11.0
Exports X 20.8 19.4 -2.0 12.2 12.7 -1.9 9.8 13.6
Source: Authors’ merged-model simulations. 
Table 12.16  Price inflation for the merged-model simulations, 1995–2002
Growth rate (percentage)
Variable Symbol 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Absorption price P 51.0 40.3 7.4 5.1 5.1 8.5 14.8 19.9
GDP deflator PD 51.9 40.9 8.8 5.0 5.0 10.0 15.0 20.0
Export price XPI 21.0 0.7 1.4 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0
Import price MPI 5.0 5.3 -0.9 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0
Exchange rate E 50.2 25.3 2.3 2.0 2.0 5.0 8.0 11.0
Source: Authors’ merged-model simulations. the inflation tax. The acceleration in do-
mestic inflation was assumed to outpace the
acceleration in the depreciation rate of the
metical, leading to an appreciation in the
exchange rate. This would benefit the pri-
vate sector in relative terms, since imported
goods would become relatively cheaper. In
contrast, the government and NGO sectors,
which rely strongly on foreign transfers and
foreign borrowing, would be hurt by wors-
ening terms of trade.
Simulations for the balance of pay-
ments. The simulations for the balance of
payments again indicate that developments
would diverge from the optimistic scenario
only after the impact of the natural disaster
in 2000 (Tables 12.17 and 12.18). The dis-
aster was expected to negatively affect the
trade balance considerably during 2000–01
because of imports of essential relief sup-
plies and investment goods, and subdued
exports. The widening deficit in the trade
balance was expected to be financed partly
by increasing transfers to the government
and NGOs, but the data on the current ac-
count of the balance of payments show that
the government would have to supplement
the increased aid inflows with foreign bor-
rowing and stop accumulating foreign ex-
change reserves (Table 12.18). The figures
on resource balance, net factor service in-
come, net transfers, and current account
balance—all including enclaves—again
show that the large projects were assumed
to be unaffected by the natural disaster
(Table 12.17).
Simulations for the government and fi-
nancial accounts. The combined recurrent
and investment budget of the government
(Table 12.19) indicates that the government
budget would clearly be focused on con-
sumption for relief purposes in 2000, while
the focus would turn to investment in the re-
construction of economic infrastructure in
144 CHAPTER 12
Table 12.17  Current account of the balance of payments for the merged-simulations, 1995–2002
Growth rate (percentage)
Variable Symbol 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Resource balance RESBAL -29.9 -20.6 -15.9 -15.5 -15.0 -24.8 -20.1 -15.5
Export X 18.8 18.8 15.6 16.0 16.5 17.8 16.6 16.1
Import M 48.7 39.4 31.6 31.6 31.6 42.6 36.7 31.6
Net factor service income NETFSY -5.6 -4.4 -1.2 -1.7 -1.7 -2.6 -2.6 -2.5
Net factor payments NFP 2.0 1.9 1.5 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.0 0.8
Private foreign interest payments INFP 5.6 4.5 1.0 0.5 0.7 1.6 1.5 1.4
Government foreign interest payments INFG 2.0 1.8 1.7 2.5 2.2 2.2 2.1 1.9
Net transfers NTR 15.4 12.1 12.7 11.6 74.6 85.4 13.5 8.5
Private net transfers NTRP 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Government net transfers NTRG 12.2 8.8 10.1 9.3 72.6 82.2 11.4 7.1
Nongovernmental organization net 
transfers NTRNGO 3.2 3.3 2.6 2.3 2.0 3.3 2.1 1.4
Current account balance CURBAL -20.1 -12.8 -4.5 -5.6 57.9 58.0 -9.2 -9.5
Resource balance, including enclaves RESBALENC -29.9 -20.6 -15.9 -26.4 -27.8 -34.5 -14.2 -10.7
Net factor service income, including 
enclaves NETFSYENC -5.6 -4.4 -1.2 -2.8 -3.1 -4.8 -7.3 -6.4
Net transfers, including enclaves NTRENC 15.4 12.1 12.7 23.7 87.2 95.3 12.8 8.1
Current account balance, including 
enclaves CURBALENC -20.1 -12.8 -4.5 -5.5 56.3 56.0 -8.7 -9.0
Source: Authors’ merged-model simulations.2001. Clearly, the projected government
budget in 2002 reflects the longer–term
trends for the convergence of the consump-
tion and investment shares. The foreign in-
terest payments would not decline as fast as
envisioned in the optimistic scenario be-
cause of increased foreign borrowing.
However, this scenario indicates that the in-
creased interest payments from the addi-
tional debt burden could be manageable.
The projected financing of the increas-
ing requirement in government borrowing
indicates that the government could manage
a natural disaster without putting unneces-
sary pressure on the domestic credit market
(Table 12.20). Increasing aid inflows and
use of foreign borrowing would allow the
government to limit changes in domestic
credit to the government to less than 1 per-
cent of GDP. In terms of the money supply
(Table 12.21), private domestic credit
would drop strongly in response to the dis-
aster. A decision to put a lid on any further
accumulation of foreign exchange reserves,
combined with restrained use of the credit
market by the government, would allow the
private sector to subsequently expand do-
mestic credit even in the face of inflation-
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Table 12.18  Capital account of the balance of payments for the merged-model simulations, 1995–2002
Share of GDP (percentage)
Variable Symbol 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Current account balance CURBAL -20.1 -12.8 -4.5 -5.6 57.9 58.0 -9.2 -9.5
Change in private net foreign debt DNFDP 19.4 12.8 13.0 2.8 3.1 5.5 2.4 2.2
Change in government net foreign debt DNFDG 5.2 5.3 5.9 4.3 -59.5 -63.5 6.8 7.2
Change in foreign exchange reserves DR 4.4 5.3 14.4 1.5 1.5 0.0 0.0 0.0
Source: Authors’ merged-model simulations.
Table 12.19  Government budget for the merged-model simulations, 1995–2002
Share of GDP (percentage)
Variable Symbol 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Government tax revenue TG 13.1 13.4 14.4 14.4 14.4 14.4 14.4 14.4
Government net foreign transfers E*NTRG 12.2 8.8 10.1 9.3 72.6 82.2 11.4 7.1
Government consumption P*CG 9.7 8.7 10.2 10.8 10.8 15.5 11.2 11.8
Government investment P*IVG 16.6 14.2 15.2 14.7 14.3 14.8 17.3 13.9
Government transfers GT 0.8 1.1 1.4 1.2 1.1 1.3 1.1 1.0
Government foreign interest payments E*INFG 2.0 1.8 1.7 2.5 2.2 2.2 2.1 1.9
Government borrowing requirement BRG 3.8 3.6 3.9 5.6 -58.5 -62.8 5.9 7.1
Source: Authors’ merged-model simulations.
Table 12.20  Government finance for the merged-model simulations, 1995–2002
Share of GDP (percentage)
Variable Symbol 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Government domestic credit DDCG -1.4 -1.7 -2.0 1.3 1.0 0.7 -0.9 -0.1
Government net foreign debt E*DNFDG 5.2 5.3 5.9 4.3 -59.5 -63.5 6.8 7.2
Government borrowing requirement BRG 3.8 3.6 3.9 5.6 -58.5 -62.8 5.9 7.1
Source: Authors’ merged-model simulations. induced increases in the velocity of money
circulation.
Conclusions
The optimistic scenario developed in this
chapter shows that the continuation of the
positive GDP growth path after economic
stabilization was achieved had to be accom-
panied by high investment growth. Since
government investment expenditures were
projected to remain somewhat subdued be-
cause of revenue constraints, private invest-
ment would have to bear the brunt of pro-
moting growth. Nevertheless, the private
sector budget was growing slower than
GDP because of the virtual standstill in re-
mittances from mine workers in South
Africa and the assumption that government
transfers would remain constant in real
terms. In spite of relatively modest interest
payments, it follows that private consump-
tion growth would have undercut real GDP
growth during 1998–99. In spite of higher
GDP growth rates, which were projected to
begin to significantly affect gross private
income during 2000–02, high foreign inter-
est payments would have halted the expan-
sion of disposable income. The private con-
sumption share of GDP would be expected,
therefore, to continue to fall throughout the
simulation period. Moreover, this would
give the government room to pursue an ef-
fective pro-development expansion of re-
current expenditures during these years.
Nevertheless, the government budget
share of GDP was expected to decline as
growth started to pick up because of budget
constraints on the revenue side. Given that
any major breakthrough on domestic rev-
enue collection was not forthcoming, the
relative development of the government
budget was expected to be closely related to
decisions of donor countries on aid alloca-
tions. An annual growth rate of 3 percent in
terms of U.S. dollars would have reduced
the relative importance of this government
revenue item, and brought down aid de-
pendency significantly. It would however,
also have reduced relative investment allo-
cations inside the government budget. Aid
inflows were expected to represent the
major financing component of government
investment expenditures. Nevertheless, in-
vestment expenditures directed toward con-
struction of physical and social infrastruc-
ture would continue to make up a large
share of a significantly enlarged pie. On the
financing side, debt reduction inside the
HIPC initiative and continued access to
overseas financial markets would enable
the government to avoid exerting pressure
on domestic capital markets.
The pessimistic scenario moderates the
optimistic scenario in the sense that it in-
corporates a natural disaster in 2000. Such a
disaster would temporarily affect most of
the structural characteristics of the model.
In the initial disaster year, an induced tem-
porary decline in the aggregate savings rate
would be partly compensated for by 
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Table 12.21  Money supply for the merged-model simulations, 1995–2002
Year
Variable Symbol 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Private domestic credit DCP 14.7 13.7 17.0 17.0 17.2 12.8 16.7 18.7
Government domestic credit DCG -1.9 -2.9 -4.4 -2.5 -1.3 -0.5 -1.3 -1.1
Foreign exchange reserves E*R 14.4 17.3 28.8 27.0 25.5 27.2 22.4 18.5
Money supply MS 27.3 28.0 41.5 41.5 41.5 39.5 37.7 36.1
Source: Authors’ merged-model simulations. increased aid inflows and foreign borrow-
ing. Aggregate consumption could presum-
ably be maintained at a reasonable level,
since unaffected areas would continue to
consume more. Strongly decreasing con-
sumption in affected areas would be re-
placed partly by increasing government and
NGO expenditures, supported by increased
imports of relief supplies. Investment in
general and private investment in particular
would decline significantly to release re-
sources for the emergency operation.
In the subsequent year, 2001, priorities
were projected to change in favor of a re-
construction operation that would re-estab-
lish destroyed economic infrastructure.
Continuing high donor support and further
increases in foreign borrowing would be
vital to such government investment expan-
sion. Depending on the support of the gov-
ernment and NGOs, the heavily affected
agricultural sector was projected to experi-
ence a significant rebound that would drive
growth in 2001. Private consumption and
investment were projected to rebound as
well. Nevertheless, the reconstruction of
economic infrastructure would allow for a
grace period, where private investment
growth would be lower than GDP growth.
Accordingly, producers would be able to
expand capacity utilization without further
investment. Finally, the reconstruction ef-
fort was projected to bring the economy
back to its initial positive growth path in the
final year of the simulation period (2002).
Among the more persistent effects of
the pessimistic scenario, the natural disaster
was projected to spark an inflationary
process, gradually worsening the external
terms-of-trade. This would affect the gov-
ernment and NGOs negatively, since they
depend strongly on foreign capital inflows
for financing purposes. In contrast, the real
appreciation would benefit the private sec-
tor, since imports would become relatively
cheaper. Another persistent effect of the
pessimistic scenario is that the government
would increasingly have to resort to in-
creased foreign borrowing. Nevertheless,
given that the HIPC initiative was success-
fully carried through, the current scenario
indicates that the additional interest pay-
ments would be sustainable if the economy
quickly returned to its previous positive
growth path. Nevertheless, the pessimistic
scenario also indicates that this would 
require a decisive move by donors to sup-
port a large-scale relief and reconstruction
operation.
SCENARIO BUILDING: THE MERGED MODEL 147CHAPTER 13
A Standard World Bank–IMF Simulation
Framework with CGE Features
T
he merged model presented in Chapter 12 leaves much to be desired. Bringing the
IMF’s financial programming and World Bank’s RMSM modeling approaches to-
gether entails the explicit inclusion of price indices for domestic and traded goods, but
trajectories for the price indices are exogenously specified. There are no explicit links among
projected economic growth, factor supplies, and total factor productivity; and no attempt is
made to relate behavioral relationships or exogenously specified outcomes to decisions made
by optimizing agents. Finally, distributional issues cannot be addressed. In contrast, these is-
sues are central in the context of CGE models.
This chapter addresses the shortcomings of the merged model by integrating the CGE
methodology with the World Bank and IMF approaches.
119 Thus, a combined SAM framework
is established to form the basis of an integrated, dynamic CGE model with a financial sector.
All variables are defined in Appendix C.
A Comprehensive SAM Framework
The structure of the static Mozambican CGE model formulated in Chapter 6 is based on the
accounting framework summarized by the macroeconomic SAM in Table 5.2. This SAM has
some dimensions that are particularly useful in relation to data handling for CGE models. The
distinction between activities and commodities in the market for goods and services enables
the production and retail levels in the marketing chain to be kept separate, and information on
the specific structure of the “use” matrix of intermediate inputs and the “make” matrix of mar-
keted domestic production to be retained.
The distinction between activities and commodities is also useful for other reasons. First,
it enables accounts to be kept separately for domestic sectoral production, including produc-
tion specific taxes, and for overall sectoral supplies, including other indirect taxes at the retail
level. Second, it makes it possible to retain sector-specific information on the costs associated
with marketing goods in a way that highlights that the costs constitute a wedge between pro-
ducer and consumer prices. Third, it is a convenient way to keep separate account of sectoral
This chapter was written by Henning Tarp Jensen, and Finn Tarp.
119There are various examples of recursively linked frameworks between RMSM and the 1-2-3 model, including
in particular those used by the World Bank and the IMF. For some examples, go to the World Bank’s Website,
http://www-wds.worldbank.org.
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imports and the sectoral use of intermediate
inputs. Imports are included among the sup-
ply of goods in the commodity account
columns, while production activities de-
mand intermediate inputs from the com-
modity account rows. Afinal reason for dis-
tinguishing between activity and commod-
ity accounts is that it makes it possible to
keep separate information on home con-
sumption of own production and consump-
tion of marketed goods.
Detailed accounts for the income flow
from production factors to enterprises and
households are another dimension of the
SAM framework that handles data, which is
especially useful for the CGE model. The
standard CGE model is based on a set of
production functions that functionally relate
sectoral production to sectoral inputs of
production factors. Several factors of pro-
duction are typically included because fac-
tor intensities differ between production
sectors. A standard CGE model also em-
bodies optimizing agents that make sectoral
production decisions on the basis of sec-
toral profit opportunities, and the model ex-
plicitly accounts for the sectoral distribution
of production factors. 
Because of the sectoral differences in
factor intensities, relative factor prices
change with sectoral production opportuni-
ties. Changes in relative factor prices are
important to capture. They imply changes
in the factorial distribution of income.
Moreover, households differ in their rela-
tive supplies of factors, so changes in rela-
tive factor prices affect the distribution of
household income. Finally, expenditure pat-
terns also differ among households, so care-
ful modeling of the income flow from pro-
duction activities to households is impor-
tant. Overall, separate factor, enterprise,
and household accounts are important in the
CGE-model framework. They form the
basis for modeling the household income
flow.
While the distinction between activities
and commodities in the goods market and
detailed information on the household in-
come flow are useful for the CGE modeling
approach, these features are not so impor-
tant in standard macroeconomic models.
Typically, they do not rely on the sectoral
detail available in the use and make matri-
ces of the SAM framework.
120 Moreover,
attention is generally not paid to differential
treatment of taxes, and marketing margins
and home consumption of own production
is not accounted for. Macroeconomic mod-
els typically operate with aggregate income
numbers, where value-added, at market
prices, is distributed directly among aggre-
gate private and government sectors. Fac-
tor, enterprise, and household accounts do
not need to be kept separately in the SAM
framework for a standard macroeconomic
model, which cannot be used for distribu-
tional analyses.
The above-mentioned distinguishing
features of macroeconomic models are also
characteristic of the merged model. In par-
ticular, the merged model relies on an ag-
gregate resource balance, so this model op-
erates with only one goods account. This
shows that the activity and commodity ac-
counts from the CGE-model framework
correspond to a single aggregate goods ac-
count in the merged-model framework. In
addition, the merged model distributes ex-
ogenously imposed income directly to the
government and an aggregate private sec-
tor. The factor, enterprise, and household
accounts from the CGE-model framework
correspond to a single account for the pri-
vate sector in the merged-model frame-
work. Apart from these aggregate accounts,
the dimensions of the real side of the
merged model presented in a SAM 
120As is clear from Chapter 12, the merged model does include some sectoral detail in relation to the specifica-
tion of sectoral growth paths for real GDP and exports. However, such information does not rely on the distinc-
tion between activity and commodity accounts in the SAM framework.framework (Table 13.2) correspond closely
to the dimensions of the CGE-model frame-
work for the MACSAM (Table 5.2).
To arrive at a complete SAM frame-
work for the merged model, the real-side
SAM has to be supplemented with a finan-
cial-side SAM (Table 13.2). The financial
sector of the merged model presented in a
SAM framework can be summarized in
terms of five categorized accounts: domes-
tic capital market, foreign capital market,
private investment, government invest-
ment, and savings-investment balance.
While the savings–investment balance actu-
ally derives from the combined private and
government investment accounts from the
real-side SAM, the remaining four accounts
are necessary to ensure consistency be-
tween savings, investment, and financial
flows.
The private and government investment
accounts ensure that sectoral imbalances
between savings and investment are fi-
nanced by borrowing in the foreign capital
market or the domestic money market. In
addition, the domestic money market and
foreign capital market accounts ensure that
private and government borrowing from
domestic and foreign sources are consistent
with changes in the money stock and the
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Table 13.1  Real side of the merged model
Receipts Expenditures
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.
Production Private Government Government Private Rest  of 
sector recurrent recurrent investment NGO investment the world Total
1. Production Private Government Government NGO Non- Exports Final
sector consumption consumption investment consumption government (FOB) demand
investment
2. Private Value-added  Government Net  transfers Private
recurrent at market price transfers by workers income
3. Government Direct and  Government
recurrent indirect taxes Recurrent
Receipts
4. Government Aid in Government
investment government aid 
budget receipts
5. NGO Aid in NGO aid 
NGO budget receipts
6. Private Private Government Government Net
investment gross savings gross savings investment  capital Total
budget deficit inflow savings
7. Rest of the  Imports Imports
world (CIF)
8. Total Supply for Private  Government Government NGO Private Foreign
final demand income recurrent investment expenditure investment exchange
allocated expenditure available
Source: Authors’ merged model.
Note: NGO means nongovernmental organization; FOB means free on board; and CIF means cost, insurance, and freight.balance of payments.
121 All domestic finan-
cial liabilities are therefore included into the
broad money stock concept that forms part
of the model. The domestic money market
account (Table 13.2) indicates how this
concept of broad money relates to the ex-
pansion of domestic credit and foreign ex-
change reserves.
The discussion above shows how the
Mozambican static CGE model and the
merged model are related. The real SAM
underlying the CGE model can be reduced
to correspond to the real side of the merged
model and hence can be linked to the SAM
for the financial side of the merged model.
In sum, the combined SAM framework
consisting of the real-side SAM (Table 5.2)
and the financial-side SAM (Table 13.2),
makes up a comprehensive set of SAMs for
the two models.
The Integrated Model
In the merged model, the real-side variable
relationships indicate that the difference be-
tween private income and expenditures is
made up of net private savings (SP) and pri-
vate foreign interest payments (INFP)
(Table 13.3). Foreign interest payments are
subtracted from gross savings to arrive at
the net savings that enter the financial-side
variable relationships (Table 13.4). The
A STANDARD WORLD BANK–IMF SIMULATION FRAMEWORK WITH CGE FEATURES 151
Table 13.2  Financial side of the merged model
Receipts Expenditures
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.
Domestic Foreign  Private Government  Savings-investment
money market capital market investment investment balance Total
1. Domestic Change  in Change  in
money market broad money money demand
2. Foreign capital  Change in foreign Current Change in
market exchange reserves account deficit foreign assets
3. Private Change in private Change in the
investment domestic credit private foreign Private savings Demand for 
debt plus revolution private assets
of foreign exchange
reserves
4. Government Change in Change in the  Government  Demand for 
investment government  government  savings plus net  government
domestic credit foreign debt foreign transfers assets
5. Savings– Private Government Total
investment investment investment investment
balance expenditures expenditures
6. Total Change in  Change in  Supply of  Supply of Total
money supply foreign liabilities private assets government assets savings
Source: Authors’ merged model.
121The framework does not include any domestic capital market for longer-term domestic borrowing. This sim-
plification is based on the observation that the Mozambican capital market is very thin.152 CHAPTER 13
same logic applies to the government in-
vestment account. Foreign interest pay-
ments do not explicitly enter the savings–
investment balance in the financial sector of
the merged model. In an accounting sense,
they net out in the aggregation of the private
and government investment accounts. Nev-
ertheless, the foreign interest payments are
accounted for implicitly in the current ac-
count (CURBAL).
The definitional relationship between
increasing broad money (MD) and increas-
ing domestic credit (DCP and DCG) and
foreign exchange reserves (E*R) follows
from the domestic money market account.
Since broad money is an asset of the private
sector only, the model assigns all seignior-
age to the government sector. Intersectoral
interest payments between the private and
government sectors in relation to domestic
credit taking are not included in the model.
The allocation of credit is not an issue at the
current level of aggregation in the merged
model.
122 This is because the government
has privatized all commercial banking ac-
tivities and because the government takes
little domestic credit.
The sources of broad money expansion
also include the accumulation of foreign ex-
change reserves. The domestic currency
value of reserves can change either from the
building-up of foreign currency reserves
122Clearly, interest rates in both formal and informal markets are high and important for credit allocation between
private sector agents in Mozambique. This issue disappears with an aggregate private sector.
Table 13.3  Real-side variables in the merged model
Receipts Expenditures
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.
Production Private Government Government Rest  of 
sector recurrent recurrent investment NGO Capital the world Total
1. Production P*CP P*CG P*IVG P*CN P*IVP E*XPI*X Net commodity 
demand
2. Private sector GDP GT E*(NFP+  Private
NTRP) income
3. Government TG Government
recurrent recurrent
receipts
4. Government E*(NTRG– Government
investment INFG) aid receipts
5. NGO E*NTRNGO NGO aid 
receipts
6. Capital SP+E*IN SG+ E*INFG – BRG-SG E*(–INFP– Total
FP – E*INFG CURBAL) savings
7. Rest of   E*MPI*M Imports
the world
8. Total Net Private Government Government NGO Private Foreign
commodity income recurrent investment expenditure investment exchange
supply allocated expenditure available
Source: Authors’ merged-model. 
Note: See Appendix C for definitions of variables. NGO means nongovernmental organization.(R) or from changes in the exchange rate
(E). In the merged model, the revaluation of
foreign exchange reserves is assumed to fall
into the hands of the private sector. A de-
preciating exchange rate generates private
income from this source. Together with pri-
vate and government foreign borrowing
(NFDP and NFDG), the revaluation of for-
eign exchange reserves help to finance the
deficit on the balance of payments.
Because some of the accounts on the
real side of the merged model map into
multiple accounts in the SAM framework
for the CGE model, problems might arise in
relating the financial sector of the merged
model to the real sector in the CGE model
(Table 13.5). However, this does not repre-
sent a problem with the current models. The
investment accounts in the merged-model
framework (Table 13.3) and in the CGE-
model framework (Table 13.5) are almost
similar in dimensions. The aggregation into
one private sector account implies that en-
terprise and household savings (ENTSAV
and HHSAV) are aggregated into gross sav-
ings in the merged model. This in turn im-
plies that an equation has to be added in the
integration of the two models that defines
private net savings as the difference be-
tween the sum of enterprise and household
savings, and private interest payments.
Altogether, the two SAM frameworks
also show that simple relationships exist
among the financial sector variables from
the merged model and the real sector vari-
ables in the CGE model. First, enterprise
and household savings in the CGE model
add up to net private savings plus private
net foreign interest payments in the merged
model. Second, recurrent government sav-
ings (GRESAV) in the CGE model represent
gross government savings, and add up to
net government savings plus government
net foreign interest payments in the merged-
model framework. Third, foreign aid 
inflows into the government budget 
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Table 13.4  Financial-side variables in the merged model
Receipts Expenditures
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.
Domestic Foreign  Private Government  Savings–investment
money market capital market investment investment balance Total
1. Domestic MD Money
money market demand
2. Foreign capital  (E*R) –E*CURBAL Demand for
market foreign currency
3. Private DCP E*NFDP+ SP Demand for 
investment E*R(–1) private assets
4. Government DCG E*NFDG SG + E*NTRG Demand for
investment government
assets
5. Savings– P*IVP P*IVG Total
investment investment
balance
6. Total Money Supply Supply Supply Total
supply of foreign of private of government savings
currency assets assets
Source: Authors’ merged-model. 
Note: See Appendix C for definitions of variables. NGO means nongovernmental organization.154 CHAPTER 13
(FAIDGIN) in the CGE model are net of
foreign interest payments, so this flow
amounts to the difference between net unre-
quited transfers to the government (NTRG)
and government net interest payments in
the merged model. Fourth, the foreign sav-
ings inflow into the private investment ac-
count (FSAV) in the CGE model is net of in-
terest payments and therefore adds up to the
difference between the current account
deficit (-CURBAL) and private net foreign
interest payments in the merged model.
Fifth, the deficit on the government invest-
ment budget (-GINSAV) in the CGE model
maps into the difference between the over-
all government borrowing requirement
(BRG) and gross savings on the recurrent
budget.
Four of the five relationships between
variables in the investment accounts of the
CGE model and the merged model outlined
above are fundamental for the integration of
the two models. The government borrowing
requirement does not need to be defined ex-
plicitly in the integrated model, but two
other relationships do need to be estab-
lished between variables in the merged
model and the CGE model: foreign aid in-
flows into the NGO budget (FAIDNGO) in
the CGE model are equivalent to net trans-
fers to NGOs (NTRNGO) in the merged
model; and remittances (REMIT) in the
CGE model are equivalent to net factor
payments (NFP) in the merged model. Net
transfers to privates (NTRP) are zero
throughout the base years and the simula-
tion period. In sum, six relationships among
variables in the CGE and merged model
need to be established to integrate the fi-
nancial sector from the merged model with
the real sector from the CGE model.
Once these six relationships have been
established, they are supplemented by four
equations to ensure that the accounting
identities included in the SAM financial
framework are fulfilled (Table 13.4). Ac-
cordingly, borrowing in the domestic
money market and in the foreign capital
market is consistent with the money stock
and the balance of payments. Moreover, im-
balances between savings and investment
are financed both in the private and govern-
ment sectors. The accounting identity defin-
ing the savings–investment balance in the
merged model does not need to be included,
since it amounts to the sum of the private
and government investment accounts in the
CGE model.
In addition to the 10 consistency rela-
tionships already defined, the financial sec-
tor of the integrated model is characterized
by 5 more relationships. Two of these rela-
tionships define private and government
foreign interest payments from their net
foreign debt in the previous period. Finally,
3 technical and behavioral relationships
close the model. The first defines the gov-
ernment net foreign debt as a fixed share of
export earnings. This is a technical relation-
ship that allows the analyst to implement
the assumed impact of the HIPC initiative
in a simple way.
123 The second behavioral
relationship defines the accumulation of
foreign exchange reserves as a linear func-
tion of changes in import expenditures. This
specification tracks government objectives
regarding the level of foreign exchange re-
serves.
124 The third behavioral relationship
defines the demand for money from a sim-
ple quantity equation specification. Alto-
gether, 15 equations are needed to integrate
the financial sector of the merged model
with the CGE model.
Simulations with the merged model 
are driven by exogenously specified 
growth paths for GDP and exports without
123At the time of writing, the HIPC initiative was assumed to reduce the government net foreign debt to 200 per-
cent of aggregate export earnings in mid-1999.
124The government objective is to maintain foreign exchange reserves at a level that can finance five months of






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.considering the accumulation of factor
stocks and productivity change.
125 How-
ever, this is not the case in the static CGE
model where GDP growth is driven by the
accumulation of factor supplies and total
factor productivity growth, while exports
are determined by GDP growth and relative
prices.
To turn the static CGE model into a dy-
namic model, it is therefore necessary to
specify updating formulas for the factor
supplies that drive growth. Simple updating
formulas with fixed growth rates were in-
cluded for the updating of labor supplies. In
contrast, the updating formula for the capi-
tal stock was related to total investment ex-
penditures in the previous period. This for-
mulation implies that government and pri-
vate investment are added to the capital
stock (after depreciation), which is subse-
quently allocated among production activi-
ties. However, the formulation suffers from
a problem with units. The factor supplies
are defined in terms of value-added, while
investment is defined in terms of ordinary
expenditures. In the current context this
problem was solved by scaling down the in-
vestment aggregates before adding them to
the capital stock
126 The final step in the
specification of the integrated model was to




The integrated model defined in the previ-
ous section was based on a comprehensive
SAM financial framework. The data needed
for calibrating the integrated model can
therefore be identified from this framework.
However, a financial SAM with the dimen-
sions given here will not provide enough in-
formation for model calibration (Table
13.3). No information is available, for ex-
ample, on the levels of financial aggregates.
This is important, since foreign interest
payments depend on the level of foreign
debt in the previous period. In addition, the
level of government domestic credit typi-
cally acts as a key target variable when
Bank–Fund models are used to make simu-
lations. To capture all variables of the
model, base-year data were therefore organ-
ized inside a spreadsheet.
The real sector of the integrated model
resembles the original static Mozambican
model in most respects. The 1995 real SAM
presented in Chapter 5, which formed the
basis for the static CGE model in Chapter 6,
can also be used as a basis for the integrated
model in combination with a financial sec-
tor data set. It was decided that the forecast
horizon for the simulations should cover
1998–2002, since reliable national accounts
and financial sector data were available up
until 1997. However, the real sector of the
integrated model requires detailed sectoral
information that is only available from the
1995 SAM. It was therefore decided to cal-
ibrate the integrated model to a complete
1995 data set, consisting of the 1995 real
sector SAM presented in Chapter 5 and a
consistent set of financial sector data. The
goods accounts were aggregated into four
production activities including agriculture,
industry, services, and marketing services,
and three retail commodities including agri-
culture, industry, and services. The factor
and household accounts were left un-
changed.
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125Note that the merged model has other dynamic elements, including the relationship between GDP and invest-
ment, as well as financial relationships defining foreign interest payments and the accumulation of domestic
credit, foreign debt, and foreign exchange reserves. The dynamic financial relationships are also included into
the integrated model.
126The scaling factor is equal to the returns to capital. In the current Mozambican context, returns to capital are
assumed to be 20 percent. This is close to the estimate provided in Chapter 6.
127The full set of integrated model equations are in Jensen (1999).A STANDARD WORLD BANK–IMF SIMULATION FRAMEWORK WITH CGE FEATURES 157
The dynamic CGE model is “cali-
brated” by running the model forward to
replicate the 1996–97 base-year data. The
running-forward of the model means that
the value of many parameters changes be-
tween 1995 and 1997. Nevertheless, one set
of structural details does not change as part
of the targeting exercise—the set that de-
fines technologies used in production activ-
ities from sectoral use of intermediate in-
puts and factorial distribution of sectoral
value-added in the 1995 SAM.
128 The SAM
data set implies that production sectors dif-
fer significantly in their relative use of in-
termediate inputs and primary factors. At
one extreme, agricultural production, which
is dominated by smallholder farmers,
stands out as an extremely labor-intensive
sector that uses few intermediate inputs. At
the other extreme, marketing service pro-
duction is very capital-intensive with a rea-
sonably high input cost share of total pro-
duction value. While the industry and serv-
ice sectors require more or less equal
amounts of primary factor inputs, they are
both characterized by high intermediate
input cost shares—exceeding 50 percent of
production values. Indirect tax rates (that is,
production subsidy rates) are also kept con-
stant during the running-forward of the
model. They are, however, virtually nonex-
istent and therefore not important for model
behavior.
Another set of parameters that does not
change during the running-forward of the
model is the factorial income distribution.
This implies that the distribution of factor
income among households differs signifi-
cantly from factor to factor. The majority of
value-added by agricultural labor flows to-
ward rural households—mainly small-
holder farmers—while urban households
receive only slightly more than half of
value-added by nonagricultural labor. Nev-
ertheless, urban households receive the vast
majority of value-added by capital.
The updating of the base-year data is
important, since significant changes have
occurred during 1995–97, especially in re-
lation to the import side, but the domestic
propensity to save and inflows of foreign
capital have also changed considerably. The
targeting exercise does not allow for the
complete replication of all nominal and real
values. The running-forward of the model
allows for the replication of all nominal val-
ues in the merged-model simulations, as
well as real values of GDP and trade aggre-
gates, and foreign currency values of capi-
tal inflows. Real consumption and invest-
ment aggregates, however, are not targeted.
While NGO and government consumption
overshoots by around 6 percent in 1997, the
other major aggregates remain within 2 per-
cent of actual national account numbers.
The targeting exercise relies mainly on data
available from the data set underlying the
merged-model simulations in Chapter 12.
However, sectoral aggregates are also tar-
geted where additional data on national ac-
counts are available. This is important for
the tracking of aggregates of sectoral trade
and GDP of the marketing services sector.
The targeting of nominal and real ag-
gregates over the base-year period 1996–97
implies that certain parameters must be al-
lowed to change. The parameters of the
model can be divided into those that have
been previously estimated, and those that
are calibrated on the basis of data and esti-
mated parameters.
129 The estimated param-
eters include trade elasticities and minimum
consumption levels. While trade elasticities
remain fixed during the targeting exercise,
128The only parts of the production technologies that are allowed to change as part of the targeting exercise are
the productivity parameters.
129The static CGE model underlying the integrated model is based on estimated trade elasticities and minimum
consumption levels for the linear expenditure system. These parameters were estimated on a sample covering
1991–96, as discussed in Chapter 6.the running forward of the integrated model
implies that updating the LES parameters is
important. Accordingly, the estimated mini-
mum shares at the consumption level were
applied to the 1996 household consumption
patterns to update minimum consumption
levels and marginal consumption shares.
The 1996 minimum consumption levels
were subsequently imposed on 1997.
130
The point of departure is to target real
GDP for each of the four production activi-
ties. This is accomplished by allowing the
productivity parameters of the production
functions to vary. Trade aggregates—that
is, exports and imports—are also targeted
for each of the three retail sectors by vary-
ing share parameters of the CET export
transformation functions and of the CES
import aggregation functions. Subse-
quently, foreign savings inflows clear the
external account by targeting remittances
by workers as well as foreign aid inflows
into the government and NGO accounts.
Since implicit world market prices for im-
ports and exports as well as the exchange
rate are also tracked, all domestic currency
flows in the external account are also 
targeted.
With the nominal variables, the target-
ing of nominal sectoral GDP is attained by
varying the velocity of money circulation
and sectoral rates of marketing margins.
Since three different types of marketing
margin rates are associated with each sec-
tor, restrictions need to be imposed on the
variation of the margin rates. It was decided
that margin rates should vary proportion-
ately sectorwise, while the flat structure 
of import margin rates should remain 
constant.
131
Targeting of government tax revenue
was achieved by changing factor, enter-
prise, and household income tax rates
through the inclusion of a uniform additive
tax rate increment.
132 Because government
foreign interest payments are also targeted,
government savings are tracked; private net
savings are implicitly targeted through total
private consumption. A uniform increment
was added to the savings rate to ensure an
equal spread across both households and
enterprises.
With the financial sector variables, pri-
vate and government foreign interest pay-
ments are targeted by varying the effective
interest rates applied to the stock of foreign
debt from the previous period. The remain-
ing financial sector variables can be tar-
geted by targeting the three variables that
are determined through technical and be-
havioral specifications, including the
money stock, foreign exchange reserves,
and government net foreign debt. These
variables are targeted by allowing the coef-
ficients of their respective functional forms
to vary.
Simulations
The integrated model differs from the
merged model as a simulation tool. It in-
cludes general-equilibrium features, such as
price-clearing of goods and factor markets.
The merged model is generally used as a
check the consistency of an assumed
growth path in relation to private and gov-
ernment spending needs and the availability
of financial resources. In addition to these
kinds of consistency checks, the integrated
model allows additional checks on implied
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130This is necessary because no reliable household consumption pattern was available for 1997 at the time of
writing.
131The targeting of nominal GDP through the targeting of real GDP and money demand is necessary in targeting
nominal sectoral GDP for services. This is so since services are not subject to marketing costs by definition.
132The terms were only added to nonzero tax rates. Specifically, this implies that the factor tax rate on agricul-
tural labor remains zero.changes in relative prices, implicitly as-
sumed sectoral growth in factor productiv-
ity, and implied changes in the distribution
of income among households. It follows
that the integrated model allows for other
points of reflection in addition to traditional
target variables, such as government do-
mestic credit expansion.
As noted in the previous section, the in-
tegrated model has been calibrated to target
the 1995–97 data set underlying the
merged-model simulations. It follows that
the initial values for the integrated-model
simulations and the merged-model simula-
tions are basically the same. Furthermore,
the current simulations are based on the ex-
ogenously specified growth paths for sev-
eral variables as part of the closure of the
model. These growth paths are taken from
the optimistic scenario included in the
merged-model simulations, implying that
the integrated-model simulations will
mimic the merged-model simulations. The
current integrated-model simulations can
therefore be viewed as a consistency check
on the optimistic scenario from the merged-
model simulations. Parameter values are
generally fixed over the simulation period
at the calibrated values for the 1997 base
year.
133
The closure of the model implies that
real and nominal GDP as well as nominal
consumption and investment expenditures
by the government are targeted at their re-
spective growth paths in the merged model.
Nominal GDP is targeted by tracking the
growth path for the money stock in the
merged model and keeping the velocity of
money circulation constant. Furthermore,
the model closure implies that foreign capi-
tal inflows in the form of foreign remit-
tances to households, net foreign transfers
to the government and NGOs, and foreign
savings inflows are all targeted to their re-
spective growth paths in the merged model.
The model closure also needs to include a
numeraire price index to determine the
basic price level for each year. The targeting
of both real and nominal GDP at their
growth paths in the merged model implies
that the GDP deflator acts as price nu-
meraire for the current integrated-model
simulations. Both the GDP deflator and
world market prices were targeted at their
growth paths in the merged model.
With the factor market, labor supplies
are assumed to grow at a constant 2.7 per-
cent per year, which is in line with expected
population growth. In contrast, the supply
of capital is updated from a specification
based on a yearly depreciation rate of 6.7
percent and a rate of return to capital of 20
percent. Since the current simulations track
the growth path for real GDP in the merged
model, the average productivity in the pro-
duction activities must be allowed to vary.
This is achieved by including a multiplica-
tive productivity parameter that restricts
sectoral productivity levels to vary propor-
tionately. Since aggregate real GDP grows
at around 9 percent per year and the capital
stock grow around 10 percent per year, av-
erage productivity growth must be around 4
percent per year. This conclusion is differ-
ent from the merged-model simulations,
where productivity growth was not seen as
a precondition for such growth rates. The
integrated model requires strong productiv-
ity growth, since it has to make up for a
slowly growing labor supply.
Capital-intensity of production implies
that industry and service sector GDP grow
around 10–11 percent per year. This is 
qualitatively similar to the merged-model
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133The only parameters that do not reflect 1997 base-period values are the parameters that relate accumulation of
government net foreign debt and foreign exchange reserves to export and import growth, respectively. Govern-
ment debt accumulation is assumed to amount to 200 percent of export growth, while reserve accumulation is
assumed to amount to five months of additional imports.simulations, since growth rates in industry
sector rates are higher than growth rates in
the service sector. However, the merged-
model simulations envision higher growth
in the industry sector and lower growth in
the service sector. The current simulations
therefore seem to imply that the merged-
model growth paths for sectoral GDP are
inconsistent with future developments in
the factor markets.
134 On the other hand, the
simulations may also be taken as evidence
that factor productivity growth should not
be varying proportionately over time. Agri-
cultural sector GDP is reasonably close to
the merged-model growth path, since factor
productivity growth of around 4 percent
and labor supply growth of around 3 per-
cent add up to sectoral GDP growth of
around 7 percent.
In general, the closure implies that most
variables mimic the merged-model simula-
tions closely. This is particularly the case
for the government account, where the
overall government budget, including tax
revenues, is tracked closely. The integrated-
model simulations for imports and exports
also remain very close to the merged-model
growth paths. They only differ somewhat
from the merged-model simulations be-
cause of a small depreciation in the real ex-
change rate of around 1 percent per year. Fi-
nally, because of the technical and behav-
ioral relationships relating the accumulation
of government foreign debt and foreign ex-
change reserves to export and import
growth, simulations for foreign debt and
domestic credit aggregates as well as other
items of the balance of payments develop in
a very similar way as well.
135 Having estab-
lished that the two sets of simulations are
comparable, the discussion now turns to
relative prices and the distribution of in-
come between households.
The relative price developments are
needed, according to the current integrated-
model simulations, to support the optimistic
scenario of the merged-model simulations
(Table 13.6). Agricultural price indices 
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Table 13.6  Price inflation for the integrated-model simulations, 1998–2002
Growth rate (percentage)
Prices 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Producer prices
Agriculture 9.6 8.1 8.1 8.2 8.3
Industry 4.1 4.4 4.3 4.2 4.2
Ordinary services 4.4 4.6 4.4 4.3 4.3
Marketing services 2.8 3.5 3.4 3.3 3.3
Consumer prices
Agriculture 6.8 6.3 6.3 6.4 6.5
Industry 4.2 4.6 4.6 4.6 4.6
Ordinary services 4.5 4.7 4.6 4.5 4.5
Exchange rate 2.5 2.8 3.0 3.1 3.1
Source: Authors’ integrated-model simulations.
134Note that the factor markets are not explicitly included in the merged-model framework. However, they are
supposed to be taken into account implicitly by the modeler.
135For computational reasons, the expected debt relief in mid-1999 is not included in the current integrated-model
simulations. However, since effective interest rates have been changed comparably, this does not have any major
impact on the comparability with the merged-model simulations. The government is still assumed to be able to
borrow what amounts to 200 percent of additional export earnings each year.generally increase faster than goods prices
in other sectors. While agricultural pro-
ducer prices increase twice as fast as indus-
try and service sector prices, moderate price
increases in the marketing service sector
imply that agricultural consumer prices in-
crease at a more moderate pace. Neverthe-
less, they still increase considerably faster
than other prices. The strong agricultural
price increase follows from increasing de-
mand pressures combined with moderate
expansions of agricultural goods supply.
While imports of agricultural goods in-
crease fast, they only constitute a fraction of
total supply. Thus, domestic supply of agri-
cultural products is constrained by the mod-
erate expansion of agricultural labor supply,
combined with the very rudimentary agri-
cultural production technologies. The
widening price differentials in the current
simulations therefore indicate that bottle-
necks can arise in relation to a future capi-
tal deepening of the economy.
Agricultural import prices expand much
slower than domestic prices, underpinning
the strong expansion of agricultural imports
(Table 13.7). In contrast, agricultural export
prices expand at much the same pace as do-
mestic prices, serving to limit the expansion
of agricultural exports. For industry goods
and services, it generally follows that world
market prices in domestic currency expand
faster than domestic prices. The prices in
the optimistic scenario therefore underpin
the expansion of agricultural imports at the
expense of industry and service sector im-
ports. Furthermore, relative prices underpin
the expansion of industry and service sector
exports to generate foreign currency for the
increasing imports. Clearly, relative import,
export, and domestic prices are strongly af-
fected by the exchange rate and the price of
marketing services.
The factor prices reflect the assumed
economic growth during the simulation 
period (Table 13.8). Demand pressures 
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Table 13.7  Inflation in domestic world market prices for the integrated-model simula-
tions, 1998–2002
Growth rate (percentage)
Prices 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Import prices
Agriculture 4.7 5.1 5.3 5.3 5.3
Industry 4.7 5.1 5.3 5.4 5.3
Ordinary services 5.5 5.8 6.1 6.2 6.2
Export prices
Agriculture 7.6 7.5 7.9 8.0 8.0
Industry 6.1 6.3 6.5 6.7 6.7
Ordinary services 5.5 5.8 6.1 6.2 6.2
Source: Authors’ integrated-model simulations.
Table 13.8  Growth in factor returns for the integrated-model simulations, 1998–2002
Growth rate (percentage)
Factor prices 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Agricultural labor 13.7 12.7 12.9 13.1 13.2
Nonagricultural labor 11.6 11.5 11.4 11.5 11.6
Capital 2.4 4.9 5.1 5.0 4.7
Source: Authors’ integrated-model simulations.following the expansion of economywide
income imply that all demand components
expand quickly. Together with factor pro-
ductivity growth of around 4 percent per
year, this causes a relatively strong expan-
sion of factor prices. Moreover, the capital
deepening of the economy during the simu-
lation period implies that labor wages in-
crease much faster than capital returns.
Labor wages increase by between 11 and 13
percent per year, while capital returns in-
crease by around 5 percent per year. The
factor returns seem to indicate that rural
households with high endowments of labor
benefit the most from economic growth.
Thus, rural households experience a strong
income expansion in nominal terms. How-
ever, rural households also have very high
budget shares of agricultural products.
Their cost of living therefore expands rela-
tively quickly as well.
The differences in the growth paths for
factor returns and cost-of-living indices
have implications for the distribution of
welfare among households. This can be
seen from the measures of equivalent varia-
tion (Table 13.9). The relatively strong
nominal income expansion for rural house-
holds is not enough to offset the relative in-
creases in living costs. While poor rural
households do enjoy a significant improve-
ment in welfare, it is smaller than the wel-
fare improvement for urban households. On
the one hand, the moderate increases in the
price of marketing services allow agricul-
tural producer prices to increase faster than
agricultural consumer prices because of the
high agricultural marketing margin rates.
This benefits poor rural households, which
are characterized by a high share of agricul-
tural labor income and high budget shares
of agricultural products. On the other hand,
the intensification of capital in the economy
and the associated increases in value-added
by capital benefit the urban households
even more. While urban household welfare
increases the most, the economic growth
path envisioned in the optimistic scenario
of the merged-model simulations improves
welfare for both types of households
strongly.
Conclusions
As demonstrated in this chapter, the SAM
framework can be used to integrate macro-
economic and general-equilibrium models.
The integrated model used in this study
combines the sectoral detail of the static
CGE model in Chapter 6 with simple dy-
namics and the financial sector from the ap-
plication of the merged model in Chapter
12. If economic growth paths from the opti-
mistic scenario of the merged model are im-
posed as part of the integrated model clo-
sure, growth paths of macroeconomic ag-
gregates are similar between the two sets of
simulations. Thus, the optimistic scenario
from the merged-model simulations ap-
pears quite plausible, even when consider-
ing issues related to factor markets, relative
prices, and income distribution.
The implied productivity increases 4
percent per year on average, which is feasi-
ble at the current level of development in
Mozambique. Moreover, the integrated-
model simulations show that the relative
producer prices change in favor of 
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Table 13.9  Equivalent variation for the integrated-model simulations, 1998–2002
Base income Growth rate (percentage)
Households (100 billion metical) 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Urban households 121.0 8.6 15.7 21.6 26.5 30.5
Rural households 113.0 8.0 14.4 19.8 24.1 27.4
Source: Authors’ integrated-model simulations.agricultural products. Agricultural labor
wages increase rapidly, which leads to rela-
tively strong income growth for poor rural
households. However, the integrated-model
simulations also demonstrate that the opti-
mistic scenario of the merged model may
have undesirable distributional implica-
tions. The strong nominal income growth
for rural households is accompanied by rel-
atively significant increases in rural living
costs. Producer price increases spill over
into consumer prices for agricultural prod-
ucts, so the capital deepening of the econ-
omy, combined with rudimentary agricul-
tural production technologies, implies that
the distribution of welfare changes in favor
of urban households. Against this back-
ground, it appears policies to ensure rural
households can take advantage of increas-
ing access to capital are strongly needed.
In sum, compared with the simple
merged-model simulations of the World
Bank and IMF, the explicit inclusion of
CGE features in the integrated model en-
ables the analyst to focus more directly on
the preconditions regarding factor supplies
and productivity underlying assumed
growth paths. The impact on the distribu-
tion of income can also be derived. In gen-
eral, the integrated model therefore appears
to be a strong tool for identifying potential
problems with strategies for the future. In-
creased detail comes at the expense of more
difficult data requirements, but the growing
availability of SAMs for a wide range of de-
veloping countries shows that in practice
such data requirements in many cases can
be fulfilled without major difficulty. Imple-
mentation of the integrated model as sug-
gested in this chapter is therefore not only
desirable but also a feasible operational pro-
posal for moving beyond the simple World
Bank–IMF framework.
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Lessons Learned
T
his study sought to respond to the fundamental economic development challenges fac-
ing Mozambique, identified in Chapters 2 and 3. After more than 10 years of structural
adjustment, the reform program has essentially been implemented. However, as shown
in Chapter 4, the more-or-less complete implementation of the structural adjustment program
does not mean that sufficient conditions for sustained economic development are in place.
Mozambique remains very poor, and the need for continuing economic development is clear.
The choice and design of an appropriate development strategy is by no means immediately
evident. However, for a country with abundant arable land and scarce human and physical cap-
ital, like Mozambique, the role of agriculture is of particular interest. In keeping with this
study’s focus on agriculture, a 1995 social accounting matrix with significant agricultural sec-
tor detail was constructed. The SAM, presented in Chapter 5, captures two innovative but fun-
damental features of the Mozambican economy: high marketing costs for domestic, imported,
and exported goods, and the significant prevalence of home consumption—particularly for
rural households. While high marketing costs and home consumption are features of many
African economies, there are no other African SAMs, to the knowledge of the authors, that in-
corporate these features.
The key importance of agricultural development emerged from a series of traditional
SAM-based multiplier analyses. Agriculture has large sectoral multipliers relative to nonagri-
culture. In addition, this study introduced a new perspective on the multiplier for value-added
by capital. This new measure indicates that agriculture is generally a more effective use of
scarce capital compared with industry and services. Agricultural commodities with attractive
features for promotion in the short to medium term include maize and rice as well as small-
scale livestock and forestry.
The SAM also forms the basis for establishing a static CGE model in Chapter 6. Unlike
most CGE studies, considerable effort was taken to establish a firm empirical foundation for
the parameter values and structure of the model. Specifically, the study introduced a maximum
entropy approach to parameter estimation for CGE models. The trade parameter estimates ob-
tained using this approach point strongly to the need for development efforts to aid in the trans-
formation of domestic products into export products. Export volumes are highly insensitive to
changes in world market prices. In addition, import substitution elasticities for most com-
modities are low. On the other hand, transformation elasticities between imported and domes-
tically produced primary food products are high. This result is consistent with the expansion
This chapter was written by Channing Arndt and Finn Tarp.
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of domestic food production and rapid de-
cline in imported food volumes experienced
since 1992, following the drop in food aid.
Overall, the CGE model was found to be
capable of explaining many salient aspects
of the performance of the Mozambican
economy in the postwar period, and it was
concluded that the model provided a rea-
sonable basis for further analysis.
The CGE model was first used to ana-
lyze the high level of aid dependency. Re-
ductions in aid inflows were shown in
Chapter 7 to have significant welfare impli-
cations, reflecting in particular the limited
scope for increased foreign borrowing to
cushion the impacts of decreased aid. This
lack of access to financial markets com-
bined with a continuing lack of export mar-
ket penetration and low export transforma-
tion elasticities implies that reductions in
foreign aid inflows, without prior structural
changes in relation to international credit-
worthiness or penetration of export mar-
kets, will be accompanied by forced reduc-
tions in absorption of imported and domes-
tically produced goods. Private and govern-
ment investment expenditures, which rely
heavily on foreign financing, are particu-
larly strongly affected.
It is widely held that the import-
substituting economic policies of the past
led to a significant bias against agriculture.
Chapter 8 demonstrated reason to be cau-
tious about mainstream views when ac-
counting for the low tradability of agricul-
tural goods and the importance of market-
ing margin wedges between producer and
retail prices and associated home consump-
tion of own production. While agricultural
export taxes are relatively unimportant,
given the low level of exports, nonagricul-
tural import tariffs actually increase agricul-
tural production incentives. While this
study does not suggest a return to destruc-
tive import-substituting policies, it does
cast light on the reason why simplistic trade
liberalization policies have often been un-
successful in promoting agricultural pro-
duction and economic development.
The simultaneous inclusion of market-
ing margins and home consumption indi-
cate that the CGE model could be used to
study the interactions between agricultural
development and infrastructure improve-
ment. The simulations in Chapter 9 indi-
cated that improved agricultural technology
and lower marketing margins yield large
welfare gains across the economy. In addi-
tion, a combined scenario revealed signifi-
cant synergies, given gains in the combined
scenario exceeded the sum of gains from
the individual scenarios. The combined sce-
nario also indicated that relative welfare im-
provements are higher for poor rural house-
holds. The magnitude and distribution of
benefits show that priority should be given
to simultaneous improvement in agricul-
tural productivity, especially in small-scale
farming.
An important dimension of the develop-
ment process is the intrahousehold distribu-
tion of welfare gains between men and
women. Using a version of the CGE model
that incorporates risk-reducing behavior
and gender roles in agricultural production,
the simulations in Chapter 10 analyze the
impact of improvements to agricultural
technology and marketing margins. The re-
sults show that agricultural technology im-
provements benefit both men and women in
rural households. Moreover, technological
change in cassava appeared to be a particu-
larly strong lever for increasing female and
overall household welfare, especially when
considering risk. Agricultural technology
improvements were particularly compelling
when combined with marketing system im-
provements.
One of the major risks facing small-
scale farmers is the frequency of droughts.
The impact of alternative schemes for dis-
tribution of food aid in response to drought
was examined in Chapter 11. Clearly,
drought negatively affects total welfare.
Total welfare is least affected by drought
when food aid is channeled through the
government, but alternative distribution
schemes have a more desirable impact onthe distribution of household welfare. Com-
pared with monetization of food aid by gov-
ernment, direct household distribution
strongly benefits rural households. These
results indicate that, when improving the
welfare of drought-stricken rural house-
holds is the primary goal of food aid, direct
distribution of food aid is preferable. This
conclusion would, however, be less con-
vincing if the government were able to use
food aid revenue in a manner strictly tar-
geted to drought-stricken rural households.
The simulations in Chapters 7-11, sum-
marized above, were designed to shed light
on an important set of policy issues facing
the Mozambican economy. It is clear that
the static CGE analytical framework ap-
plied in these chapters is indeed useful in
drawing conclusions of practical signifi-
cance for structural policymaking in the
medium term. Overall, the results suggest a
strong potential for agriculture-led develop-
ment with attractive distributional implica-
tions, provided adequate policy measures
are taken. Moreover, the negative effects of
unavoidable natural calamities can be mini-
mized if appropriate schemes for food aid
distribution are established.
Another critical dimension of policy
analysis, which cannot be addressed with
the static CGE model, concerns budgetary
planning within a medium-term framework.
A set of coherent macroeconomic medium-
term scenarios for Mozambique was there-
fore developed in Chapter 12 on the basis of
a simple merged version of standard World
Bank and IMF simulation tools. Among the
key insights of these simulations was the
importance of debt reduction on a large
scale inside the HIPC initiative and of
Mozambique’s continued access to over-
seas financial markets. This is necessary to
enable the government to avoid exerting 
excessive pressure on domestic credit 
markets. The crucial role of donor action in
times of major natural disaster was clearly
indicated under the more pessimistic 
scenario.
The merged-model simulations do not
provide information on distributional issues
and relative prices. A simple SAM method-
ology for integrating macroeconomic and
CGE models was therefore developed in
Chapter 13. It was subsequently applied to
integrate the merged and static CGE-model
frameworks into a dynamic CGE model
with an aggregated financial sector. The in-
tegrated model represents a simulation tool
that accounts for relative prices and income
distribution. The optimistic scenario from
the merged-model simulations was applied
to the integrated model to assess its impli-
cations. While relative price changes gener-
ally benefit poor rural households, the ex-
pansion of the economy’s capital stock ben-
efits urban households in relative terms.
The integrated-model simulations therefore
indicate that the merged-model simulations
overlook an undesirable—but likely—
distributional impact.
Overall, this study confirmed that the
agricultural sector is key to any satisfactory
development process in Mozambique. Agri-
cultural development has the potential to
achieve the twin goals of growth and im-
proved income distribution. Nevertheless,
this study also showed that the successful
implementation of such a strategy relies
heavily on both appropriate government ac-
tion and active donor support. This report
summarizes what can be learned from mak-
ing better use of available knowledge, tools,
and data systems in one of the poorest coun-
tries in the world. Nevertheless, while the
analyses are specific to Mozambique, the
basic analytical approach is replicable and
could be brought to bear on a series of
countries both within and outside Africa.
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i Shift parameter for Armington function
ad(activ) aD
j Shift parameter for production function
af af Shift parameter for constant elasticity of transformation
(CET) labor function 
alpha(f,activ) ai Factor share parameter for production function
at(comm) aTi Shift parameter for CET export function 
betah(comm,hh) Linear expenditure system (LES) marginal consumption level
of home-produced goods
betam(comm,hh) LES marginal consumption level of marketed commodities
cpiwtsh(comm) Price index weights for home-consumed goods in the con-
sumer price index (CPI)
cpiwtsm(comm) Price index weights for marketed goods in CPI
delta(comm) Share parameter for Armington function
esr0 Enterprise savings rate
eta(comm) Price elasticity of export demand
etr0 Enterprise tax rate
exrb  Base exchange rate
gamma(comm) γi Share parameter of CET export function
gammah(comm,hh) LES minimum consumption level of home-produced goods
gammam(comm,hh) LES minimum consumption level of marketed commodities
qd(activ) Dummy variable for computing ad(activ)
gles(comm) Government consumption share
imake(activ,comm)  “Make” row coefficients
makef(activ,comm)  “Make” flow matrix 
mrd(comm) Domestic margin coefficient
mrdf(comm) Value of margins on domestics
mre(comm) Export margin coefficient
mref(comm) Value of margins on exports
mrm(comm) Import margin coefficient
mrmf(comm) Value of margins on imports
pcb(comm)  Base final consumption price of commodity goods
pdab(activ) Base domestic price
pdcb(comm) Base domestic supply price for marketed goods
pdchb(comm) Base domestic supply price for home-consumed goods
ppiwts(activ) Price index weights for producer price index
pqab(activ) Base composite activity price
pqqb(comm) Base composite consumption price
pqxb(comm) Base composite commodity price
pweb(comm) Base export price
pwmb(comm) Base import price
pvb(activ)  Base value-added price
rhoc(comm) ρC
i Exponent for Armington functionTHE CGE-MODEL SPECIFICATION 169
Parameter Symbol Definition
rhof ρ
f Exponent for CET labor function
rhot(comm) ρT
i Exponent for CET export function
risklow(activ) Lower bound on production for risk
rmd(comm) Ratio of imports to domestic sales
sdistr(hh) Distributed profit shares
sremit(hh) Remittance shares
strans(hh) Government transfer shares
SUPERNUM(hh) Household supernumerary income
tau τ Share parameter for CET labor function
tcb(comm)  Base consumption tax rate
tc0(comm) Consumption tax (+) or subsidy (-) rates
te(comm) Export tax (+) or subsidy (-) rates
teb(comm)  Base export tax
tf(f) Factor tax rates
th(hh) Household tax rate
thmul0 Uniform household tax-rate multiplier
tm(comm) Tariff rates on imports
tmb(comm)  Base tariff rate
txb(activ)  Base indirect tax
tx0(activ) Output tax rates




EXR  Exchange rate
PC(comm) Consumption price of composite goods
PDC(comm) Domestic price for marketed commodity goods
PDCH(comm) Domestic price for home commodity goods
PE(comm) Price of exports
PINDEX Producer prices or GDP index
PM(comm) Price of imports
PQA(activ) Average production price of composite activity 
PQQ(comm) Price of composite consumption goods
PQX(comm) Average production price for composite commodities 
PV(activ) Value-added price
RISK(activ) Risk premium complementarity170 APPENDIX A
Production
Variable Definition
DC(comm) Marketed consumption of commodities
DCH(comm)  Home consumption of commodities
E(comm)  Exports
M(comm) Imports
QQ(comm) Demand for composite goods 
QX(comm) Domestic output of composite commodities 
QA(activ) Domestic output of composite activities 
Factors
Variable Definition
FDSC(f,activ) Factor demand by sector
FS(f) Factor supply
FSLAB Aggregate labor supply
WF(f) Average factor price
WFDIST(f,activ) Sectoral proportionality ratios for factor price
WFLAB Aggregate average labor return
YFCTR(f)  Factor income
Income and Expenditure
Variable Definition
CAPINV Total private investment
CDH(comm,hh) Final demand for home-produced commodities
CDM(comm,hh) Final demand for marketed commodities
CI(comm) Final demand for private productive investment




ESR Enterprise savings rate
ETR  Enterprise tax rate
EXPTAX Export subsidy payments
FACTAX Factor tax revenue
FAIDGIN Aid in government budget
FAIDNGO Aid in nongovernment organization budget
FSAV Net foreign savings
GD(comm)  Final demand for government consumption
GDTOT Total government recurrent consumption
GI(comm) Final demand for government productive investment
GININV Total government investmentTHE CGE-MODEL SPECIFICATION 171
Variable Definition
GINREV Revenue from government investment account
GINSAV Savings from government investment account 
GOVTH Government transfers to households
GOVTE Government transfers to enterprises
GRESAV Government recurrent account savings
GREREV Government recurrent account revenue
HHSAV Total household savings
HHTAX Household tax revenue
ID(comm) Final demand for productive investment
INDTAX Indirect tax revenue
INT(comm) Intermediates uses
INVEST Nominal private investment
MPS(hh) Marginal propensity to save by household type
NGOD(comm)  Final demand for nongovernment organization consumption
NGOREV Account revenue for nongovernmental organizations
REMIT Remittances
SAVING Nominal private savings
TARIFF Tariff revenue
THMUL Uniform multiplier for household tax rate 
WALRAS1 Slack variable for private savings-investment balance
YE Enterprise income
YH(hh) Household income
Yinstp(instp) Private institutional income
GDP and Other Derived Variables
Variable Definition
ABSORB Absorption in market prices
GDPVA Value-added in market prices
GOVRABS Government recurrent expenditure-to-absorption ratio
GOVIABS Government investment-to-absorption ratio




TC(comm) Consumption tax rate
TX(activ) Output tax rate
Other Variables
Variable Definition
FOODAID(comm) Food aid in form of composite commodity
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137Equations A42 and A43 form a single LES and as such could be written as a single equation. They are 
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The CGE-Model Specification
Merged-Model Equations
GDPt = Σi GDPSi,t (C1)
GDPSi,t = (1+γ i,t)*GDPSi,t-1 (C2)
GDPTOTt = GDPt+(ENCIVt+ENCXt-ENCMt)/PDt (C3)
Xt = Σi XSi-t (C4)
XSi,t = (1+λi,t)*XSi,t-1 (C5)
XTOTt =X t+ENCXt/(Et*XPIt) (C6)
IVt = κ0GDPt-1+ κ1(GDPt-GDPt-1) (C7)
IVt =I V P t+IVGt (C8)
IVTOTt =I V t+(ENCIVt+ βt*MADDt)/Pt (C9)
log(Mt)= α0+A1log(GDPt)+ A2log(Et*MPIt/PDt) (C10)
MTOTi =M t+(ENCMt+MADDt)/(Et*MPIt) (C11)
Pt*CPt = (1-ß t)*GDYt (C12)
Pt*(CTOTt+IVTOTt)= P D t*GDPTOTt-Et*RESBALt (C13)
RESBALt = (XPIt*XTOTt-MPIt*MTOTt) (C14)
CTOTt =C t+(1-ßt)*MADDt/Pt (C15)
Ct =C P t+CGt+CNt (C16)
GDYt =P D t*GDPt+Et*NFPt+Et*NTRPt+(GTt-TGt) (C17)
INFGt = NFDGt-1*IRFGt (C18)
BRGt =P t*(CGt+IVGt)+(GTt-TGt)+Et*(INFGt-NTRGt) (C19)
BRGt = Et*(NFDGt-NFDGt-1)+(DCGt-DCGt-1) (C20)
INFPt = NFDPt-1*IRFPt (C21)
CURBALt = RESBALt+NETFSYt+NTRGt+NTRPt+NTRNGOt+NTRENCt (C22)
NETFSYt = NFPt+NFPENCt-INFGt-INFPt (C23)
Rt-Rt-1 = CURBALt+(NFDGt-NFDGt-1)+(NFDPt-NFDPt-1) (C24)
Rt-Rt-1 =D t(MPIt*Mt-MPIt-1*Mt-1) (C25)
Pt = (PDt*GDPt+Et*[MPIt*Mt-XPIt*Xt])/
(PD1995*GDPt+E1995*[MPI1995*Mt-XPI1995*Xt]) (C26)
MDt = (1/vt)*GDPNt (C27)
GDPNt =P D t GDPt (C28)
MSt-MSt-1 =E t*(Rt-Rt-1)+(DCt-DCt-1)+(Et-Et-1)*Rt-1 (C29)
DCt = DCGt+DCPt (C30)
MSt =M D t (C31)
Pt*CNt =E t*NTRNGOt (C32)
NFDGt =G t*XPIt*Xt (C33)
177Merged-Model Variables
Variable Definition
C Total real consumption
CP Private real consumption
CG Government real consumption
CN NGO real consumption
IV Total real investment
IVP Private real investment





GDY Nominal private disposable income
TG Government transfers to the private sector
GT Government tax revenues
BRG Government borrowing requirement
SP Private savings
SG Government savings
INFP Payments of private net foreign interest 
INFG Payments of government net foreign interest 
NFP Net factor payments
NTRP Private net foreign transfers from abroad
NTRG Government net foreign transfers from abroad
NTRNGO NGO net transfers from abroad
DC Total domestic credit
DCP Private domestic credit taking
DCG Government domestic credit taking
R Foreign exchange reserve holdings
MS Money stock
MD Money demand
NFDP Private net foreign debt




XPI World market price deflator for exports
MPI World market price deflator for imports
XS Sectoral exports
GDPS Sectoral GDP
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Variable Definition
CTOT Total real consumption, including private consumption from enclave income
IVTOT Total real investment, including private investment from enclave income
XTOT Total real exports, including enclave exports
MTOT Total real imports, including enclave imports and private imports from enclave 
income
GDPTOT Total real GDP, including enclave income
RESBAL Resource balance, including flows of enclave net resources flows
NTRENC Enclave net transfers from abroad
NFPENC Net factor payments, including repatriation of enclave profits
NETFSY Net factor service income, including flows of enclave net factor-income 
CURBAL Current account balance, including flows of enclave current-account 
ENCIV Real investment by enclaves
ENCX Real exports by enclaves
ENCM Real imports by enclaves
MADD Nominal private income from enclaves, or additional private imports from 
enclave income180
APPENDIX C
Variable Definitions in Chapter 13
Merged-Model Equations
Variable Description
CP Private real consumption
CG Government real consumption
CN Nongovernmental organization 
(NGO) real consumption
IVP Private real investment




TG Government transfers to the 
private sector
GT Government tax revenues
BRG Government borrowing requirement
SP Private savings
SG Government savings
INFP Private net foreign interest payments
INFG Government net foreign interest 
payments
NFP Net factor payments
NTRP Private net foreign transfers from 
abroad
NTRG Government net foreign transfers 
from abroad
NTRNGO NGO net transfers from abroad
CURBAL Current account balance
DCP Private domestic credit taking
DCG Government domestic credit taking
R Foreign exchange reserve holdings
MD Money stock
NFDP Private net foreign debt
NFDG Government net foreign debt
PD GDP deflator
P Absorption deflator
XPI World market price deflator for exports




CD Private real consumption
CG Government real consumption
NGOD NGO real consumption
CI Private real investment
GI Government real investment
E Real exports
M Real imports





GOVTE Government transfers to enterprises










GRESAV Government recurrent budget savings
GINSAV Government investment budget savings
REMIT Remittances from workers abroad
FAIDGIN Foreign aid in the government budget





PE Export price in domestic currency
PM Import price in domestic price
EXR Exchange rate181
Acronyms and Abbrevations
BCM Banco Commercial de Moçambique
BM Banco de Moçambique
BMP Banco Popular de Desenvolvimento
CES Constant elasticity of substitution
CET Constant elasticity of transformation
CGE Computable general equilibrium
CPI Consumer price index
ESRP Economic and Social Rehabilitation Program
ESS Error sum of squares
FEER Fundamental equilibrium exchange rate
Frelimo Frente de Libertação de Moçambique
GDP Gross domestic product
GNP Gross national product
HIPC Heavily indebted poor countries
ICM Instituto de Cereais de Moçambique
IMF International Monetary Fund
LES Linear expenditure system
M1 Narrow money supply
MACSAM Mozambique macroeconomic social accounting matrix
MERRISA Macroeconomic reforms and regional integration in southern Africa project
MOZAM Mozambican social accounting matrix
MPF Ministry of Planning and Finance
NDP National Directorate of Planning
NGO Nongovernmental organization
NIS National Institute of Statistics
OER Official exchange rate
OLS Ordinary least squares
PPP Purchasing power parity
Renamo Resistencia Nacional de Moçambique
RMSM Revised minimum standard model
SAM Social accounting matrix
Semoc Sementes de Moçambique
TSS Total sum of squares
UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization
UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund
VAT Value–added tax
WDI World Development IndicatorsBibliography
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